TASK FORCE 1942

SURFACE NAVAL ACTION IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC™

FREE
David Leadbetter's Greens™ Demo Disk Inside!

MICROPROSE™
ENTERTAINMENT • SOFTWARE

IBM 386, 486, Tandy and Compatibles

2 MB RAM, DOS 5.0 and hard disk required • EMS recommended

VGA/MCGA only • Joystick or Mouse recommended

IBM®, Ad Lib™, Roland®, Soundblaster™ and compatibles

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TASK FORCE 1942

SURFACE NAVAL ACTION IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC™

A Long Lance torpedo rips through the hull of your flagship. Huge columns of water from enemy gunfire surround your battleships. It's just another day in *Task Force 1942*, the first in a new series of spectacular World War II Pacific War simulations from MicroProse.



This is your chance to command a fleet of destroyers, cruisers, and battleships against aggressive enemy forces in the South Pacific.

No detail has been overlooked in this painstakingly researched simulation. Your daily routine will include firing torpedoes into enemy vessels. Issuing commands to ships and convoys. And confronting enemy ships head-on in explosive night battles.

Plus, to really boost your confidence, you'll experience frightening torpedo wakes and blinding explosions so realistic you'll need to change uniforms every time you play.

Task Force 1942 from MicroProse. It's the only way to experience the thrills...and risks...of surface naval combat in World War II.

- Command U.S. or Japanese forces.
- Hundreds of combat ships faithfully reproduced.
- Battle enemies in single engagements or comprehensive campaigns.
- Technical guidance from Vice Admiral William Mack, Gunnery Officer aboard the *John D. Ford* in the World War II Solomons Campaign.

Game Design by MPS LABS

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Actual screens may vary

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
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

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TASK FORCE 1942
Surface Naval Action in the South Pacific™

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
U.S. NAVY
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V
the five Sullivan brothers
"missing in action" off the Solomons
THEY DID THEIR PART

FOREWORD

From August, 1942, to early 1943, the naval surface forces around the island of Guadalcanal battled to preserve or destroy the foothold of the Marine forces fighting to maintain control of the strategic island.

Guadalcanal was unknown to the American people prior to that time, but they soon realized that it was a vital part of the American strategic plan to deny further advance south by the Japanese Army and Navy rapidly pushing toward Australia.

Admiral King, the Chief of Naval Operations, decided that the Japanese advance must be stopped there, the Marines must hold the island, and the Navy must supply and protect them. This was a difficult task. The American forces had not operated together; the supporting carriers were few in number and several were damaged. When Admiral Turner's amphibious force landed on the morning of the 7th of August, the surprised Japanese quickly left the coastal area, and the initial landings were successful. But the Japanese soon realized the vital importance of the island, and their naval forces gathered at Rabaul Harbor to the north and from there began a series of attacks on the American and Australian naval forces trying to protect Guadalcanal.

Their first effort was called the Battle of Savo Island. The American and Australian naval forces suffered devastating losses, but the Japanese failed to follow up their dramatic victory and attack the vital transports lying off the beaches.

Subsequent forays made by the Japanese resulted in the Battle of Cape Esperance, the First Battle of Guadalcanal, the Second Battle of Guadalcanal, and the Battle of Tassafaronga. The American forces continued to suffer severely but gradually learned valuable lessons and began to inflict heavy casualties on the determined Japanese.

◀ *1943 propaganda poster invoking the five Sullivan brothers, all killed when the USS Juneau was sunk following the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal I. (U.S. Naval Historical Center.)*

MicroProse has brought to the student of naval history an opportunity to share in this important campaign. *Task Force 1942* gives the player a chance to experience the problems that faced Admirals Callaghan and Scott and their subordinate commanders. The player can observe the actual progress of each dramatic engagement or can alter the conditions of the battle to suit his own ideas of the proper tactics. It is possible to go to any unit or commander and take over its maneuvers. The game is programmed to respond to your commands using the appropriate tactics that would have been used by the Japanese and Allied captains.

Find out what Admirals Callaghan and Scott saw; change their decisions, and see what would have happened had you been in command.

The presentation of the action is dramatic and accurate. Starshells float down, revealing enemy ships. The flight of friendly projectiles can be followed by their tracers.

Hits and splashes of near misses surround the enemy. Enemy fire produces battle noise, splashes, and hits on the ship you have chosen to command.

After you have commanded in one of these battles, you will realize how the difficulties of lack of specific information, noise of battle, the veil of darkness, and the mistakes of both commanders and subordinates affected the progress of the battles.

Try your hand at command. Can you follow the logic of the actual commanders? Can you do better? Or would you end up at the bottom of Iron Bottom Sound together with Admirals Callaghan and Scott, the commanding officers of the many ships rusting there, and the brave and skilled crew members?

You will find the task difficult, but interesting and rewarding. When your ship is sunk, you can terminate the battle; Admirals Callaghan and Scott and the officers and men of their ships couldn't; they had to fight on and die to preserve your freedom.

— Vice Admiral William P. Mack (USN, Ret.)

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◀ *American sailor manning a torpedo director. (National Archives.)*

QUICK START

THE MATERIALS

This Manual provides a tutorial, detailed instructions on how to play the game, and historical background that sets the context for the simulation. It applies to all computer systems.

The ID Book is designed in the format of a World War II U.S. Navy identification manual. The U.S.N. side describes the warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy; the I.J.N. side describes the U.S.N. Each contains accounts of the eight historical engagements included in the game, as seen from their side.

The Technical Supplement gives specific instructions for your computer system.

The Controls Summary Card lists all keyboard, mouse, and joystick commands, as appropriate for your computer system.

The Map of the Solomon Islands is based on a genuine U.S. Government map of the archipelago. The data in the game follows the islands' real coastlines, so this map can be a valuable navigational aid.

INSTALLATION

The Technical Supplement has complete information about installing *Task Force 1942* as appropriate for your computer system.

◀ *The heavy cruiser H.M.A.S. Australia, photographed on 31 August 1942. (National Archives.)*

LEARNING TASK FORCE 1942

There are three basic approaches to learning how to play this game. Pick the method that suits you best:

1. Play and Skim. You can dive in and try the game, pausing when necessary and referring to the **Controls Summary Card** or this manual. Leave all the Reality Options on their easy ("unrealistic") settings and select one of the simpler historical engagements, such as the American side of the Battle of Kula Gulf or the Japanese side of the Battle of Tassafaronga. Start out just controlling the lead ship, then work your way up to giving orders to the whole task group.

2. Follow the Tutorial. This will walk you through the basics of ship and task group command in a logical, step-by-step fashion.

3. Study. Real naval officers have to learn to do everything "by the book" before they ever see any action. Read through this manual and the **ID Book**, paying special attention to *Commanding a Ship, Commanding a Task Force,* and *Game Options*. Then select an interesting Historical Engagement (or even the full Guadalcanal Campaign) and go to it!

TUTORIAL

■ The purpose of this tutorial is to acquaint you with the basics of commanding a ship and a task group. We have selected a relatively easy scenario, but don't be disappointed if you don't win immediate triumphs. Just take it easy, follow the instructions and watch what happens. Remember, your most important control is "Pause"; don't hesitate to stop the game whenever you feel like it to study the tutorial and think about what to do next.

INITIAL OPTIONS

After passing through the title sequence and credits you will be presented with a series of menus that enable you to select your game and set up its conditions of play. For this tutorial, make the following selections:

Select Game Type: Choose Historical Engagement.

Select Engagement: Choose Kula Gulf.

Select Navy: Choose United States Navy.

Reality Options: Select *OK* without changing any of the options (their defaults are the "easy" settings).

Name Entry: Type in whatever name you choose and press "Enter."

Ship Identification: Here you are shown the silhouette of a Japanese warship and must select the matching name from a list. Flip through your **ID Book** until you find the silhouette that matches the one shown, then choose its ship class name from the list. (Note: This was done as an informative method of copy protection, the theory being that only a person who has purchased both disks and manual can pass the test. After the first game, you won't need to do it again until you reboot the program.)

◀ *Night firing of a 5" gun mount on a U.S. Navy destroyer. (National Archives.)*

Briefing Screen: Admiral Halsey briefs you on the situation and shows you a map of the area. From here you go right into the game.

BRIDGE

The first screen that appears is the center bridge station of the USS *Honolulu,* the light cruiser that is the flagship of U.S. Navy Task Group 36.1. It's night time in The Slot; you can dimly see one of your van destroyers out the front window of the bridge.

• *Move your cursor around.* Notice that when it passes over certain "hot spots" on the screen their names appear: Engine Telegraph, Ship's Wheel, Damage Control, Charts. If you click while on a hot spot, you activate its information or controls.

• *Move your cursor to the right edge of the screen.* The scene shifts to the starboard bridge. Find the hot spots here, as well: Binoculars, Gun Director, Damage Control.

• *Move your cursor to the left edge of the screen.* Now you're back on the center bridge.

• *Move your cursor to the left edge of the screen.* The scene shifts to the port bridge: Observer View, Charts. If the *Honolulu* had torpedoes, the ladder down on the left would be a hot spot for the Torpedo Director.

• *Click on the Charts hot spot.* This sends you to the charts battle station.

CHARTS

You'll see a map with a couple of green islands at the bottom and two lines of black dots in the blue ocean. At the lower left is a panel displaying a clock, the time rate, zoom scale, and chart scale.

• *Click on the top of the panel and drag it to the top of the screen.* This gets it out of the way of the action. Use the same method to relocate menus if they happen to block a part of the charts you want to see.

• *Move your cursor over the southern group of dots.* An info box appears that tells you they are "unidentified ships." These are the enemy.

• *Move your cursor over the northern group of dots.* This is TG36.1: your task group. The info box tells you the group's heading (293°), speed (25 knots), and ship make-up: 4 DDs (destroyers) and 3 CLs (light cruisers).

• *Click on your task group.* A task group command menu appears.

• *Select "Take Command."* A longer command menu appears, listing all the orders that you can give to your task group as a whole.

• *Select "Set Speed."* The command menu is replaced by a speed submenu with a slider bar. The submenu shows your group's current speed: 25 knots. Drag the slider bar to the right as far as it will go (34 knots), then click on the box at the upper left corner of the title line. The command menu will reappear. You have just ordered your task group to speed up to 34 knots, the maximum speed of your slowest ship.

• *Select "Set Heading: Column Turn."* The command menu disappears and a compass appears on the charts, centered on your group's lead ship. Move the cursor around and you will see the compass needle rotate to follow the cursor. Rotate the needle until the digits in the compass say that it is pointing to course 215, then click. The command menu will reappear. You have just ordered your task group to make a column turn to course 215°. They will gradually turn south, the lead ship first, followed by the others in order.

• *Press the "Increase Time Rate" key until the Rate digit in the panel reads "8."* It will take a few minutes for your ships to close to combat range with the enemy. By increasing the time rate to its maximum of 8 times normal, your ships will quickly close the gap.

While you're waiting, take a few moments to slide the charts around a bit. Move your cursor to an edge, then back again; the chart will slide one notch in the direction indicated. Try another edge. But keep an eye on your task group. When white splashes start to appear near the black dots of your ships, the enemy is firing on you and it's time to take your next action.

• *Press the "Decrease Time Rate" key until the Rate digit in the panel reads "1."* You don't want to let time run out of control when you have orders to give.

• *Click on your task group and select "Take Command."*

• *Select "Fire at Will."* You have just ordered your ships to shoot back as soon as they get good target solutions on the enemy. (1942 targeting computers need time to analyze distance, speed, and heading data.)

• *Select "Set Heading: Column Turn" to course 180°.* This will enable you to continue to close the range to your enemy, but at an angle, so that the guns on all your ships will be able to bear on their targets.

• *Press the "Zoom" key.* A "zoom" window appears on the chart. Center it between your ships and the enemy's and click. The chart zooms to level 3 (as indicated on the panel) and you can see the situation in closer detail.

• *Click on your task group's lead ship.* The entire task group highlights and the task group command menu appears. Click again on the same ship and only the lead destroyer division highlights, and the task group command menu is replaced by the "DesDiv" (destroyer division) command menu. Click one last time and only the lead ship, the USS *Nicholas,* is highlighted; the DesDiv command menu is replaced by the USS *Nicholas* command menu.

• *Select "Fire Starshells."* The command menu disappears; you must now use your cursor to select where you want the starshells to go. Click on the closest enemy ship, the leader of the group of three. (Notice that it is identified as an "Akizuki Class Destroyer" rather than an unidentified ship; you are close enough that your lookouts can recognize its silhouette.)

You have just ordered your lead destroyer to fire aerial flares ("starshells") over the lead enemy ship. This will illuminate the enemy and make your ships' targeting easier.

Now it's time for a firsthand look at the action.

• *Press the "Bridge" key.* This keyboard shortcut enables you to go directly to the center bridge. Notice that the destroyers out in front of you are illuminated: the enemy is using starshells, too!

• *Move the cursor to the right, to the starboard bridge, then click on the Binoculars.*

BINOCULARS

When you arrive at this station the binoculars are automatically pointed at the nearest target. You'll probably see starshells floating down, guns winking on the enemy ships, and shells arcing up into the air.

• *Press the "Zoom" key to maximum zoom.* Now you can see the enemy ships much more clearly.

• *Rotate View left and right.* Scan around and try to get an idea of the situation. You may find it difficult to tell which way you're looking. There are two indicators below the viewport that can help. On the right is a sort of compass called the "view gauge". The ship image on the view gauge shows which way your ship is heading; the needle pointing from the center of the ship shows which way you are looking (the "bearing"). On the left a digital display shows the exact bearing you are looking along.

(Note: if the "frame rate" in the view port — the frequency at which the graphics are updated — is slow and chunky, you might want to press the *Land Detail Adjust* key to simplify the background landforms. This should speed up the frame rate.)

Let's try laying our guns on one of those targets out there. Note the bearing of the closest illuminated target.

• *Press the "Return to Bridge/Back Out One Level" key.* This takes you directly back to the starboard bridge.

• *Click on the ladder that leads to the Gun Director.*

GUN DIRECTOR

When you arrive in the gun director it is usually pointed at the nearest target. At night it's all too easy to become confused and fire at a friendly ship, so let's check first to make sure.

• *Press the "ID Book" key.* This brings up the ID Book, which identifies the target you are currently pointed at (unless it is too distant for your lookouts to see it clearly). You should be pointed at a Japanese destroyer. Let's get a closer look so we can target our guns on it.

• *Click on the view port to go to close-up view.*

• *Click on the targeting levers at the bottom of the screen.* Your cursor disappears: you are now in targeting mode.

• *Press the "Zoom" key to maximum zoom.*

There are two sliding pointers on the view port, one at the bottom of the port (the "traverse pointer") and one at the right side of the port (the "range pointer"). You want to get them both roughly centered on your target.

• *Rotate left or right until the traverse pointer is centered.* The traverse pointer follows the ship you are targeting. When the pointer is centered, the ship is in the middle of the view port.

• *Adjust the range pointer up or down until it is centered.* If range starts out considerably off, it may take several seconds for the range pointer to move to the center of its area.

Now that you have the target roughly centered, it's time to turn on your targeting computer so it can use this data to lock on the target and develop a "firing solution."

• *Press the "Director Targeting Mode On" key.* The solution gauge under the view port will light up, indicating the targeting computer is on the job. As long as you keep the target roughly centered, the needle that indicates the accuracy of the firing solution should increase toward "100" at the right side of the gauge.

• *Center the target and press the "Fire Weapons" key.* Every gun that bears on (can aim at) the target will fire simultaneously. As they fire, the green battery readiness lights at the lower right of the gun director will turn yellow, indicating that the guns are now unable to fire. It takes several seconds to reload them; when the lights turn green again, you can fire when ready.

It takes several seconds for your shells to travel to your target, which is probably about five miles (10,000 yards) away. When they arrive, you will see them come down as brilliant orange tracers. Your first few salvos are almost certain to miss — see the splashes near the target? — but keep at it. The longer you keep the target centered, and the more you fire, the better the targeting solution. Soon your shells will be falling right around the target, and some of them will be scoring hits.

Trade salvos with the enemy for a while until you get the hang of it. You can see they're shooting back, and you may notice the occasional nearby splash from one of their near misses, or worse, feel the impact of an enemy shell on your own ship. They have developed a good solution on your ship, too — which means it's time to change course to throw their targeting off.

• *Press the Charts key.*

CHARTS AGAIN

The enemy is much nearer now — and look at all those splashes from the gunfire! Let's zoom up for a closer look.

• *Press the "Zoom" key.* Center the zoom window and click. Now the ships appear as actual ship shapes, wakes and all. Your task group has been on the same course and speed for several minutes, which makes it vulnerable to torpedo attack. Time to turn!

• *Select "Set Heading: Column Turn" to course 275°.* This will hopefully enable your ships to dodge any torpedoes that are currently heading towards them, while putting them on a course that will keep them in range of the enemy with all guns bearing.

Now try a torpedo attack of your own.

• *Click on the lead ship in your column until you get the USS Nicholas command menu.*

• *Select "Set Heading."* Turn the destroyer toward the nearest enemy.

• *Select "Set Speed."* Increase speed to maximum.

• *Select "Fire Starshells."* Select the nearest enemy to make sure it's illuminated.

When your ship gets within about 2500 yards of your enemy (use the scale on the panel to give you an idea), you'll want to turn slightly to bring your torpedoes to bear — and to avoid enemy torpedoes.

• *Select "Set Heading."* Turn at an angle to your target.

• *Press the "Torpedo Director" key.*

TORPEDO DIRECTOR

The torpedo director will already be pointing at your nearest target. Notice that there's no magnification at this station: if you can't see your target, you're not really close enough for torpedo combat.

• *Center the target in the rectangular traverse pointer.*

• *Press the "Director Targeting Mode On" key.* If the target is close enough, you'll get the "Target Acquired" message.

Now it's your job to keep the target centered on the traverse pointer until the targeting solution reaches an acceptable level, i.e., when the needle on the solution gauge is in the red zone. When it reaches that point, launch a spread of torpedoes.

• *Press the "Fire Weapons" key, traverse slightly, and press again.* Fire four or five torpedoes at slightly different angles to get the best "spread" on your target.

You can either watch your target from here, go to the binoculars for a close-up view to see if it gets hit, or go to the charts and watch your torpedoes' progress there.

That's the end of the formal tutorial. Take over from here, try out some more options, and just play till you get the hang of it. Rely on the *Pause* key, and remember that this manual has an index at the back that can help you find quick answers to your questions. Good luck, captain!

COMMANDING A SHIP

■ Every ship has its own (computer) captain who gives orders based on standard naval procedures *even if you do nothing.* You can be along strictly for the ride, if you choose — or you can personally command one of the ship's battle stations, or all of them, one after another. You outrank everybody, so wherever you choose to give orders, your commands override those of the ship's officers.

THE BRIDGE

The bridge is your ship's command center: from here you control its course and speed, from here you step into the battle stations to get information or take personal control of your ship's weapons.

The bridge is actually three views: the center bridge, where you con the ship, check the charts, or view damage control reports; the starboard bridge, which contains the binoculars and the ladder to the gun director; and the port bridge, which leads to the torpedo director and the observer view.

When you move the cursor over an active object (one which you can click on to activate), its name will appear onscreen. Clicking there will activate a control or send you to a battle station.

CHANGING COURSE

To change course, click on the ship's wheel. Position the cursor on the left side of the wheel and hold the button down to turn to port; position the cursor on the right side while holding down the button to turn to starboard.

You can also order a turn using keyboard commands that function no matter where your cursor is on the bridge. (See your **Controls Summary Card**.) Pressing the appropriate key will turn the ship gradually to port or starboard. Pressing a *turn* key while SHIFT is held down will automatically start your ship on a turn one point (that is, 22.5 degrees) to port or starboard. Pressing repeatedly will turn it two or more points.

◀ *Japanese painting depicting the Battle of Sunda Strait. Tokushiro Kobayakawa, 1942. (National Archives.)*

CHANGING SPEED

To change speed, click on the engine telegraph. When the graphic appears, use the slider to decrease or increase speed.

You can also use the keyboard to change speed regardless of cursor location. Pressing the *increase speed* key will cause your ship's speed to increase gradually. Pressing it while SHIFT is held down will cause speed to increase to one-half maximum (if below this level), or to maximum (if at one-half or above).

Pressing the *decrease speed* key similarly causes a gradual decrease in your ship's speed. Pressing it with SHIFT causes speed to decrease to one-half maximum (if above that level) or to full stop (if at one-half maximum or less).

CENTER BRIDGE (U.S.N.)



CENTER BRIDGE (I.J.N.)



GOING TO CHARTS

To go to the charts battle station, click on the chart table (at the left side of the center bridge, or at the right side of the port bridge).

GOING TO DAMAGE CONTROL

To call up the damage control report, click on the damage display lights (at the right side of the center bridge, or at the left side of the starboard bridge).

GOING TO THE BINOCULARS

To view the battle situation more clearly, click on the binoculars in the middle of the starboard bridge.

GOING TO THE GUN DIRECTOR

The ladder up at the right of the starboard bridge leads to the gun director; click on it to go there.

GOING TO THE TORPEDO DIRECTOR

If your ship has a torpedo mount, click on the down ladder at the left of the port bridge to go to the torpedo director.

STARBOARD BRIDGE (U.S.N.)



GOING TO THE OBSERVER VIEW

To view the situation as if you were in a reconnaissance plane outside your ship, click on the sky area out the windows of the port bridge.

STARBOARD BRIDGE (I.J.N.)



PORT BRIDGE (U.S.N.)



PORT BRIDGE (I.J.N.)



KEYBOARD COMMANDS

There are also keyboard command shortcuts for moving around the bridge and going to the other battle stations. See your **Controls Summary Card**.

Torpedo Wakes: These lines show where torpedoes are passing through the battle area. Your side's torpedo wakes are usually visible (you know where and when your ships launched torpedoes); display of enemy torpedo wakes depends on visibility conditions.

THE CHARTS

The charts display the current battle situation in a top-down map view, using information compiled from visual observation, radio reports, and radar (if available). The icons displayed on the charts fall into the following categories:

Ships: These are clear depictions of ships for which the type, location, speed, and heading are known or clearly observed. Friendly vessels and nearby enemies typically appear as ships.

Shapes: These represent vessels for which only partial information is available. A shape shows the approximate size, direction, and location of the target.

Blips: These represent targets which are unidentified, unknown, or intermittently seen. Only approximate location is shown.

Splashes: These white dots, which grow and fade, depict columns of water where shells are falling into the sea.

CHARTS



Information Boxes and Command Menus: These provide information and command options for your ships. See the COMMANDING A TASK FORCE section of this manual for details on their meaning and use.

In addition to the command menus, there are several controls that enable you to reconfigure the charts.

CHANGE SCALE (ZOOM/UNZOOM)

There are five levels of scale (or "zoom") on the charts. Level 1 shows the widest possible area with the least detail, while level 5 shows the smallest area in the greatest detail. When you first consult the charts, you are at level 2. At this level, all ships (even "shapes" and "blips") are represented as dots.

Press the *zoom* key and the scale window appears. Move it to the area you want magnified and click to zoom to level 3. This gives a closer view of the situation. Note that all ships still appear as dots.

Zoom again to change scale to level 4. On levels 4 and 5 ships appear as ships, shapes, or blips, with visible wakes (if speed and direction are known). For greater detail, press *zoom* one more time for level 5.

To scale back out to higher levels, press the *unzoom* key.

SLIDE THE CHARTS (SCROLL AROUND)

To slide the charts (in essence, scrolling the maps and moving your viewpoint around the charts of the Solomons), move the cursor to the edge of the map in the direction you want to slide. There are also keyboard commands for sliding the charts: see your **Controls Summary Card**.

TIME RATE

Sometimes you may wish to increase the rate at which time passes, for example if you wanted your ships to close range with the enemy by several thousand yards before opening fire. The game proceeds at a normal rate of time unless you choose to increase the time rate by pressing the *increase time rate* key. Each time you press the key, you increase time rate by a factor of 1, i.e., 2 times, 3 times, 4 times, etc., up to a maximum of 8 times normal time rate. Pressing SHIFT with the *increase time rate* key jumps it to maximum time rate.

Conversely, pressing the *decrease time rate* key slows time rate back toward normal by a factor of one per key press; pressing SHIFT with *decrease time rate* jumps it to normal time.

Time rate temporarily reverts to normal whenever you open a command menu.

CHARTS



DAMAGE CONTROL



DAMAGE CONTROL

The damage control screen performs two functions. First, it lists the statistics of the ship: speed, armament, etc. Second, it displays the current condition of the ship, reporting current maximum speed possible, hull integrity (ranging from *unscathed* to *critical* and *sinking*), and status of major ship's systems. Each system (e.g., turret #1, turret #2, engines, fuel bunkers, fire control) is accompanied by a colored light, which glows green for active, yellow for damaged, and red for destroyed. Damage control also reports if the ship is on fire, flooding, or has a jammed rudder.

DAMAGE EFFECTS

The usual effects of damage to the various ship's systems are as follows:

Turret or Mount: Weapons out of action.

Engines: Loss of speed.

Fuel Bunkers: Fire.

Damage Control: Repair rate decreased.

Generators: Radar off, fire control impaired, steering may be impaired.

Rudder: Turn rate decreased, or rudder stuck at one setting.

Magazine: Fires and explosions.

AA Battery: Antiaircraft defenses damaged or destroyed.

Fire Control: Directors cannot lock onto targets.

Secondaries: Secondary weapons out of action.

Torpedoes: Torpedo mount destroyed.

Aircraft: Aircraft destroyed, possible fire.

REPAIRS

Every ship has damage control parties that are responsible for controlling and repairing damage. Areas critically hit are controlled or repaired in approximately the following order: flooding; fires; generators; fire control; main guns; rudder; engines and boilers; secondary and antiaircraft guns.

Control and repair rates are variable depending on the amount of damage the system has taken, and the size and health of the damage control parties. A ship that takes a hit in the damage control station will find it difficult to repair damage.

THE BINOCULARS

If you want to view the situation personally, the binoculars are your best bet for either a quick scan or a detailed look. They can traverse more rapidly than the gun or torpedo directors, and their maximum magnification ("zoom") is better than either the gun director or the observer view.

MAGNIFICATION (ZOOM/UNZOOM)

Pressing the *zoom* key increases magnification. Each press doubles the magnification, to 2 times, 4 times, 8 times, and 16 times normal (maximum), or press the SHIFT key with *zoom* to automatically increase the binoculars to 16 times magnification.

Press the *unzoom* key to decrease magnification, backing out one level per press, or press SHIFT and *unzoom* (to instantly return to minimum magnification).

TRAVERSE VIEW

To scan left or right, use the mouse, joystick, or *left/right* key to rotate your view in the desired direction. The longer you hold the input device right or left, the faster the view rotates. Let up and rotation will stop; press again and it will restart at the slow rate.

BINOCULARS



A keyboard shortcut (see the **Controls Summary Card**) enables you to jump instantly to the next cardinal direction (north, east, south, or west) in the direction you indicate. Thus, if you are viewing along bearing 60°, and you jump view to the right, you will be looking along bearing 90° (due east).

BEARING AND RANGE

These are rolling digital displays. Bearing indicates along what compass angle you are looking. For this purpose, the compass is divided into 360 degrees. 0° is due north, 90° is east, 180° is south, and 270° is west.

When a ship approaches the center of the binoculars view a range to the ship in yards is displayed below.

THE VIEW GAUGE

This is a compass that tells you both which way your ship is going (heading) and which way you are looking (bearing). The rotating dial has a ship shape painted on it; the direction it is pointing is the compass direction of the ship's current heading. The rotating needle indicates which compass direction (bearing) the binoculars are looking. This helps to clarify the relationship between your view direction and your ship's movement direction.

SHIP CONTROLS

The keyboard controls that enable you to steer the ship and change its speed are all active at this battle station.

THE GUN DIRECTOR

The gun director is a rotating turret-like station located in the superstructure of your ship. Except in extraordinary situations, the gun turrets on your ship do not target and fire independently; instead, all the gun turrets follow the targeting directions and fire commands of the gunnery officer commanding the gun director.

The gun director view integrates information from optical range finders and fire-control radar (if available) to determine a target's range, heading, and speed. A mechanical ballistics computer then calculates a "solution" for the target: where to aim the ship's guns so that the falling shells will intersect with the enemy vessel. When the gunnery officer believes that the solution for a target is good enough, he presses the fire button and all the ship's guns (that are loaded and bear on the target) fire at once.

GUN DIRECTOR, WIDE VIEW (U.S.N.)



GUN DIRECTOR, WIDE VIEW (I.J.N.)



WIDE VIEW AND CLOSE-UP VIEW

When you first arrive in the gun director, it is in *wide view* mode. In this mode you are back from the view port and can consult the ID book (see below). Move your cursor to the view port and click on it to switch to *close-up mode.* This expands the view port for improved targeting.

THE ID BOOK

If you have a reasonably good view of your locked-on target, the ID book will turn to the page that describes its ship class. To open the ID book, click on the book at the bottom of the screen (wide view only), or press the *ID book* key. Click or press again to close the book.

If your target is too distant or too obscured (by night or smoke) to see clearly, the ID book is no help in identifying the target type, and closes automatically.

MAGNIFICATION (ZOOM/UNZOOM)

Click on the magnification knob or press the *zoom* key to increase the magnification in the view port. Each press doubles magnification, to 2 times, 4 times, and 8 times normal (maximum). Pressing the SHIFT key with *zoom* automatically increases the view to 8 times magnification.

Press the *unzoom* key to decrease magnification, one level per press. To instantly return to minimum magnification, press SHIFT and *unzoom.*

TARGETING MODE

You cannot lock onto a target unless you are in "targeting mode." To activate targeting mode, go to the close-up view and click on the targeting levers at the bottom of the screen (or press the *Director Targeting Mode On* key). The cursor disappears, and the input devices that usually move your cursor now enable you to traverse the view and adjust range.

TRAVERSE VIEW

To scan left or right in targeting mode, use the mouse, joystick, or *left/right* key to rotate your view in the desired direction. In most cases, the longer you hold the input device right or left, the faster the view rotates. (See your **Technical Supplement** for details.) Let up and rotation will stop; press again and it will restart at the slow rate.

"LOCKING ON" AND THE SOLUTION GAUGE

Traverse the view until a vessel nears the center of the view port. The traverse pointer at the bottom of the view port will "pick up" the vessel and follow it. You can attempt to lock onto any ship the traverse pointer is following by pressing the *Director Targeting Mode On* key.

Below the view port is the solution gauge. When you lock onto a target, your ship's observation stations begin sending range, speed, and heading data to the targeting computer. The solution gauge lights up and the needle starts indicating the quality of the targeting computer's solution. The closer the needle moves to 100 (the right side of the gauge), the better the solution and the more accurate your gunfire will be.

GUN DIRECTOR, CLOSE-UP VIEW (U.S.N.)



GUN DIRECTOR, CLOSE-UP VIEW (I.J.N.)



The better your spotters can see a target, the better the solution (close range and illumination by starshell or fire are among the things that improve visibility). Also, the longer you remain locked onto a target, the better the solution. The solution also improves once you fire a few shots and the spotters can see where they fall.

The solution degrades if the target changes speed or heading, or somehow becomes harder to see (starshells go out, the target starts making smoke, etc.). You will also get poor solutions if you constantly switch from target to target.

Sometimes when you attempt to lock onto a distant or obscured target, the solution gauge will fail to come on. This indicates that there is simply not enough data to lock onto that target. (But you can still fire — see below.)

FIRING THE BATTERIES

To fire, press the mouse button, appropriate joystick button, or the *fire weapons* key. All loaded guns that bear on the target will fire.

The battery readiness lights indicate which gun mounts or turrets are available to fire at the designated target. If a light is off, the indicated turret is either reloading, unable to bear (aim at) the target due to its position on the ship, or is damaged or destroyed.

When you fire, all readiness lights will turn off while the guns reload. (See the "Ordnance" sections of the **ID Book** for information on the firing cycles of the various weapons. The smaller the gun, the faster it reloads.)

MANUAL TARGET ADJUSTMENT

If your targeting computer cannot lock onto a certain target, or if your ship's fire control is knocked out (range finders and radar damaged or destroyed), you will find it necessary to adjust your targeting manually. In this case, the positions of your traverse pointer and ranger pointer determine where your salvos will fall.

Even if the computer can't lock onto a target, the traverse pointer will still pick up the nearest vessel to the center of the view port. Traverse the view until your target is at or near the center.

Next, adjust the range pointer by moving it forward or back with your mouse, joystick, or arrow keys. Forward (farther away) is up toward the top of the reticle; back (closer) is down toward the bottom.

If your target is stationary, you will want to have the traverse pointer and the range pointer both in the center of their respective movement ranges. Fire a salvo and see where it lands; if it misses, adjust your aim accordingly (e.g., if the shells landed short, push the range pointer a little farther out and fire again).

If your target is moving, you will want to "lead" it. For example, if it's moving toward the right of your view port, fire ahead of it to the right; if it's moving away from you, fire ahead beyond it. You must apply more lead to fast, distant targets than to slow, near ones.

You can manually adjust your targeting even when your computer is locked onto a target. This is an especially useful tactic if your solution value is low but you can tell by how the shells are falling which way to adjust your aim.

STARSHELLS

Starshells are flares attached to parachutes fired so that they open above a target and gradually drift down, illuminating the vessel and making it easier to identify and aim at. On a dark night, it's almost impossible to have effective gunnery without them. If your ship has 4.7" or 5" guns, you can elect to fire starshells at your target.

To switch from AP (armor-piercing) ammunition to starshells, press the *starshells* key. The ammo switch will be set to starshells, and after a short delay all 5" shells fired will be starshells. For proper placement over a target starshells require a high trajectory, and thus will take longer to arrive than regular AP ammunition.

To switch back to AP ammo, press the *starshells* key again.

RANGE, BEARING, SPEED, VIEW GAUGE

Bearing indicates along what compass angle you are looking.

Range indicates the distance in yards to the current target.

Speed is the estimated speed, in knots, of the target vessel.

The view gauge is a compass that tells you both which way your ship is going (heading) and which way you are looking (bearing).

SHIP CONTROLS

The keyboard controls that enable you to steer the ship and change its speed are all active at this battle station.



The pointer's and trainer's stations in an American Mk. 37 gun director, photographed in May, 1942. (U.S. Naval Historical Center.)

TORPEDO DIRECTOR (U.S.N.)



THE TORPEDO DIRECTOR

Torpedo direction and targeting was handled differently by the American and Japanese navies, and even varied quite a bit within the navies from ship type to ship type. In *Task Force 1942,* torpedo targeting is handled right on the torpedo mounts. The more modern ships used torpedo directors mounted in the superstructure, but targeting from the mount is more interesting visually.

There is no cursor on the torpedo director screen: moving a mouse or joystick serves only to traverse the view. All commands are keyboard-controlled (except for those that are also activated by mouse or joystick buttons). See your **Controls Summary Card.**

TRAVERSE VIEW

To scan left or right, use the mouse, joystick, or *left/right* key to rotate your view in the desired direction. The longer you hold the input device right or left, the faster the view rotates. Let up and rotation will stop; press again and it will restart at the slow rate.

Your torpedo mount is located right or left of the centerline of the ship; thus, it can only rotate in the 180° between the bow of the ship and the aft. (For example, if you are on the port torpedo mount, it can only point out to the port side.) Press the *Shift to Other Torpedo Mount* key to switch to the other side.

A keyboard shortcut (see the **Controls Summary Card**) enables you to jump instantly to the next cardinal direction (north, east, south, or west) the way you indicate. Thus, if you are viewing along bearing 60°, and you jump view to the right, you will be looking along bearing 90° (due east). This can also be used to shift torpedo mounts.

TARGET SELECTION

When you arrive at the torpedo director you will find it is already pointing at your ship's most likely torpedo target. There is no image magnification on the torpedo director, so if you want to select a different target, or be sure which target you are aiming at, you may want to take a side trip to the binoculars battle station where you can scan in detail. At the binoculars, note the bearing of the ship you want to target, then return to the torpedo director and traverse the view until it centers on the same bearing. There's your target.

TORPEDO DIRECTOR (I.J.N.)



TARGETING

When you first arrive at the torpedo director it is in manual mode: if you fire a torpedo it will launch straight out along the bearing indicated. Unless you are very close indeed, this is a poor way to try to hit your target. It is much better to have the targeting computer find a solution and set your torpedoes to the appropriate speed and course before launching. To do this, you must put the director into targeting mode.

To activate targeting mode, turn until a target ship is centered on the traverse pointer and press the *Director Targeting Mode On* key. The solution gauge lights up to indicate that targeting mode is now active.

The needle on the solution gauge indicates how good a solution the targeting computer has to the problem of how to set a torpedo to hit your target. The closer the needle approaches to 100% (at the right of the gauge), the better the chance that a torpedo launched at that point will hit the intended target — assuming the target doesn't change course or speed.

The longer you keep the traverse pointer centered on the target, the better the solution will be. The computer uses range, bearing, and estimated speed information from two points on your ship to solve the targeting problem, and the more data you give it over a long period, the better. (Also, the closer you are to your target, the better, as closer readings are more accurate.)

However, don't wait too long, because if your target changes course or speed the solution will degrade. The trick is to try to estimate when the solution is at its best possible value, and fire then.

Note that you cannot launch torpedoes at targets that are within 15° of your bow or stern. (If the needle is pointing into the red area on the view gauge, you cannot fire.) You may have to use the ship controls to turn the ship to port or starboard slightly to get a shot at your target.

Mark 33 gun director in action. (National Archives)

TARGET RANGE, BEARING, AND SPEED; VIEW GAUGE

The range to the target, its bearing and estimated speed are shown by the rolling digital displays.

The view gauge is a compass that tells you both which way your ship is going (heading) and which way you are looking (bearing). Note the red "no fire" zones on the torpedo director view gauge.

TORPEDO SPEED

Torpedoes can be set to slow, medium, or fast speed; the slower the speed, the longer the torpedo's range, but the greater the chance the target will change course and speed before the torpedo gets there. The torpedo speed indicator shows what speed setting the computer has selected to set for your torpedoes, given the current target. If you are in manual mode, the speed is always set to "fast."

FIRING TORPEDOES

To fire a torpedo, press the *Fire Weapon* key.

A spread of torpedoes markedly increases your chance of hitting. To fire a spread, press *Fire Weapon,* traverse slightly, fire again, traverse slightly, and fire again, continuing until you have fired enough or the mount is empty.

TORPEDO READINESS

The torpedo readiness lights indicate how many torpedoes are currently available for launching from the torpedo mounts on the side of the ship your mount is on. The Japanese torpedo director only has a digital display indicating the number of torpedo reloads available. If a Japanese ship with torpedo reloads expends all the torpedoes in its mounts, it will take 15 minutes or more for the reloads to be put in place. The readiness lights will then come back on.

SHIP CONTROLS

The keyboard controls that enable you to steer the ship and change its speed are all active at this battle station.



The USS Aaron Ward, a Benson-class destroyer, photographed on 17 August 1942. Note the gun director turret with radar antenna above the bridge. (National Archives.)

THE OBSERVER VIEW

The observer view enables you to survey the situation as if you were in a reconnaissance plane circling your ship.

MAGNIFICATION (ZOOM/UNZOOM)

Press the *zoom* key to increase the magnification. Each press doubles magnification, to 2 times, 4 times, and 8 times normal (maximum). Pressing the SHIFT key with *zoom* automatically increases the binoculars to 8 times magnification.

Press the *unzoom* key to decrease magnification, backing out one level per press. To instantly return to minimum magnification, press SHIFT and *unzoom.*

TRAVERSE VIEW

Use the mouse, joystick, or arrow keys to traverse the view.

Moving left or right rotates the view around the ship; your ship always remains in the foreground (unless it is magnified out of view).

Pushing forward ("up") moves the viewpoint toward the center of the ship. The viewpoint can move no farther than directly "above" the ship. Pulling back ("down") moves the viewpoint away from the ship. You can pull back a maximum of 800 yards from the center of the ship.

TIME RATE

If time rate was increased, it always returns to normal when you enter the observer view.

COMMANDING A TASK FORCE

Every task group, division, and ship has its own (computer) commander who is constantly giving reasonable (but uninspired) orders to his command. If you give no commands to your ships whatsoever, they will fight the battle for you, following standard procedures. However, you are certain to want to make your own choices, so *Task Force 1942* lets you take over whatever decisions you think are most crucial or most interesting. At will, you can take command at any level and override your commanders' orders through the command menus, as explained below.

THE TACTICAL CHART

When commanding a task force or task group, you are attempting to coordinate the battle activities of a number of ships, typically eight or more. To do this, you must have a grasp of the entire tactical situation, which means that you will spend a great deal of time plotting the action on the charts. While you can *see* better from various battle stations, the charts show you the relative positions of the ships with the greatest clarity, so it is from the charts that you will give your general orders to your task group.

TEXT WINDOWS

Two types of text windows appear on the tactical charts: information boxes and command menus.

Text Window Hierarchy: When you point the cursor at one of the ships in a friendly task group, the entire task group highlights and a TG (task group) information box appears.

If you click on a ship in the highlighted task group, the task group command menu appears in addition to the info box.

◀ *Fletcher-class destroyers of Squadron 21, photographed 15 August 1943. (National Archives.)*

If you click again on a ship in the task group, its division highlights in one color, and the individual ship highlights in a different color. In addition, the TG info box and TG command menu are replaced by a ship info box and a division command menu.

If you click on a highlighted ship in a highlighted division, the division command menu is replaced by a ship command menu. Move the cursor to other ships in the division and the highlighted ship and command menu will change.

Independent Action: Ships on independent action are outside the text window hierarchy. Point the cursor at a lone ship and you will get its ship info box; click on it and its ship command menu appears.

Information Boxes: A task group (TG) info box displays the following information:

TF or TG number.
Commanding Officer's name.
Location (latitude and longitude).
Heading.
Speed.
Composition (number of DDs, CLs, CAs, etc.).

A ship information box displays this information:

Ship name.
Commanding Officer's name.
Ship class.
Heading.
Speed.
Damage (None, Light, Moderate, Heavy, Sinking).

Info boxes for enemy task groups or ships will probably include only partial information. Certainly TG number, ship name and commanding officer's name will remain unknown.

Command Menus: You can take command and override your commanders' orders at any time through the command menus. As soon as you open a command menu, the appropriate commander stops giving orders while he waits for your commands. (In other words, your commander is inactive while the command menu is open, so give your orders rapidly!)

If a command menu appears in an inconvenient spot, it can be relocated elsewhere on the chart. Click on the title bar at the top of the menu and, *holding the button down,* drag the menu to a more favorable location.

To close a command menu, click on the box at the left side of the title bar. To select an option on the menu, move the cursor over the option so that it highlights, then click.

The actual command menu options are covered later in this chapter, after a short discussion on formations and visibility (to make clear what the commands pertain to).

REVIEW: CHANGING SCALE, SLIDING, AND TIME RATE

There are five levels of scale (or "zoom") on the charts. When you first consult the charts, you are at level 2, which shows the widest possible area. Press the *zoom* key to change scale to level 3. This gives a closer view of the situation. Press the *zoom* key again twice to change scale to level 5. This level provides the greatest detail, but in the smallest area. To scale back out to levels 2 and 1, press the *unzoom* key.

To slide the charts (scrolling the maps), move the cursor to the edge of the map in the direction you want to slide.

To speed up the game press the *increase time rate* key. Each press of the key increases time rate by a factor of 1; i.e., 2 times, 3 times, 4 times, etc., up to a maximum of 8 times normal time rate. Pressing SHIFT with the *increase time rate* key sends it right to maximum time rate.

Conversely, pressing the *decrease time rate* key slows time rate back toward normal by a factor of one per key press; pressing SHIFT with *decrease time rate* jumps it to normal time.

Time rate automatically reverts to normal whenever you open a command menu.

MOVING IN FORMATION

Since ancient times, admirals have realized that the only way to maintain tactical control over a group of ships during the chaos of battle is to have them move in formation. The captain of a ship in formation knows where his friends are, and can support them (and receive support in return) if they get into trouble.

TYPES AND FUNCTIONS OF FORMATIONS

There have been many theories on naval formations, but in practice it has always been found that simple formations are best. The more complex the formation, the more training required to implement it, and the sooner it seems to fall apart during combat. Changing formation once combat has begun is so difficult and dangerous that it is rarely attempted; in *Task Force 1942* this is not an option.

The following types of formations are available:

Column: In this formation the ships simply follow each other in line, taking their cue from the "guide ship" or "lead ship," the first vessel in line. This is the simplest of all formations, and the most common. It is the easiest formation to maintain, even while making sharp turns or torpedo runs.

Line: In line formation ships form a line perpendicular to the line of motion, as if marching side by side rather than one behind the other. The advantage of this formation is that the ships can sweep a wider area of sea, so it is frequently used by divisions of light ships that are scouting ahead of the main body. The guide ship in this formation can be located at either the port or starboard end of the line.

COLUMN FORMATION



LINE FORMATION



ECHELON LEFT FORMATION



ANTIAIRCRAFT FORMATION



Echelon: This is a diagonal formation that falls halfway between column and line. It comes in two forms: echelon left, in which ships follow the guide ship at an angle off to port, or echelon right, in which the ships trail off to starboard. To an extent, echelon formation combines the advantages of column and line. It is often used by divisions of light ships that are slightly in advance of a main body, screening it from attack.

Antiaircraft Formation: This formation places the lighter ships in a circular screen around the heaviest ships in the group, which are the natural targets of air attack. Incoming aircraft must penetrate the antiaircraft defenses of the outer ring before attacking the center. This formation doubles as an antisubmarine defense, with destroyers on the outer ring where they can detect and attack lurking submarines before The subs can ambush the heavy ships.

EFFECTS OF MANEUVERS ON FORMATIONS

Naval formations tend to come apart under the stress of combat, and a lot of energy is spent on trying to maintain or regain formation. Different maneuvers have different effects, as explained below:

Column Turn: A column turn, in which ships turn one after another, is usually a simple matter for ships in column formation. It is more complicated for ships in echelon formation, especially if the trailing ships must make a wide outside turn (e.g., in a left echelon formation making a starboard turn, the following ships must put on extra speed to maintain position). At high speeds a column turn may cause an echelon formation to come apart. A column turn is not possible to ships in line formation; none follows the other, so all turn simultaneously.

All Ships Turn (Simultaneous Turn): A group of ships in column formation that performs a simultaneous turn will suddenly appear to be in echelon or line formation. A turn back to the original heading (or its diametric opposite) will restore the ships to column formation, but anything else may cause it to come apart. The same caveat applies to echelon formation. Ships in line formation naturally turn simultaneously, but they will appear to be in echelon or column formation unless they return to their original heading (or its reciprocal).

Independent Action: A ship that is ordered to turn on its own (if, for example, you give it steering commands from its bridge) will leave whatever formation it is in and go on independent action. Thereafter it will follow your orders, if you give them, or its captain's own decisions about the best course to follow.

COLUMN TURN



SIMULTANEOUS (ALL SHIPS) TURN



Damage: A ship that suffers so much damage that it is unable to keep up with its formation will usually turn out of the way of the others and go on independent action. (Frequently this means leaving the battle area as fast as possible.)

Collision Avoidance: Captains will do what they can to avoid collisions with other ships, even if this means leaving a formation. In this way a severely damaged friendly ship that comes to a sudden stop can wreck a whole formation as subsequent ships swerve to avoid it.

Captains will also attempt to avoid obvious land masses, even if their orders indicate they should plow right into them. However, if a ship is maneuvering close inshore there is always the chance of running onto a reef, which plays havoc with a formation as following ships try to avoid the grounded vessel.

VISIBILITY

How well a target can be identified on the charts, and how well it can be targeted, depends upon its visibility to both eyesight and radar. A ship's relative visibility determines whether it will be displayed on the charts as a ship, a shape, or a blip.

Ships: are clear depictions of ships for which the type, location, speed, and heading are known or clearly observed. Friendly vessels and nearby enemies typically appear as ships. *Shapes:* represent vessels about which only partial information is available. A shape shows the approximate size, direction, and location of the target. *Blips:* represent targets which are unidentified, unknown, or intermittently seen. Only approximate location is shown.

OPTICAL VISIBILITY

Under normal daylight conditions a warship can be seen at ranges up to 20,000 to 30,000 yards (the bigger the ship, the farther away it can be seen). However, a number of conditions can modify sighting range. All of these effects are cumulative.

Smoke and Splashes: It is difficult to pinpoint the exact location of a ship obscured by a smoke screen. Likewise, a ship surrounded by the splashes of falling shells can take some consolation in the fact that all those splashes make it harder to see and harder to target .

Night: Darkness is the most obvious bar to visibility. On a moonlit night sighting range may be cut by as much as half, while on a dark night it may fall to between a quarter and a third of normal sighting range.

Starshells: The purpose of a starshell is to remove the protective cloak of night. Ships under a falling starshell are illuminated to a degree that varies depending on how close they are to the flare. A ship right under a starshell will be lit up more brightly than one that is off to the side.

Searchlights: A searchlight is even more effective than starshells at illuminating an enemy ship; its drawback is that it also exactly pinpoints the location of the searchlight user.

NOTE that searchlights and starshells are no help at all in daylight.

Firing Guns: Other things being equal, a ship firing its guns is much easier to see than one whose guns are silent.

On Fire: Any ship that catches fire will be easily seen at night, while during the day the oily smoke rising from a burning ship makes it a much easier target.

Japanese Optics: In 1942, the equipment and training of I.J.N. lookouts is far superior to that of the U.S. Navy, particularly the Japanese night optics. Carefully trained in the use of especially powerful night binoculars and range finders, Japanese observers frequently outperform American radar at night.

RADAR VISIBILITY

In 1942 radar is a high-technology secret largely unknown to the Imperial Japanese Navy. It is so new that even in the American navy, where it is being installed on every ship that comes up for refitting, its capabilities are often misunderstood and it is frequently underutilized. At this time the U.S.N. has two main models of radar: the SC ("Sugar Charlie") type and the brand-new SG ("Sugar George") unit.

SC Radar: The metric-wave SC radar was designed primarily for an air search function: it is elevated and not easily focused, which makes it difficult to use for detection and identification of surface targets. In addition, its information is displayed on an oscilloscope-style screen, with targets making blips in a single line that is drawn across the screen as the radar is rotated. It isn't easy to interpret data

displayed in this manner, especially when it's mixed with confusing reflections from islands, rain squalls, and even flocks of birds. SC radar is an aid to the Americans at night, but it is more than offset by the superb Japanese night optics.

SG Radar: The newer centimetric-wave SG radar was designed specifically for surface search, and broadcasts a much tighter, more focused beam than the SC model. It is also the first radar to use the familiar flat display with the radar line sweeping 360 degrees around the broadcaster at the center. This provides the radar operator with a much clearer picture of his surroundings, enabling a good one to tell number, size, and heading of nearly all targets within 30,000 yards. SG radar *greatly* increases the "visibility" of Japanese targets.

However, in late 1942 the SG radar is a top-secret device mounted in few American ships. Even fewer are the officers who understand its value and significance.

FC Radar: Most American ships are also mounted with fire control radar, which is no good for search purposes, but is used to "lock on" to a target and provide accurate ranging information to the targeting computer. The Japanese use their excellent optics to perform the same function.

COMMANDING BY TASK GROUP

The key to commanding a task group of eight ships or more is to remember that maneuvers take a long time to execute, so try to plan them in advance. It will take quite a while for all your ships to speed up, slow down, or go through a turn, so you must try to anticipate where your enemy will be several minutes in the future.

Offensively you want to try to maneuver your ships so that as many guns as possible can be brought to bear on the enemy. Thus, the worst possible situation is a column of ships charging straight at your target: the forward guns of the lead ship bear on the enemy, but all the rest are blocked ("masked") by the ships ahead of them. The best possible situation is a line perpendicular to the enemy, so that all your ships are broadside to their targets, and all their guns and torpedoes can be used. This brings the maximum firepower to bear on the target. If, in so doing, you "cross the T" of an enemy column coming toward you, you will be in the ideal situation in which all of your guns can bear, while only a few of theirs can return fire.

Defensively your main worry is to avoid maintaining a constant speed and course long enough for your enemies to track and target on you. The longer your ships stay on a steady course and speed the better their targeting solutions will be — and the better the enemy's solutions will be, as well. Worst of all, you must consider that at any given moment there may be torpedoes in the water aimed at where your ships will be if they maintain their course and speed. You must vary your course and speed often enough that your ships will not be sitting ducks, but not too often, or their own targeting will be thrown off. Experience will teach you how often to swerve, and how much.

If you know there are torpedoes approaching your task group, the best way to avoid being hit by them is to turn toward them, thereby presenting the smallest possible target. (This is called "combing the wakes" of the torpedoes.) If the torpedoes are very close, a simultaneous (all ships) turn is advisable.



Japanese battleships in column formation. (U.S. Naval Historical Center.)

TASK GROUP COMMAND OPTIONS

The task group command menu offers a number of different options, each of which is discussed below.

Set Speed: When you select this option, a slider bar appears that enables you to set the task group's speed, from 0 knots (full stop) to the maximum speed of the slowest ship in the group. Slide the bar to the speed desired and close the box to send the order.

Set Heading: Column Turn: When you select this option, a compass rose appears on the charts centered on the task group's guide ship. Moving the cursor around the compass rotates the needle; move the needle to the desired new course and click to send the order.

In a column turn, the guide ship turns first, and each subsequent ship turns when it reaches the point where the guide ship turned, thus maintaining column and echelon formations. A line formation will perform a column turn like a simultaneous (all ships) turn.

Set Heading: All Ships Turn: This works the same as a column turn, except that all ships turn simultaneously instead of in column order.

Fire at Will: This orders your ships to open fire with their guns as soon as they have reasonable solutions on the nearest enemy targets. When you select this option, it immediately changes to *Cease Fire;* selecting *Cease Fire* orders your ships to silence their guns.

Fire Torpedoes: This orders all ships with torpedo mounts to fire as soon as they have reasonable solutions on enemy targets. When you select this option, it immediately changes to *Hold Torpedoes.* Selecting *Hold Torpedoes* orders your ships to launch no more torpedoes at the enemy.

(Commander's Name) Commands: When you select this option, you return command of your ships to the task group commander. He will continue to give orders based on standard naval procedure (and his own personality) until you once again override him with a command menu.

Enter Flagship: This option sends you to the center bridge of the task group flagship.

COMMANDING BY DIVISION

Commanding a division of a task group is much like commanding the entire group, in that the situation still evolves relatively slowly, and you must still think well in advance both offensively and defensively. The advantage of commanding by division is that usually all the ships in a division have roughly the same capabilities, and can therefore perform some functions better at the division level than at the task group level. For example, a division of speedy destroyers can be sent out in advance of the heavier ships, as a screen or to perform a fast torpedo run. Meanwhile, a cruiser or battleship division, with its heavier guns, can be kept back out of effective range of the smaller enemies but still well within its own longer reach.

DIVISION COMMAND OPTIONS

All of the command menu options available at the task group level are available to the division commander, plus the following additional choices:

Torpedo Run: When you select *Torpedo Run,* the command menu disappears, which is your cue to move the cursor to an enemy ship and click on it to select it as the target of the torpedo run. When you have done this, the division command menu returns.

A division ordered on a torpedo run increases to maximum speed and turns to close with its designated target. The division's torpedo directors will lock on the target, and as they achieve reasonable solutions, one by one the ships will launch their torpedoes and turn away.

(The reason they turn away after launch is that a torpedo run usually entails getting closer to the enemy than is comfortable, particularly for destroyers, who are the usual recipients of *Torpedo Run* orders.)

Lay Smoke: When you select this option, every ship in the division will begin making smoke from the smoke generators on its fantail. This obscures the generating ships and leaves a trail of smoke that blocks vision.

Independent Action: This orders a division commander to leave the task group and start making his own tactical decisions. Once a division goes independent, this option changes to *Rejoin Task Group.*

Rejoin Task Group: This orders a division to "get back in line" with the task group. Once it does so, it once again follows the orders of the task group commander, and this option reverts to *Independent Action.*

Note that in many cases a division ordered to *Rejoin Task Group* will find the order difficult or impossible to comply with, due to distance, damage, or other factors.

COMMANDING INDIVIDUAL SHIPS

Commanding individual ships gives you much greater flexibility and precision, but you will be much busier if you try to give individual course, speed, and combat orders to every ship. You will probably want to keep most of your ships in formation and give specific individual orders only to certain key ships. Of course, if the stresses of combat cause your formations to unravel, you will end up having to give a lot of individual ship orders.

SHIP COMMAND OPTIONS

Set Speed, Fire at Will, Fire Torpedoes, Torpedo Run, Lay Smoke, and (Commander's Name) Command: These all function just as they do on the task group and division command menus.

Set Heading: This is a single order, without the *Column Turn* and *All Ships Turn* subsets; since setting a heading for an individual ship takes it out of formation, they are irrelevant.

Target Ship: This option enables you to pick a specific target for your ship's gunfire. When you select it, the command menu disappears, and you must then move the cursor to the ship you want as a target and click on it. The ship command menu then returns. (If you want to pick a specific ship as a torpedo target, use *Torpedo Run.*)

Fire Starshells: When you select *Fire Starshells,* the command menu disappears, and you must move the cursor to an enemy ship or a map location and click on it to select it as the target of the starshells. When you have done this, the ship command menu returns.

(Note that if your ship lacks 4.7" or 5" guns, the *Fire Starshells* option is not available.)

Searchlight On: Selecting this option enables you to pick a target for your searchlights. When you select *Searchlight On,* the command menu disappears, and you must move the cursor to an enemy ship or map location and click on it. (The range of a searchlight is 10,000 yards; if you select a target or location beyond this range, you will target a map location on that line at 10,000 yards from your ship.) Once you have selected a target, the ship command menu returns, with *Searchlight On* altered to *Searchlight Off.* Select *Searchlight Off* to stop illuminating.

Note that turning on a searchlight may light up an enemy ship, but it also clearly shows your own exact location. Use searchlights with care!

Independent Action: This orders a ship commander to leave the division and make his own tactical decisions. This option then changes to *Rejoin Div.*

Rejoin Div: This orders a ship to return to its place in its division. As with the *Rejoin Task Group* command, this order may be difficult or impossible to achieve.



COMMANDING A CAMPAIGN

■ The Guadalcanal campaign is the heart of *Task Force 1942*. In the campaign, your goal is to enable your side's troops on Guadalcanal to conquer the entire island before the end of the year. As naval commander: you must accomplish this goal by naval means. With limited ships, supplies, and troops, you must somehow keep your troops on Guadalcanal supplied, reinforce them whenever you can, interdict the enemy's supplies and reinforcements, and sink the enemy's warships. If you do this more successfully than the enemy, you will win.

Victory Conditions: Victory comes when one side's troops occupy all three of the bases on Guadalcanal: Aola, Henderson Field, and Tassafaronga. At the start of the campaign the Japanese occupy Aola and Tassafaronga, and the United States has just occupied Henderson Field. Troops capture opponent's bases through ground battles, which occur when one side achieves a numerical advantage over the other. Your goal is to put enough well-supplied troops on the island to capture the enemy-held bases, and to prevent the enemy from doing the same to you.

THE STRATEGIC MAP

The strategic map shows the Southwest Pacific from New Ireland to the New Hebrides, centering on the Solomon Islands chain. The Japanese occupy New Britain, New Ireland, and the Solomons as far south as Guadalcanal. The Allies occupy the New Hebrides, and intend to wrest control of Guadalcanal from the Japanese.

A moving point on the map accompanied by an identifier (e.g., a box labeled "TF62") represents the location of a friendly task group. A small cross represents a sighting of an enemy unit. Aircraft symbols represent known aircraft movements.

◀ *Destroyer transport (APD) unloading U.S. Marines, 1942. (National Archives)*

CHANGE SCALE (ZOOM/UNZOOM)

The strategic map has two levels: level 1, which shows the largest scale, and level 2, which displays more detail. The strategic map always appears on level 1; to change scale to level 2, press the *zoom* key. Press *unzoom* to return to level 1.

SLIDE (SCROLL MAP)

This works just like the tactical charts: move the cursor to the edge of the map in the direction you wish to scroll. Note that the level 1 map scrolls up and down, but not left and right.

TIME RATE

You can speed up or slow down the game by pressing the *increase time rate* and *decrease time rate* keys.

BASE INFORMATION

When you place the cursor over one of the bases on the strategic map, a base information text window appears, displaying the base's name, who occupies it currently (Americans or Japanese), and its location. It also lists any air groups in residence, and how many troops the occupying force has there. (The latter information is subject to some variation if the *Inaccurate Reports* reality option is active.)

TASK GROUP INFORMATION

Placing the cursor over a friendly task force or task group causes a task group information window to appear. This window displays the group's name or number, its location, heading, and speed, and its ship makeup, showing numbers of TRs (transports), DDs (destroyers and destroyer-transports), CLs (light cruisers), CAs (heavy cruisers), BBs (battleships), and CVs (carriers and seaplane carriers). Any supplies and troops carried are also listed.

TASK GROUP COMMAND MENU

If you click on a friendly task force, a command menu appears that includes the following options:

Set Speed: This enables you to select the speed of your task force, limited by the top speed of the slowest ship.

Set Waypoints: When you select this option, the menu disappears, and the task group's current waypoints and course become visible. To edit these waypoints, move the cursor to the desired points and click.

Select Formation: Select this option and the command menu disappears, to be replaced by a series of menus that enable you to select formation for each division in the task group. If you select "antiaircraft" formation from the first such menu, it will be applied to the entire task group and no further division menus will appear.

ENGAGEMENTS

When a friendly task group comes within combat range of an enemy unit, an engagement information window appears reporting the location and the unit involved. If the friendly task group is one over which you have control (i.e., not a carrier force), a command menu appears with the following options:

Command: Selecting this option puts you in tactical command of the battle and sends you to the bridge of the task group flagship. You will probably want to take personal command of all important battles.

Observe: When you select this option, you remain at the strategic level of the simulation. The battle is fought out without your direct participation, and you receive a report of the results. This option is provided so that you do not have to bother personally commanding every small scuffle between minor units. Of course, if you prefer to play it out, you can select *Command* instead.

Results of Engagements: An engagement ends when all of one side's ships have fled the battle area or been incapacitated (or sunk). The simulation then returns to the strategic map. Ships in your task force that have been badly damaged immediately leave the group and head for your home base.

RECONNAISSANCE AND INTELLIGENCE

You can't make strategic decisions without information, particularly information about enemy movements and activities. Your strategic information comes from naval intelligence, sightings from coast watchers, submarines, and carrier aircraft (over which you have no control), and from reconnaissance flights by observation aircraft (which you can control).

NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

Occasionally a message box will appear on the strategic map with information from naval intelligence about enemy activities or intentions. This is often advance information about the enemy, and therefore doubly valuable (as opposed to sightings, which are current or recent information).

SIGHTING INFORMATION

An enemy sighting is indicated on the strategic map by a small cross. A recent sighting shines brightly; crosses gradually fade and disappear as their relevance fades with time.

Place your cursor over a cross and a sighting information text window appears with details about the unit sighted: time seen, course, speed, and task group makeup. (Note that if you have selected the *Inaccurate Reports* reality option this information may be only partially correct.)

AIR SEARCH

To perform an air search you must first click on a friendly base with an air group. When the base screen appears, select the *Air Search* option. The strategic map will then return, with a wedge-shaped search area extending from the chosen base toward the cursor. (The length of the wedge indicates the range of the planes being used to search; the width depends on the number of planes available.) Move the cursor until the wedge covers the area you want searched, and click to select.

ATTRITION REPORTS

In addition to information about the enemy, you will sometimes receive messages about damage and losses to friendly task groups due to aircraft or submarine attacks. Enemy bases with air groups in residence pose a grave danger to any task groups foolish enough to pass near them during daylight hours.

ORGANIZING TASK FORCES

As overall commander of your side's surface ships in the Guadalcanal Campaign, it is up to you to create the task forces that will carry out the missions intended to bring victory over your opponents. You will be doing most of your task force formation at your home base (Espíritu Santo or Rabaul); that is where your available ships start the campaign, where reinforcements appear, and where damaged ships and task groups retreat to after battle.

Task groups can only be created or changed at a friendly base. No task group away from a base can be altered (except through combat) until it returns a friendly base.

To organize or change a task group or task force, click on a friendly base to call up the base menu, then choose the *Available Ships* or *Edit Task Group* option.

AVAILABLE SHIPS

This option opens the available ships menu, which lists all of the ships currently at the chosen base (regardless of task group assignment). Place the cursor over the box in the lower left to highlight a ship name. A silhouette of the ship appears above, and its statistics and current condition are listed at the left. Click on the ship name to see a rotating three-dimensional view of the ship.

EDIT TASK GROUP

Selecting this option brings up the *Assign Task Groups* worksheet, a multiple menu that enables you to create and change task groups by moving ships from one category to another.

In the bottom half of the screen are two menu boxes. The left menu consists of *Available Ships, Damaged Ships,* and any existing task groups at the base. The right menu also lists existing task groups, plus *Create New Task Group.* Clicking on any of these options replaces the menu with a list of ships in the option selected.

- *Available Ships* lists all undamaged ships in the base, regardless of task group affiliation. (Left menu only.)
- *Damaged Ships* lists all damaged ships currently undergoing repairs at the base. (Left menu only.)
- An existing task group lists all ships currently assigned to it. (Note that ships formerly assigned to a group that became damaged are now on the *Damaged Ships* list and are no longer listed with their former group.)
- *Create New Task Group* names/numbers a new task group and opens an empty list. (Right menu only.)

When you highlight a ship name with the cursor, that ship's silhouette and current statistics appear above.

Assigning ships to task groups: First, make sure both the right and left menus are open to task groups, *Available Ships* or *Damaged Ships.* Highlight a ship on either side, then click on it to transfer it to the list on the other side. For example, suppose *Available Ships* is open on the left, and *Task Group 62.1* is open on the right. You highlight the USS *Vincennes* on the *Available Ships* list, then click on it. The *Vincennes* is then added to the *Task Group 62.1* list on the right. To remove it from TG 62.1, highlight the ship's name on the right menu and click on it, and it will disappear from the *Task Group 62.1* list.

Note that only damaged ships can be moved into the *Damaged Ships* list.

Task Group makeup: Remember these rules about task group construction:

- No task group may have more than 8 cruisers and/or battleships in it.
- Maximum task group size is 16 ships (unless there are transports in the group).
- A task group with transports can have no warships but destroyers or destroyer transports (or seaplane carriers) in it; no cruisers or battleships.

SUPPLY AND REINFORCEMENT

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

Though *Task Force 1942* is a naval simulation, ultimate victory in the campaign game depends on your side's ground forces defeating the enemy and winning uncontested control of the island of Guadalcanal. To win, you must keep your troops on Guadalcanal supplied and reinforced. Patrol and bombardment missions may be fun, but you must run a certain number of supply missions to Guadalcanal or the enemy will win and all your patrols and bombardments will have been for nought.

Why not just run supply missions, then? Because transports are slow and extremely vulnerable to surface ship and aircraft attacks, even when escorted. You need patrol missions to whittle down the enemy's offensive capabilities and to keep the enemy's patrols away from your transport-heavy supply missions. You need bombardment missions to suppress the enemy's air groups because your transports aren't fast enough to get in and out of Guadalcanal waters in a single night. Sometimes several patrols and bombardments are needed to set the stage for a successful supply mission, especially if you are delivering a lot of reinforcements. If enemy warships get in among your laden transports and sink a division's worth of troops, it could cost you the campaign.

Unloading U.S. supplies at a Pacific island landing zone. (National Archives.)

TRANSPORTING TROOPS

Troops are transferred in units of 50 soldiers. Each transport can carry up to 1,750 troops. In contrast, destroyer transports (APDS) can carry no more than 150 soldiers, while big seaplane carriers like the Japanese *Chitose* and *Nisshin* can each transport as many as 3,000 troops. Guard your fleet of transports well: they are your only method of getting large quantities of troops to Guadalcanal quickly.

Unfortunately, reinforcements intended for Guadalcanal do not appear at your home base in a steady stream. They arrive in big, awkward quantities like battalions and divisions, usually later than you needed them but before you're ready to transport them. (The actual reinforcement schedule for both sides varies slightly as to arrival times, and is never the same from one campaign game to the next.)

Keep an eye on the number of troops you and your enemy have on Guadalcanal. If you have fewer than your opponent, then you had better consider a troop-heavy supply mission.

If either side seems to gain a significant advantage in number of troops, it will initiate an attack on an enemy-held base. Whether the base holds or is captured, both sides will lose troops. Be prepared to act quickly to reinforce your troops after a battle.

Note also that, even if there are no battles, troop numbers on Guadalcanal gradually decline nonetheless due to the presence of loathsome tropical diseases and relatively primitive medical conditions. (Troop numbers also decline when they are out of supply — see below.)

SUPPLY AND RESUPPLY

Supplies are measured in ton units; each ton of supplies will feed and arm 50 soldiers for about one day. An APD can carry a maximum of 288 tons of supplies; a transport can carry 3,360 tons; a seaplane carrier can haul up to 5,760 tons. (Note: 96 tons take up the same amount of room as 50 troops and their equipment.) The troops occupying Henderson Field automatically receive 96 tons of supplies per day via air cargo, but this is not nearly enough to keep a large force in supply. Both sides must make regular naval supply runs to Guadalcanal or suffer the consequences of running out of supply.

The consequences are dire: troops at a base that runs out of supplies may lose as much as 20% of their strength *per day*. Even if you have no more reinforcements to bring to Guadalcanal, you can always make an impact on the ground combat situation by interdicting the enemy's supplies. If you can keep your own troops supplied while cutting off the enemy's resources, your side will eventually win.

American transports en route to Pacific war zone. (National Archives.)

PLANNING MISSIONS

Once you have organized your task group and decided what to do with it, you must select its actual mission. Missions can be selected at any base where you have ships. Click on a base and select *Supply Mission, Patrol Mission,* or *Bombard Mission* from the base menu.

Once you have chosen mission type, it takes three steps to determine the details. Step one is creating your task force from a menu that lists all task groups available at your chosen base. Clicking on a task group on the base menu transfers it to the mission task force menu; clicking on a group in the task force returns it to the base.

Step two is selecting a commanding admiral from a list of those available for assignment. The admirals are all officers who were present in the campaign, and reflect the aggressiveness or caution of the historical admirals. You must have an admiral for each task group, and (if your task force consists of more than one task group) an overall commander for the task force. The admirals are listed on the left menu, the task groups on the right. Select a task group first by clicking on it, then click on the admiral you wish as commander. Continue until every command spot is filled.

In step three you select your mission's destination. You will see a proposed route out and back plotted on the strategic map; successive turn locations are called *waypoints.* Standard waypoints are assigned, but you are given the opportunity to alter these. Once you are done editing waypoints, time resumes on the strategic map and your task force starts its mission.

Some of these steps vary by mission type, as described below.

SUPPLY MISSIONS

Step one for supply missions involves not just selecting a task force, but also loading it. First, be sure to select a group that you know contains at least one transport or destroyer transport. (The Japanese may also use destroyers and seaplane carriers as transports. Once you have made your selection, the loading worksheet appears. This consists of a base menu on the left and a task group menu on the right, each listing the troops and supplies currently assigned to the base or task group. The task group menu also has a digital capacity number that indicates how much of the task group's cargo capacity is currently filled. (For example, if the capacity number reads 35%, then whatever troops and supplies are listed on the task group menu fill up 35% of the task group's potential carrying capacity.)

To load or unload, simply click on the troops or supplies you wish moved and they will transfer from one side to the other (in units of 50 troops or 96 tons of supplies). You can switch back and forth until you have achieved the mix of troops and supplies you want.

(The supply problem in this campaign is a matter of transport rather than availability; for this reason, the amount of supplies available at the home bases of Espíritu Santo and Rabaul is unlimited.)

In step three of mission selection you must choose a friendly base as a destination. The base menu will be replaced by the strategic map with the waypoints of your mission displayed. You can then move and click with your cursor to change your waypoints, should you choose, excepting the waypoint of your destination base.



U.S. Navy night shore bombardment in the Central Solomons, 12 July 1943. (National Archives.)

PATROL MISSIONS

The function of a patrol mission is either to send your ships where they are likely to find the enemy, or to place them to defend against a likely enemy attack. Since a patrol mission isn't bound for a specific base, in step three you must *Select Patrol Time* before you *Select Waypoints.*

When you choose *Select Patrol Time,* the *Patrol Duration* menu appears. This shows the end time of the patrol (which always starts out at about 24 hours from the current time), and three options: *Earlier, Later,* and *OK.* Click on *Earlier* or *Later* to change the patrol's end time, and select *OK* when you've selected the duration you want.

Select Waypoints sends you to the strategic map, where no default waypoints are displayed: you must select all waypoints yourself. Note that if you place a waypoint at a certain location, then place a second, then place the third at the same location as the first, your ships will patrol between the first and second waypoints until it is time to return to base. This enables you to place your ships where you think the enemy will pass in hopes of ambushing them.

BOMBARDMENT MISSIONS

A bombardment mission is the easiest type of mission to set up. Just select your task group, admiral, and the enemy base you intend to bombard. When you get to the waypoint editing step you will notice that there are several unchangeable waypoints adjacent to the base chosen to be bombarded. These are the bombardment waypoints, which are navigation points your ships will sail between while conducting the bombardment.



GAME OPTIONS

■ This chapter explains in detail the various options available for playing the game, and their effects.

SELECTING YOUR ACTION

On this screen you are invited to select the type of game you want to play: a single historical battle (Historical Engagements), a full campaign game (Guadalcanal Campaign), or an engagement you define for yourself (Simulated Encounter).

HISTORICAL ENGAGEMENTS

The Solomons Campaign of World War II was the most intensive period of naval surface action in the history of modern warfare. In addition to countless small skirmishes there were at least a dozen significant surface engagements big enough to be called "battles." Since aircraft ruled the daytime in the Solomons, all of these actions took place at night.

If you select *Historical Engagements,* you are given a menu of eight battles to choose from, listed in chronological order.

Savo Island: 9 August 1942. This battle took place shortly after the initial landing on Guadalcanal by the U.S. Marines, when the transports were still unloading troops and supplies. The Allied ships defending the transports were completely surprised by a Japanese cruiser force and largely annihilated in one of the worst defeats in the history of the U.S. Navy. This is not an easy scenario for Japanese players, who may push too far into Savo Sound and find themselves surrounded by American defenders. It is even harder for players of the American side, who must defend against a powerful, concentrated cruiser force with smaller units scattered in several areas. Furthermore, the crews of the American ships have been on alert for several days, and start the battle in a highly fatigued condition.

◀ *Japanese painting depicting the Battle of Savo Island. An Australian cruiser is struck by torpedoes. (National Archives.)*

Cape Esperance: 11-12 October 1942. In this battle an American cruiser-destroyer force intercepted a roughly-equivalent Japanese force of cruisers and destroyers bent on bombarding Henderson Field. Historically, the American group "crossed the T" of the bombardment force and surprised and battered the Japanese. For either side, this is a clear, manageable engagement for the beginning to intermediate player.

Guadalcanal I: 13 November 1942. The wildest, most confusing naval melee in World War II. Once again, an American cruiser-destroyer force intercepted a Japanese bombardment group, but this time the Japanese brought two battleships, and the two forces blindly plowed into each other in the dark, intermingling in a horrific brawl. This scenario is a challenge for either side, particularly the American player, who must find a way to cope with those two battleships.

Guadalcanal II: 14-15 November 1942. The Japanese tried for Henderson again with another battleship-cruiser bombardment force, but this time they encountered two modern American battleships. Split into four groups, the sizeable Japanese force offers a considerable command and control problem to the player of the Japanese side. The U.S. side features a compact but very powerful task group, highly maneuverable but badly outnumbered.

Tassafaronga: 30 November 1942. A Japanese "Tokyo Express" force of eight destroyers was ineffectually ambushed by an American cruiser-destroyer force. With a textbook-perfect torpedo attack, the Japanese destroyers mauled the American cruisers at the expense of only one DD. This is an easy and straightforward scenario, with either side highly recommended for beginning players.



Photograph from a Japanese cruiser of the USS Quincy, *pinned by searchlights and under fire, at the Battle of Savo Island. (U.S. Naval Historical Center.)*

Kula Gulf: 5-6 July 1943. A force of American light cruisers and destroyers attempted to bottle up and sink several small forces of Japanese destroyers and destroyer transports. They were only partially successful, and lost a cruiser to Japanese torpedoes. The American side of this scenario offers a good introduction to task group command against limited opposition. Playing the weak and disjointed Japanese command is a distinct challenge for the more experienced player.

Vella Lavella: 6-7 October 1943. This was an all-destroyer engagement, and for once it was the Americans who were split up. Nine Japanese destroyers and destroyer transports were opposed by three U.S. destroyers (with three more on the way). Despite being outnumbered, the (by this time) highly-trained American destroyermen turned the Japanese back. It is an interesting challenge for the American player to try to do as well as his or her historical counterpart.

Empress Augusta Bay: 2 November 1943. A big battle, the climax of the naval Solomons Campaign. To oppose the American invasion of Bougainville, the Japanese sent two heavy cruisers accompanied by two destroyer divisions. The Americans stopped them with a task group of light cruisers and destroyers. This is a good intermediate-level scenario for either side.

For further information on the Historical Engagements as seen by the opposing sides, see the **ID Book.**

Selecting Variability: After you choose an historical engagement, you will be asked to select between *Historical Conditions* or *Variable Conditions.* If you select *Historical,* your opponents' ships will begin the scenario at the historically correct speed, heading, and locations. If you select *Variable,* these factors will change with every engagement, which increases replay value by making them less predictable.

Oil-soaked survivors of the USS Helena, *rescued after the Battle of Kula Gulf. (National Archives.)*

GUADALCANAL CAMPAIGN

This selection enables you to control all of one side's surface ships in the struggle for Guadalcanal. This is a long campaign, and it will take many battles to decide the outcome. Engagements result from your decisions on how and when to supply and reinforce your troops on Guadalcanal, or when and where to attempt to interfere with the enemy's movements. The campaign begins on 7 August 1942 with the American invasion of Guadalcanal and capture of Henderson Field, but from that point the possible variations on history are virtually infinite.

SIMULATED ENCOUNTERS

This option enables you to set up your own engagement, choosing the sides and placing the encounter anywhere in the Solomon Islands.

Selecting Opponents: You construct the opposing task groups by "purchasing" ships for points, so your first task is to decide how powerful these task groups should be. Your options are:

8-Point Task Group
16-Point Task Group
24-point Task Group
32-point Task Group

Keep in mind that you can have a maximum of twelve ships per task group; destroyers cost 1 point; light cruisers cost 4 points; heavy cruisers cost 6 points; battleships cost 12 points; and *Yamato*-class superbattleships cost 15 points.

After you select how many points you will expend, an *Edit Task Group* menu appears so that you can select the exact ships you want, first for the American side, then for the Japanese.

Selecting Location: Once you have selected the opposing sides, you must choose the ground for this naval duel. The strategic map appears with an X-shaped cursor on it; select the location for your encounter and click. (You may zoom and unzoom the map if you choose.) You can only choose locations within the Solomon Islands.

After you place the location, the cursor will snap to the clock in the corner of the screen. The clock reads 0000 (midnight): press up or down on your controller or arrow keys to move the time forward or back. Click when it displays the starting time you want.

RESUME A SAVED GAME

Choosing this option summons a menu of previously saved games. Select the game you wish and click to resume where you left off.

QUIT THE GAME

This option returns you to the operating system of your computer.

NAVY SELECTION

Once you have selected your action, you have the opportunity to choose which side you will play: United States Navy or Imperial Japanese Navy.

REALITY OPTIONS

We all like an historical simulation to be as "real" as possible, but certain aspects of reality can make a game seem too slow or too difficult to play. This is largely a matter of personal preference, so *Task Force 1942* allows you some leeway in reconfiguring reality to suit yourself.

In seven key areas the *Task Force* player has the option of choosing between an easier, simplified condition, or a more difficult, more "real" condition. In each case the simplified condition is the default mode; clicking on a selection toggles it to the more difficult condition. (Selecting it again will toggle it back to "easy.")

Clear Visibility / Impaired Visibility: In *Clear Visibility* condition, observation and targeting are unhindered by darkness or smoke — it's as if it were always broad daylight. With *Impaired Visibility,* night and smoke obscure targets as described in the chapter on **Commanding a Task Force**.

No Dud Torpedoes / Dud Torpedoes: If you select *No Dud Torpedoes,* any torpedo that strikes a target will explode. With *Dud Torpedoes,* torpedoes fail at an historically accurate rate (a rate well over 50% for the American Mark 15 model).

No Friendly Fire / Friendly Fire: Selecting *No Friendly Fire* means that none of your ships will mistakenly fire on another of your ships, even if you give them a direct order. If you select *Friendly Fire,* mistakes may occur in the confusion of battle.

Tracer Ammunition / Standard Ammunition: With *Tracer Ammunition,* salvos from the ship you are in always appear brightly lit, and are easy to follow in toward your target. With *Standard Ammunition,* all the shells in the air look the same, and you will have a much harder time picking out your own shots.

Time Freezes During Orders / Time Elapses During Orders: In the first condition, everything pauses while a command menu is open. Players are free to take their time over their decisions. If *Time Elapses During Orders,* however, the battle continues while the player dithers!

No Fatigue / Fatigue Effects: In the *No Fatigue* condition, ships' crews will always be in full readiness for combat, regardless of how long they've been on alert or at general quarters. If *Fatigue Effects* is active, keeping ships in combat or on patrol status for extended periods will cause crew performance to degrade, affecting targeting, reloading speed, and repairs.

Accurate Reports / Inaccurate Reports: If you select *Accurate Reports,* intelligence on enemy movements, aerial observations, and estimates of enemy losses will all be 100% accurate. With *Inaccurate Reports,* however, you will get only an approximation of the truth. (This option appears only in Campaign games.)

The number of reality options in "easy" and "hard" modes affects scoring, as shown by the "score multiplier" at the bottom of the *Reality Options* screen. The base score multiplier (all options "easy") is 1; an additional 0.33 is applied for every "hard" option chosen. (See Scoring)

SCORING

Even an historical simulation needs an abstract scoring system, if only so players can keep track of their improvement and compare performances. Campaign games, which usually consist of a series of battles, are scored quite differently from the single-battle historical engagements and simulated encounters. Final scores are displayed on the *Hall of Fame* screens that appear at the end of each game.

SCORING HISTORICAL ENGAGEMENTS AND SIMULATED ENCOUNTERS

Scoring single battles is a relatively simple proposition: compare the player's damage and losses to the opponent's damage and losses to see how well the player did.

The player starts out with a base score of 1,000 (because we're going to be doing subtraction, and this counters our aversion to negative point scores). Points are then awarded based on the following table:

Enemy Ship Damaged

Ship Type	Light	Moderate	Heavy	Sunk
Destroyer Transport	1	2	4	8
Destroyer	2	4	8	16
Transport	4	8	16	32
Seaplane Carrier	8	16	32	64
Light Cruiser	8	16	32	64
Heavy Cruiser	12	24	48	96
Battleship	24	48	96	192
Superbattleship	30	60	120	240

After the points scored for damaging enemy ships are totaled, points are totaled for damage to the player's ships, using the same table. Points for damage to the player's ships are then subtracted from points for damage to the enemy, and the resulting value is added to the base score of 1000. This total is then multiplied by the "score multiplier" (as computed at the bottom of the *Reality Options* screen) to compute the final total score for this engagement.

SCORING THE GUADALCANAL CAMPAIGN

As the Guadalcanal Campaign has a clearcut win-loss condition, a winning campaign is scored differently from one in which the player loses.

Scoring a Win: Points are subtracted from a base score for each day after 7 August 1942 the campaign lasted. (Thus, the quicker the win, the more points scored). Points are then added in for enemy ships damaged and each ship the player has remaining, and the total is multiplied by the "score multiplier."

Scoring a Loss: Points are added to a base score for each day after 7 August 1942 the campaign lasted. (The longer the player held out, the higher the score). More points are added for enemy ships damaged and each ship the player has remaining, and the total is multiplied by the "score multiplier."



HISTORICAL NOTES

THE NAVAL TREATIES & THE PRE-WAR PERIOD

■ World War I ended in 1918, leaving a great many people in the combatant nations heartily sick of war and determined to prevent its recurrence in the future. Encouraged by President Wilson's Fourteen-Point Peace Plan and by the founding of the League of Nations, they hoped for a general disarmament and a pursuit of the arts of peace. These hopes soon foundered on the rocks of distrust between the great naval powers, who were now Britain, the United States, and Japan. Britain had always depended on sea power to hold her farflung empire together, and as a matter of longstanding policy it was held that the Royal Navy had to be the most powerful navy in the world. But by the end of the war the United States Navy was larger than the Royal Navy in manpower terms, and the U.S. Government served notice that it planned to build ships until its navy was the equal of the Royal Navy. The British, though they could not afford it, defiantly swore to maintain the primacy of the Royal Navy regardless of the cost. Meanwhile, Japan was finishing the big battleship *Nagato,* the world's first warship to carry 16" guns, and was planning to build eight more brand-new modern battleships in the next ten years.

A new naval arms race was under way, but cooler heads in the respective national governments were determined to stop it before it got out of hand. When the Harding administration came in in 1921, they immediately began organizing a series of naval disarmament talks between the great powers. The Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22 resulted in several important treaties that shaped naval construction and fleet composition for the next fifteen years.

It was agreed that the United States, Britain, and Japan would maintain a ratio of battleships of 5:5:3, putting the American and British navies on parity, with the Japanese (who, it was argued, had only one ocean to defend) at a somewhat lower level. The Japanese were not happy about this — they wanted at least a 10:7 ratio — but went along in return for an agreement that all fortification of Pacific islands would stop. The eventual limits were to be 15 capital ships each for Britain and the U.S., with nine for Japan. None were to exceed 35,000 tons, or have guns larger than 16". In addition, cruisers were limited to 8" guns and 10,000 tons displacement.

◀ *American fast battleship the USS North Carolina. (National Archives.)*

The governments were happy with the Washington Naval Treaty, but none of their navies liked it. Both the American and Japanese navies complained that the treaty limited them to fleets too small to defend their interests in the Pacific. Furthermore, the U.S. Navy was now unable to press forward with its plans to fortify Guam and the Philippines. But the armed services were out of fashion, and war with Japan seemed a distant possibility.

Limited by budget and by treaty, the navies were forced to innovate. Noting the lack of treaty limitations on number of cruisers, the Imperial Japanese Navy began to build a variety of new cruiser classes. They also labored to perfect their torpedo technology and tactics while the rest of the world's navies concentrated on gunnery. American naval research and development was inclined more toward electronics, working the bugs out of sonar detection and paving the way for radar. Naval aviation received a great deal of attention on both sides of the Pacific, as America and Japan gradually built up the world's greatest carrier forces.

By the late 1920s Britain, the U.S., and Japan were all exploiting loopholes in the Washington Naval Treaty to build up their cruiser forces, so a new conference was called in Geneva in 1927 to extend the limits to cruisers. This time Britain and America could not agree, and the conference ended in failure. The Japanese were building large cruisers that went well beyond the size limits of the original treaty, and it looked as if the race could spiral out of control. Then came the Great Depression.

Suddenly, large navies were an expensive luxury, and disarmament was once again in favor. In 1930 the London Naval Conference convened with Britain and the United States determined to come to an agreement. The Japanese, however, were just as determined to raise their ratio from 5:3 to 10:7.

In the Five-Power Treaty that resulted (including minor players Italy and France), the cruiser problem was solved by Britain agreeing to a lower ceiling, and by dividing cruisers into two types: heavy cruisers with up to 8" guns, and light cruisers with no greater than 6" guns. The 5:5:3 ratio for capital ships was reconfirmed and extended to heavy cruisers, with a 10:10:7 ratio granted to the Japanese in light cruisers. Everyone agreed to build no new big ships for six years.

However, big changes were on the horizon. The aggressive and militaristic Japanese Army was gaining increasing influence in domestic politics, and the Japanese Navy, though a separate institution, was itself being drawn into a more aggressive position. The Navy was controlled by two separate groups: the Navy Ministry, a civilian bureau which made most of the funding and policy decisions (and which had negotiated the Naval Treaties), and the Navy General Staff, which directed fleet operations and prepared the war plans. As the Japanese militarists began asserting themselves in the early 1930s, the moderates of the Navy Ministry were gradually eclipsed by the more aggressive Navy General Staff, and the Staff gradually assumed many of the policy functions once filled by the Ministry.

In 1931 the Japanese Army, acting on its own initiative, invaded and conquered Manchuria, beginning Japan's 15-year intervention in China. This was naked expansionism, but for a while Europe and America were too involved in their own economic woes to pay much heed. Japan began building up its navy, secretly and systematically violating the Naval Treaties; as the treaties had been "imposed" on her by more powerful nations, she felt justified in breaking them.

Despite the threatened build-ups that had provoked the Naval Treaties, the United States had built very few new ships in the 1920s, and its navy was far below the limits allowed by treaty. 1932 saw the election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, a man who had a special feeling for the United States Navy and was determined to see it expanded, even in hard times. The National Industrial Recovery Act, which included appropriations for a number of ships, was the start of the Navy's rebirth, but things really got under way with the Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934, which laid out a five-year building plan to bring the fleet up to treaty limits, largely with new, modern ships.

The Japanese government, as usual, viewed all American naval construction with alarm and began loud protests, on the basis that this build-up could only be intended for use offensively against Japan. Japan gave notice that it would not renew the treaties, and that as of 1937 the Japanese would accept no limitations on what they might build.

In Japan and in the fascist-ruled countries of Europe militarism marched on, but in the United States isolationism was in vogue, and most Americans turned a blind eye to events elsewhere in the world. In 1937 Japan began its wholesale invasion of China — the so-called "China Incident." When the Japanese besieged the city of Nanking, British ships on the Yangtze River and the gunboat USS *Panay* were attacked by aircraft of the Japanese Army. The *Panay* was sunk, and two days later the Japanese conquered the city and began the Rape of Nanking, in which terrible atrocities were committed against Chinese soldiers and civilians.

Despite the sinking of an American ship and the well-documented atrocities of the Japanese invaders, few Americans paid attention. American rearmament continued to proceed at a maddeningly slow pace until World War II began with the German invasion of Poland in 1939 — and even then, attention was almost universally directed toward Europe.

With the outbreak of war in Europe, the real build-up of the U.S. Navy began in earnest. Keels were laid for new aircraft carriers, new fast battleships (the first U.S. battleships since World War I), and scores of smaller warships. When focused, American industrial might was impressive, but Japan had a half-decade head start. Her navy sported many brand new ships, many old ships had been modernized, and the secret superbattleships *Yamato* and *Musashi* were nearing completion. The Imperial Japanese Navy felt itself ready to take on the world.



Japanese battleship Kongo *in Tokyo Bay, late 1942. (U.S. Naval Historical Center.)*

THE OPPOSING FLEETS

The standard naval warfare doctrine (as propounded by U.S. Navy Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan in the late 19th century) maintained that control of the sea would be won or lost in a big decisive battle between two opposing navies. Before the war both the United States Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy adhered to this concept, and it seemed to have been supported by their recent naval experience: the American fleet had decisively defeated the Spanish Navy in the Battle of Manila Bay, while the Japanese Navy had triumphed over the Russian fleet at the Battle of Tsushima. (It was held that the Battle of Jutland in World War I had been inconclusive only because the German fleet was allowed to "get away.") Accordingly, both countries approached warship design with an eye toward what place a ship would have in the Decisive Battle. Though carriers took on more importance as the 1930s progressed, doctrine held that the outcome of the Decisive Battle would be determined by big guns, not by aircraft. Until Pearl Harbor, battleships were still the queens of the fleet.

Battleships: In the half-century before 1941, a battleship was the crowning glory of a nation's armed forces. It was the single most expensive and visible symbol of a country's armed might, and represented the height of military technology. Control of the sea depended on "battle fleets," which consisted of support and scouting ships around a core of mighty battleships. It was assumed that long-range gun duels between battleships would determine the outcome of the Decisive Battle that would settle the naval war, so it was essential to have the best, and the most, battleships.

Countries that could not afford battleships had to rely on some sort of less expensive technology to balance the scales, and so modern-style torpedoes were born. Battleships had several defenses against torpedo attack, including armor, torpedo "bulges" below the waterline that kept torpedo explosions away from their vitals, and their sheer size, which meant (hopefully) that they could not be crippled by single hits. Most importantly, battleships had big guns that far outranged torpedoes, and which could be brought to bear on torpedo-carrying ships long before they got into launching range.

American plans for dealing with a war with Japan were based on the assumption that, due to the Naval Treaty limitations on capital ships, the U.S. Navy would necessarily have more battleships in the Decisive Battle than Japan, and thus would probably be victorious if they could concentrate their forces. (This ideal scenario envisioned fifteen American vs. nine Japanese battleships.) However, this plan depended on the U.S. Navy being able to get its battle fleet across the vast Pacific Ocean and into Japanese home waters, where it was assumed the Decisive Battle would take place. Thus an important design factor in all American battleships was long cruising range.

Equally important was fire control for all those big guns. The Americans had great faith in long-range gunnery, and developed excellent fire-control computers in order to maximize the value of their presumed preponderance in heavy guns.

All the American fire-control theories assumed that the Decisive Battle would be fought in the daytime, in good visibility. While the Imperial Japanese Navy planners adhered to the Decisive Battle theory, they had other ideas on where and when it would be fought. To get to the Japanese home waters the American battle fleet would have to pass through a zone of Japanese-occupied islands in the Central Pacific, where the American fleet would be worn down by attacks from submarines and long-range "Betty" bombers. By the time the Americans reached the final battleground the odds should be more nearly even — and there the Japanese counted on quality to overcome American quantity.

Japan had four battleships in the early 1930s. Two old dreadnoughts were modernized and brought up to battleship status, while four battlecruisers (the *Kongo* class) were refitted and reclassified as fast battleships, bringing the battleship total to ten. With all ten ships regularly modernized throughout the late 1930s, Japan was justly proud of her battleship fleet.

Plus secretly, virtually unguessed-at in the United States, the I.J.N. had been working on the completion of two superbattleships, the mightiest warships the world had ever known: the *Yamato* and *Musashi.* Tipping the scales at almost 70,000 tons displacement, armed with 18.1" guns, they were so far outside Naval Treaty limitations that the I.J.N. was sure no other ships could stand against them. With these ships in hand, the odds of success in the Decisive Battle seemed better than even.

However, in America battleship design had not stood still either. Though the U.S. Navy had built no new battleships for twenty years, in 1938 they began building a series of new "fast battleships," ships which could make over 25 knots and thus could keep up with aircraft carriers and heavy cruisers. Though still within Naval Treaty limitations — 16" guns and 35,000 tons — when the *North Carolina*- and *South Dakota*-class ships were finished in 1940-41 they incorporated all the most modern design features, including substantial secondary batteries of dual-purpose 5" guns in twin turrets, and the best search and fire control radar in the world. And they were to be followed in 1942 by the first of the mighty *Iowa* class, 45,000-ton battleships that, with their

New Orleans-class heavy cruiser USS Vincennes. (National Archives)

advanced fire control, might have proven a match even for the *Yamatos*. America had long lagged behind in the battleship race, but she was fast catching up.

Cruisers: The role of the cruiser in the battle fleet was a matter of some debate throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Originally the cruiser's main function was that of scouting: finding the enemy battle fleet, shadowing it and reporting on its formation. As this function was gradually taken over by aircraft, the cruiser began to assume more of a screening role, keeping aircraft and torpedo-carrying destroyers away from the capital ships at the center of the battle fleet. Some were designed especially as leaders of destroyer squadrons. With treaty limitations making battleships so expensive and rare, cruisers were even assigned roles in task groups that theoretically should have gone to battleships (especially in the Solomons Campaign).

The Washington Naval Treaty of 1921 limited cruisers to 8" guns and 10,000 tons displacement, but there was no limit on the number of cruisers that could be built, so the Americans and, especially, the Japanese experimented with various cruiser designs throughout the interwar period. After 1930 cruisers with 8" guns were referred to as heavy cruisers, while cruisers with 6" or smaller guns were labeled light cruisers, even if they had the same tonnage as the heavies.

The first heavy cruisers the U.S. Navy built under treaty limits, the *Pensacola* and *Northampton* classes, followed the American practice of relying on big guns (they originally had a few torpedo tubes, almost as an afterthought, but they were removed in early refittings). They were built with a long cruising range in mind, so in order to keep the weight down they went a bit too light on the armor. This defect was largely remedied in the *Portland* and *New Orleans* classes, which pushed the 10,000-ton displacement limits to the edge.

Many felt that the 8" guns of the heavy cruisers were simply too slow-firing to be truly effective against fast, nimble opponents like destroyers, and the result was the *Brooklyn* class of light cruisers built in the late 1930s. Each of these was armed with 15 rapid-firing 6" guns, which the U.S. Navy was confident would be just the thing to stop a destroyer attack in its tracks.

All of the above ships were equipped with reconnaissance aircraft so they could still fulfill the old scouting role. The Japanese, too, made sure all their large cruisers mounted observation planes so they could scout for the battle fleets, but they assumed that carrier task forces would have an even greater need for "eyes" than battle fleets. The *Tone* class of cruisers was designed especially to meet this need, and had an unusual configuration: four dual 8" gun turrets mounted on the bow, with the after deck kept entirely open for aircraft. The *Tone* and *Mikuma* could each keep up to five planes in the air at a time, searching far ahead of their carrier task force.

The *Furutaka* and *Aoba* classes were roughly equivalent to the American heavy cruisers, as were the *Myokos* and *Takaos,* but the latter two classes were expanded so greatly in a series of modernizations that they ended up being 30-40% larger than the American heavy cruisers (and well outside treaty limitations). The

The Japanese light cruiser Nagara leaving Kure, Japan, in 1938. (U.S. Naval Historical Center.)

Mogami class ships were even originally built as light cruisers, but once the treaties no longer held, they were enlarged and rebuilt as heavies, their 6" guns replaced with 8" weapons.

One great difference between American and Japanese heavy cruisers is that the Japanese vessels were all well-equipped with torpedo tubes, and cruiser torpedo attack was a well-practiced tactic. The Americans assumed that the range of 8" guns made torpedo attacks against cruisers futile. The Japanese, with the secret and exceptionally long-ranged Long Lance torpedo, knew better.

Torpedo tactics were also crucial to the role of the Japanese light cruisers, which were considerably smaller than American light cruisers, lightly armed and armored, and were intended primarily to serve as leaders of destroyer flotillas. The night torpedo attack was central to Japanese doctrine, so it was important to have flagships to command destroyer units under the difficult conditions of night combat. The I.J.N. even experimented with a light cruiser that mounted only two light guns, but *ten* quadruple torpedo mounts! (These torpedo-heavy monsters didn't figure in the Solomons Campaign, and thus do not appear in *Task Force 1942.*)

The Japanese seemingly had a specific cruiser type for every possible role but one: antiaircraft defense. In that area the Americans were the leaders with their *Atlanta*-class light cruisers, which mounted 16 dual-purpose 5" guns in eight twin mounts. The *Atlantas* pointed the way toward the increased screening role that cruisers would play in the latter half of the war, when the dominance of air power made it clear that antiaircraft defenses were of paramount importance. But by then, a great many of the pre-war cruisers had been sunk in the waters of the Solomon Islands.

Destroyers: Antisubmarine vessels, scouts, torpedo launchers, antiaircraft defense, screens, fast transports — destroyers were the utility ships of the fleet, liable to be assigned to almost any duty. Descended from the torpedo boats of the late 19th century, destroyers were originally intended as fast torpedo platforms, inexpensive and expendable counters to the vast dreadnoughts of the battle fleets. In World War I they became a key naval resource in the antisubmarine war, and they increased in importance in World War II, when it became necessary to defend the fleets from aircraft as well as submersibles. And they were essential for screening against surface ships, as well. Whatever the mission, there were never enough destroyers.

The Japanese assumed the lead in the late 1920s with the *Fubuki* class, which were arguably the best destroyers in the world at the time, especially after they were rebuilt to improve their stability. Armed with six 5" guns, they were the first destroyers in the world with enclosed gun mounts. They were fast, relatively large, and were well-equipped with torpedoes. Subsequent Japanese destroyer classes all incrementally improved on the *Fubuki* design, and all incorporated a special feature that was unique in the world and largely unknown to the U.S. Navy: reloads for the torpedo mounts. American destroyers carried only the torpedoes in their tubes, but the Japanese could launch a spread of torpedoes, withdraw for a few minutes to reload, then return for another assault.

The Japanese decided early on that the main function of destroyers was still torpedo attack, so they retained a consistent design philosophy throughout the interwar period. The U.S. Navy, on the other hand, changed emphasis every few years and ended up with a larger variety of destroyer designs. The *Farragut* class, designed in the early 1930s, was the first new batch of destroyers built since World War I, and featured five of the new 5" dual purpose guns. They were followed by the large *Porters,* which were designed as destroyer leaders (performing roughly the same function as the Japanese light cruisers), and had four twin turrets. The *Mahan* class set the standard for the destroyers built in the second half of the thirties: 1,500 tons, four 5" guns, and three torpedo mounts. Except for differences in the number of torpedoes the *Gridley, Sims,* and *Benson* classes were largely variations on the same theme, each slightly better than the last. The real breakthrough came in 1942 with the *Fletcher* class: these were big, well-armed, and extremely versatile. Many consider them the best all-around class of destroyers of World War II.

Despite this variety, the most unorthodox destroyers in the Pacific were not American, but Japanese. The *Akizuki* class were designed for an antiaircraft defense role, and were originally considered small light cruisers, but were then downgraded to destroyer class and fitted with torpedoes. The *Akizukis* sported four twin mounts fitted with rapid-firing 3.9" dual-purpose guns which, at short range, could be extremely deadly to other destroyers. There was nothing else quite like them.

Tactics: A key difference between the opposing fleets was the Japanese emphasis on night combat, particularly night torpedo attacks. The Imperial Japanese Navy counted on an effective night torpedo attack to whittle down the opposition preceding the Decisive Battle between battle fleets; night combat was practiced regularly and rigorously, even at the expense of ships damaged and lost in nighttime collisions. Special night optics were developed for targeting in darkness, and lookouts were trained to a level that enabled them on occasion to outperform radar. Over and over destroyers and cruisers trained in the tactic of closing with an unsuspecting enemy and launching a full spread of torpedoes before engaging them with gunfire. They knew they had the best torpedoes in the world, and were determined to make the most of them.

In addition to training and retraining, the war with China, while not primarily a naval conflict, nonetheless gave the Japanese Navy a wealth of experience that the U.S. Navy, at peace since 1918, necessarily lacked. By the time war began with the United States many Japanese naval crews had been fighting and training together for years, and this gave them an undoubted initial advantage. Japanese crews were highly disciplined and their commanders were used to following instructions with precision.

Perhaps partly as a result of this, Japanese admirals tended to favor complex formations, intricate maneuvers, and plans that required strict adherence to timetables. In short, they repeatedly made plans that could not help but fall apart in the chaos of battle. Japanese naval sub-commanders were trained to follow orders precisely, but were not encouraged to show initiative in situations that weren't covered by those orders, so Japanese battle plans frequently started well but ended poorly. Time and again their training and tactics would bring them to the verge of a smashing victory, but when the plan fell apart the commanders, unsure how to proceed, would withdraw and fail to exploit their gains, letting otherwise helpless enemies escape to fight another day.

The Americans had different problems. For most of the period between the wars the U.S. Navy was allowed to stagnate. Ships were scarce, and promotions were even scarcer; naval officers soon learned that a captain who damaged a ship had ended his career. Ammunition was expensive and dangerous, and on exercises it needed to be treated with the utmost care. *Be cautious* was the lesson

The light antiaircraft cruiser USS Atlanta, photographed on 25 October 1942. (National Archives.)

that most American captains learned, until caution became second nature to them. Sadly, caution is not a pre-eminent virtue once war actually breaks out. To win battles, the navy needed officers who were willing to fight and take risks; many officers who performed well in peacetime simply were not up to these wartime demands. 1942, the first full year of the war, was a shakeout period during which the fighting sailors gradually eclipsed the peacetime officers, but it was an expensive process, in ships and lives.

American officers preferred simple column formations to the complicated column-and-screen arrangements of the Japanese, with mixed results. The column is easier to control and maintain in a night battle than more complicated formations, but it has no warning screens, and the Americans tended to keep their columns at the same course and speed for too long, which was suicidal when facing masters of torpedo combat like the Japanese. Destroyer divisions were often kept too close to the bigger ships, negating the "small boys'" advantages of speed and maneuverability.

American training and doctrine emphasized the importance of gunnery, and accurate gunnery had always meant fighting in daylight, so training in night combat was a rare event in the U.S. Navy. The special problems of command control and target identification in night actions received little attention before the Guadalcanal Campaign, and as a general rule the Americans were ill-prepared for fighting at night. They lacked the superb night optics the Japanese had developed, and either ignored the unique advantage radar gave them, or relied on it too heavily. In night combat, American sailors had to learn through hard experience what the Japanese had learned through training.

Where the Americans excelled was in flexibility, initiative, and the willingness to keep fighting. At the battles of Savo Island, Guadalcanal, and Tassafaronga, the U.S. Navy paid a terrible price for its lack of preparation, but as a result they learned, adapted, and began to innovate. Once they learned the requirements of night combat and realized the potential of their radar equipment, the Americans were able to beat the Japanese at their own game. A year after Tassafaronga many of the crack Japanese destroyer squadrons that had made the "Tokyo Express" a legend were broken up or sunk, while the Americans had destroyer squadrons that were the equal or better of their opponents.

PEARL HARBOR TO MIDWAY: THE FIRST HALF-YEAR OF THE WAR

When the Imperial Japanese Navy determined that war with the United States was inevitable, they settled on a plan to cripple the American Pacific Fleet at one blow with a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor Naval Base in Hawaii. A task force built around four fleet carriers sailed undetected to within 250 miles of Pearl Harbor and launched a massive air strike on the morning of December 7, 1941. The Americans were caught completely by surprise; six of the eight battleships present in the harbor were sunk, and the other two were damaged. At one blow, the core of the U.S. Navy's Pacific battle fleet was shattered.

Almost simultaneously, Japan launched attacks on the Philippines, Guam, Wake Island, and the British possessions of Singapore and Hong Kong. If anyone still doubted the ability of aircraft to sink unprotected battleships, it was proven again within the week when Japanese Navy "Betty" bombers torpedoed and sank the H.M.S. *Repulse* and *Prince of Wales.*

Fletcher-class destroyer USS Charles Ausburne. (National Archives.)

On December 22 Japan launched a full-scale invasion of the Philippines. Despite a desperate but uncoordinated defense by American and Filipino troops under the command of General Douglas MacArthur, the islands fell to the Japanese on April 9, 1942.

Japan's second major southern thrust, the invasion of Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, was equally successful. In succession Malaya, Singapore, and Sumatra all fell to the Japanese invaders, who next set out to conquer oil-rich Java. Their invasion fleet was met on February 27 by a combined Dutch, American, and British task force; their battle with the Japanese escorts is known as the Battle of the Java Sea. The forces appeared roughly equal (Allies: 2 CAs, 3 CLs, 9 DDs; Japanese: 2 CAs, 2 CLs, 14 DDs), but the Allied ships had never worked together before and entered the battle fatigued. That, plus superior training and teamwork on the part of the Japanese, resulted in a decisive victory over the Allied force. The two cruisers that escaped were sunk two days later in the Battle of Sunda Strait. The invasion force was barely slowed down, and Java joined the roster of Japanese conquests.

The Americans needed to do something to prove that the Japanese were not invulnerable, that the Allies could strike back. On April 18 the U.S. Navy and Army Air Force staged the famous "Doolittle Raid," in which B-25 bombers launched from the carrier *Hornet* bombed Tokyo and other major cities, doing negligible damage but striking a blow at Japanese pride — especially that of the Imperial Navy, which was not supposed to allow an enemy to get close enough to hit at the home islands.

In late January the Japanese had conquered the Bismarck Archipelago islands of New Britain and New Ireland, appropriating the base at Rabaul. By the beginning of May they were ready to make their next move south, into the Solomon Islands. The U.S. Navy, which had broken the Japanese naval codes, was aware of the move in advance, and had moved a pair of task forces built around the carriers *Yorktown* and *Lexington* into the area. On May 3rd a Japanese landing force took the port of Tulagi, and was attacked shortly thereafter by carrier aircraft from the American task force, which sank several transports. The Japanese, alerted, diverted a carrier group of their own from escorting a New Guinea invasion force and began looking for the Americans. On the 7th of May, the Americans and Japanese found each other, and the Battle of the Coral Sea began.

This was the first carrier-*versus*-carrier battle, a fight in which the opposing fleets never saw each other. Each side lost one carrier sunk and one damaged, with the Japanese inflicting a bit more damage than they suffered, but it was a strategic victory for the Americans as the New Guinea invasion force was turned back. However, the Japanese claimed it as a victory; one more to add to their unbroken string. The Americans were still on the defensive.

The carrier USS *Yorktown* was rushed back to Pearl Harbor for repairs, because codebreakers in Naval Intelligence knew that the Japanese planned to strike next at Midway Island in the Central Pacific, a base within aircraft range of Hawaii. The Japanese planned to use the attack on Midway to draw out the American fleet for the Decisive Battle: the Americans would be overwhelmed and destroyed, and Japan would have control of the Pacific.

However, U.S. Naval Intelligence, through brilliant codebreaking and astute guesswork, had figured out just where the Japanese carrier attack would come from, and the U.S. Navy had a carrier force of their own lying in ambush. On 4 June the Japanese carrier planes attacked the tiny island of Midway — and the American carrier planes attacked the Japanese carriers. The Japanese retaliated, and sank an American carrier, but the Japanese lost all four of their fleet aircraft carriers, and the invasion of Midway was called off. It was a decisive American victory that went a long way toward redressing the losses suffered at Pearl Harbor.

Without the four carriers lost at Midway the Imperial Japanese Navy no longer enjoyed a clear advantage over the U.S. forces. The Americans began to think about taking the offensive, and turned their eyes toward the Solomon Islands.

THE GUADALCANAL CAMPAIGN

The Japanese had occupied a fine harbor at Tulagi, but the real prize lay across Savo Sound on the island of Guadalcanal: an area flat enough and dry enough to support a major air base, a rarity in the steep volcanic Solomons. From such a base the Japanese could strike at northern Australia and the New Hebrides, and threaten to cut off the lines of communication between the United States and Australia.

The Allies had agreed on a strategy of "Germany First": defeat the Nazis in Europe, then turn to Japan and the Pacific. Though most of the Allies' resources were going to prepare for the invasion of North Africa, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral King and the U.S. Navy felt that a blow had to be struck at the Japanese before they could advance any further and while their conquests were still unconsolidated. At first it was proposed to assault and recapture Rabaul, but on closer inspection this seemed far too ambitious, and plans were made instead to invade the southern Solomon Islands. The news that the Japanese were building an airfield on Guadalcanal clinched it: Operation "Watchtower" would consist of an invasion of Tulagi and Guadalcanal, which was code-named "Cactus."

"Watchtower" was very much a Navy operation, so the U.S. Marines were tapped to perform the invasion. A landing force was organized consisting of the 1st Marine Division, the 1st Marine Raider Battalion, and various support elements. This was to be the first major American amphibious landing of the war, and its organization was rather haphazard: the troops received little training, there was almost no intelligence about the landing sites, supplies and equipment were stowed poorly on the transports, or left on the docks. The invasion was originally scheduled for August 1st, but was pushed back to August 7th.

Despite the confusion, on August 7th nearly a score of transports appeared in Savo Sound and began disgorging landing craft full of American Marines bound for the beaches of Guadalcanal and Tulagi. The transports were escorted by nearly every American warship in the southwest Pacific, including a task force built around three carriers which provided air support from south of Guadalcanal. The Marines had to fight to take Tulagi, but on Guadalcanal nearly all the opposition just faded into the jungle. The Marines took easy possession of the unfinished airstrip, dubbed it "Henderson Field," and immediately set about finishing it.

The Japanese command at Rabaul was completely surprised by the invasion of Guadalcanal and Tulagi. The Rabaul command was responsible both for the Solomon Islands and for prosecuting the ongoing fight for New Guinea, and though the latter was considered far more important, when news of the invasion arrived air strikes for New Guinea were immediately retargeted for the American invasion force. Determined attacks on both the 7th and the 8th by squadrons of "Betty" bombers inflicted little damage on the invasion fleet, but they persuaded Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher to withdraw his carrier task force late on the 8th.

This left Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, commander of the invasion fleet, in a bind. Did he dare to stay within range of enemy bombers without air support? He called a conference the night of the 8th-9th with Admiral Crutchley, commander of the escort ships, and Marine General Vandegrift to decide what to do.

That night the Japanese Navy struck. At Rabaul Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa had responded to news of the invasion by immediately gathering every warship within reach and shaping a course for the landing zone. He arrived in the early hours of August 9th with five heavy cruisers, a light cruiser, and a destroyer, and shattered the defending Allied warships in the Battle of Savo Island. His escorts virtually wiped out, Turner had no choice but to order the withdrawal of the transports — with their holds still half-full of the Marines' supplies.

Suddenly the U.S. Marines on Guadalcanal were out on a limb: occupying an island in enemy territory, short on ammunition and goods, with no reliable air or sea communication with their sources of supply and reinforcement.

Both sides set about devising ways to reinforce and resupply their troops on the island. Since Guadalcanal could be reached by land-based bombers from both sides, having ships in the area in daytime was dangerous, so neither side considered sending a force of vulnerable transports. Within a week both the Americans and Japanese were reinforcing at night using fast destroyer transports, which ideally could arrive after dark, unload, and leave the vicinity by dawn, greatly decreasing the chance of being spotted and attacked by enemy aircraft.

The Japanese made no more major air attacks on the American positions until late August, resuming on the very day that the Marines

The Guadalcanal landings as seen from the bridge of the transport USS Neville. (National Archives.)

finally finished Henderson Field and flew in two squadrons of fighters and dive bombers. Thereafter dogfights between Japanese planes from Rabaul and the defending American "Cactus Air Force" were an almost daily event.

Initially the Japanese badly underestimated the number of American troops on Guadalcanal, and sent reinforcements in groups of 1000-2000 soldiers on the assumption that these would be enough to dislodge the invaders. A unit of 1000 troops, landed in mid-August, was completely destroyed when it tried to assault the American position.

The Japanese air raids that began on 20 August were preparation for the arrival of a somewhat larger force. A major supply mission built around three transports was scheduled for the 24th-25th, with a heavy escort of cruisers and destroyers. Simultaneously two carrier task forces advanced into the waters north of the Solomons, hoping that the convoy would draw the American carriers to where they could be attacked and destroyed. The result was the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, a carrier battle in which the Japanese lost a light carrier, *Ryujo,* and the American carrier *Enterprise* was badly damaged. *Enterprise* was sent back to the States for repairs, while a number of her planes were landed at Guadalcanal and joined the Cactus Air Force.

(This illustrates an interesting side effect of carrier battles. While the player of *Task Force 1942* has no direct control over carrier task forces, as in the real campaign the loss of a carrier will often free up aircraft or escort ships for use in and around Guadalcanal.)

The Cactus Air Force proved it was a force to be feared when it attacked the oncoming Japanese convoy and turned it back, after sinking a transport and the light cruiser *Jintsu.*

The Japanese returned to reinforcement by destroyer run. These almost-nightly runs came to be known to the rueful Americans, who could do almost nothing to stop them, as the "Tokyo Express."

Through September and October both sides continued to dribble reinforcements into the Guadalcanal campaign: ships, planes, and troops. Despite constant attrition, both sides' forces gradually built up, and larger and larger battles were fought: the battles of the Matanikau, the Battle of Bloody Ridge on land, and the Battle of Cape Esperance at sea. Neither side was able to build up a decisive advantage: the Americans were diverting most of their effort to Europe, while the Japanese were attempting to conquer New Guinea while keeping a strategic naval reserve at Truk to defend their farflung conquests.

Reinforcing by destroyer simply wasn't sufficient for the rapid build-up the Japanese needed to push the Americans off Guadalcanal, but the Cactus Air Force made it unsafe to use transports. Daily air raids hurt the Americans at Henderson Field, but couldn't stop them: something else needed to be done to suppress them. The Japanese decided to shell them to smithereens with battleships. The *Kongo* and *Haruna* were sent to bombard Henderson Field, and they almost succeeded in putting the Cactus Air Force out of business. When six transports full of Japanese troops arrived the next day, few planes could be mustered to attack it, and most of the troops were able to land safely. However, by a supreme effort (and despite a cruiser bombardment that night), the next day the Cactus Air Force and planes from the carrier *Hornet* attacked the still-unloading transports and sank four of them.

American supply and reinforcement runs, some with transports, were now more frequent, despite the danger, and American carrier planes were becoming a nuisance to Japanese shipping. Near the end of October the Japanese once again tried to draw out the American carriers with simultaneous convoy and carrier attacks. This time the troops were carried in destroyers, and the convoy was successful. The carrier move resulted in the Battle of Santa Cruz, another inconclusive carrier battle in which the Japanese carriers *Zuiho* and *Zuikaku* were damaged and the American carrier *Hornet* was sunk.

By the beginning of November Japanese troops had made a half-dozen major ground assaults on the American positions on Guadalcanal, all of which had ended in failure (just barely, in some cases). The Japanese decided that it was time to make a supreme effort to get an overwhelming force onto the island. They scheduled a major assault for 14 November, mustering nearly all their resources: a big convoy of 11 transports escorted by 12 destroyers; a bombardment unit of battleships to suppress Henderson Field; three groups of cruisers covering the approaches to Guadalcanal from different directions; and a carrier force to provide air cover for the convoy.

Simultaneously, the Americans were planning a major reinforcement move of their own, with two supply missions built around 3 and 4 transports, respectively, escorted by cruisers and destroyers and covered by a carrier task force to the south. The Americans also had intelligence of the Japanese effort, and were beefing up the Cactus Air Force in anticipation. Clearly, a major clash was in the offing.

The American convoys arrived first and unloaded on the 12th and 13th, in between defending against attacks from enemy aircraft. After dark on Friday the 13th the transports pulled out — but they left their escorts behind to intercept the Japanese. At midnight the Japanese bombardment group arrived, complete with battleships, and the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal began.

Guadalcanal I — the Battle of Friday the Thirteenth — ended with the bombardment group turned back, the battleship *Hiei* sunk, and the American escort group in tatters. The American group was forced to retire; the Japanese, undeterred, simply set the invasion schedule back a day and sent in a cruiser force to bombard Henderson Field. Unfortunately for Imperial plans, the cruiser batteries didn't pack enough firepower to flatten the airstrips, and their accuracy was poor into the bargain.

To the chagrin of the transport convoy, Henderson Field was remarkably unsuppressed on the morning of the 14th. Cactus Air Force planes harried the convoy throughout the 13th and 14th, with help from planes from *Enterprise,* and by nightfall of the 14th six of the transports were sunk or abandoned.

But this time the convoy didn't turn back. Under the command of the tenacious Admiral Tanaka they continued, assured that Henderson would soon be suppressed by a third bombardment group consisting of a cruiser division, a battleship, and two destroyer squadrons. The Japanese were convinced that the Americans had nothing left that could turn back such a mighty force as this.

They were wrong. The Americans had an ace in the hole: two new fast battleships, the *Washington* and *South Dakota,* were sent in with four destroyers to ambush the Japanese attack. Previously the U.S. Navy had avoided risking their few battleships in the constricted waters of the Solomons, preferring to keep them for carrier escort duty, but this was a last resort: the outcome of the whole campaign could depend on keeping Henderson Field open for business.

Japanese and American battleships met in the graveyard waters near Savo Island, and while *South Dakota* was damaged, *Kirishima* was sunk. Once again a bombardment group was turned back, and Henderson was spared. The convoy was not: the few transports that made it to Guadalcanal were driven onto the beaches, where the supplies were destroyed and troops massacred by a swarm of planes from Henderson Field. Another major Japanese offensive had failed.

It was to be the last. The Tokyo Express continued to operate for a while (an attempt to stop it resulted in the Battle of Tassafaronga, an American defeat), but the next major Japanese naval operation was the evacuation of the remaining Imperial troops at the beginning of February.

There were two main reasons the United States won the Guadalcanal Campaign. First, they won strategic victories in most of the key battles, victories which cost them a heavy price in men and ships but which nearly always stopped the Japanese from achieving their objectives. Second, while both sides lost a staggering number of soldiers, ships, and planes during the half-year campaign, the Americans, with their industrial might and larger population, were able to replace these losses. For the Japanese, the losses were irreplaceable, and thereafter the tide of war turned against them. Once Japan evacuated Guadalcanal, the initiative in the Pacific passed over to the Americans. Before the Guadalcanal Campaign Japan clearly had the upper hand in the Pacific; after Guadalcanal, and for the rest of the war, Japan was strictly on the defensive.



APPENDICES

DESIGNER'S NOTES

■ The concepts behind *Task Force* coalesced in mid-1991, when my co-designer, lead programmer Ed Fletcher, and I independently arrived at the idea of doing a WWII Pacific naval game. We had each come up with our own proposals, but when we learned that we were both working the same side of the street we joined forces, creating a single proposal that contained the strongest features of both. *Task Force* was conceived as the first game of a series that, taken together, would recreate the entire Pacific naval war. Surface action is the least complex aspect of the war to simulate, so we decided to do that first; *Task Force* will then be followed by a compatible (and as-yet-unnamed) aircraft carrier game that will be part flight simulator and part grand strategy game. *Task Force* covers ship-to-ship combat, while the sequel will be plane-*vs.*-ship and plane-*vs.*-plane.

Once we got the go-ahead on the project, our first task was to get master military-hardware artist Max Remington on board. After a year and a half of drawing aircraft Max was eager for a change. We showed him some diagrams of WWII warships and he was hooked; in minutes he was already figuring out how best to render them onscreen so all those little details would show up. It likewise wasn't hard to snag Mike Reis, the artist who created the acclaimed 2-D screen graphics for *Gunship 2000.* Once Mike heard that we were working on a naval game, he insisted on being a part of it. Mike recommended the addition of Todd Brizzi, a talented newcomer who had first made his mark on *Civilization.* Next we needed someone real sharp to work with Ed on the programming, someone who would be as enthusiastic about this project as the rest of the team. It took a bit of doing, but Ed finally found the perfect partner in John Paquin, who has turned out to be a wizard at both 3-D and 2-D graphics display.

◀ *Kent-class heavy cruiser HMAS Canberra, photographed 22 July 1942. (National Archives.)*

One of my functions on the project being that of historian, it was my job to come up with the setting for the game. It didn't take long to settle on the Solomons Campaign, in the second half of 1942. The succession of sea battles in the Guadalcanal area was the longest series of surface actions in modern naval history, and the most savage. In the constricted waters of the Solomons, the American and Japanese navies lost ship after ship in a series of ferocious night battles in which neither side to gain the upper hand. For months the two navies wrestled, the Americans with their barely-understood new technology of radar, and the Japanese with their superior training, superb night optics, and deadly Long Lance torpedoes. Both navies had a tradition of victory, and neither would concede the issue as long as they had any chance of success.

Our goal was to try to replicate the experience of a commander in one of the confusing and frenzied Solomons night actions. Tactically, that meant controlling multiple ships that move and fight in formation; acting on limited information available from lookouts (and radar, if American); and making interesting decisions about when to open fire, launch torpedoes, dodge torpedoes, lay smoke, use searchlights or flares, etc. The key to success would be the interface, the ability to control all this quickly and smoothly, and move from station to station without losing track of events. Some military simulators have so many controls to learn that they can be quite intimidating at first, but by keeping everything tied to a simple, mobile menu system, we tried to create a game that is easy to learn and use but has enough variability for fascinating, long-term play.

Graphically, we had to try to recreate the look and feel of a naval action, which meant detailed and recognizable 3-D warships, realistic bridge and battle stations for both navies, gun flashes, fires, torpedo wakes, huge towering splashes, and flares drifting down out of the dark. To do this, John Paquin has taken the existing *F-117A* 3-D system and optimized it for a naval campaign, giving us realistic water

effects, the rugged volcanic landmasses of the Solomons chain, and the ability to display a number of very complex warships simultaneously. Created by Max Remington, the warships themselves are true works of art, carefully-layered masses of hull, turrets, stacks and superstructures that replicate the well-known shapes and silhouettes of the great WWII fighting ships. (The seaplane tenders even have recognizable floatplanes on them!)

There are over forty classes of warship in the game, from APDs (obsolete destroyers converted into transports) all the way up to the mightiest battleships, including the *Iowa* and the *Yamato*. Each is accurately represented as regards size, speed, range, armor and armaments, fire control systems, and so on. Gunfire in *Task Force* is computed using actual 3-D ballistics, rather than mere statistics: the path of each shell is computed in real time, so you can watch a salvo arc up, come down, and straddle a target — splash, hit, splash! Each ship has damage locations in 3-D, so where it's hit is where it's damaged. Damage effects vary depending on location, armor penetration, etc. Hits on aircraft or a fuel bunker cause fires; torpedo hits cause flooding below decks; a hit on a magazine may cause a ship to blow up!

Ed Fletcher is responsible for the realistic ballistics, and also for implementing the warship A.I. behavior, a very tricky problem indeed. Trying to get a formation of warships to behave intelligently and realistically in the chaos of battle (and in real time!) is a daunting prospect. The fact that our task groups move and react in a way that seems to reflect decisions made by an actual human commander speaks highly of Ed's skills as a game programmer.

But then, we had an actual human commander to help us get it right. Our technical advisor on *Task Force* was Vice Admiral William P. Mack (Ret.). Admiral Mack was a gunnery officer on an American destroyer during the Guadalcanal campaign, and later went on to become commander of the Seventh Fleet and head of the Naval Academy at Annapolis. Nowadays he's the author of a series of historical novels based on the Pacific naval campaign, so he knows this subject matter from the inside out. He's been a great deal of help to us, providing us with the kind of operational details that you can't get out of the history books. How were the signal lights arranged on American and Japanese ships, and what color were they? How does a ship stay on station during a column turn? What does the operator of a gun director *do?* Admiral Mack would tell us, clearly and colorfully.

(Historical note: the Japanese Navy didn't actually have U.S.-style ID manuals, so we've taken a bit of a liberty by inventing one. What *did* they use to identify enemy vessels? Copies of *Jane's Fighting Ships!*)

Task Force has come out looking even better than we'd hoped, but of course it takes more than graphics to recreate this kind of situation, it takes great sound to bring it home and make it real. As always, our Sound Department has come through, with jarring explosions, crackling radio transmissions, and a rolling nautical score by Jeff Briggs. I also have to commend ace 3-D modeler Frank Vivirito for his work on the stunning opening animation. There's nothing like working with a talented and enthusiastic team on a project that you all believe in. When you put the fun in during development, you know it's going to come out again when the game is played, and there's nothing more satisfying than that.

— Lawrence Schick, August, 1992.

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(ORIGINAL IBM VERSION)

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Shizuka Takahashi for the Japanese Translations

GLOSSARY

AA: Antiaircraft.
All Ships Turn: Ships in a formation all turning simultaneously.
Aola: A base on Guadalcanal's north coast.
APD: Navy letter-code for a destroyer transport.
B-17: Boeing B-17 "Flying Fortress," long-range land-based bomber.
BatDiv: Abbreviation for Battleship Division, a division consisting of battleships.
Battery: Collective term for a ship's guns.
Battleship: A warship armed with 14" to 18" guns, from 30,000 - 70,000 tons displacement.
BB: Navy letter-code for a battleship.
Bearing: The direction you are looking; the direction of a target from your ship; always expressed in compass degrees.
"Betty": Mitsubishi G4M long-range land-based naval bomber, Allied code-name "Betty."
CA: Navy letter-code for a heavy cruiser.
Cactus: American military codename for Guadalcanal.
Capital Ship: A battleship or aircraft carrier.
Casemate: A gun mount system built into the side of a warship.
CL: Navy letter-code for a light cruiser.
Column Formation: Ships following each other in a straight line.
Column Turn: Ships in formation turning one after another.
CruDiv: Abbreviation for Cruiser Division, a division consisting primarily of cruisers.
Cruiser, Heavy: A cruiser armed with 8" guns, typically 9,000 - 15,000 tons displacement.
Cruiser, Light: A cruiser armed with guns no larger than 6", from 3,000 - 10,000 tons displacement.
CV: Navy letter-code for an aircraft carrier.
CVS: Navy letter-code for a seaplane carrier.
DD: Navy letter-code for a destroyer.
DesDiv: Abbreviation for Destroyer Division, a division consisting primarily of destroyers.
DesRon: Abbreviation for Destroyer Squadron, a unit made of several Destroyer Divisions.
Destroyer: A fast, lightly-armed warship, typically 900-2,000 tons displacement.
Destroyer Transport: An obsolete destroyer converted for fast transport duty by the removal of various boilers and weapon mounts.
Division: *Navy:* A subset of a task group, usually consisting of similar ships. *Army:* A large unit of troops composed of several regiments.
Dual Purpose Gun: Suitable for use against both ships and aircraft.
Echelon Formation: Ships following each other in a diagonal line at an angle to the line of motion.
Escort: A warship assigned to protect a more vulnerable ship, such as a transport or aircraft carrier.
Espíritu Santo: American-controlled naval base in the New Hebrides; the American player's home base.
F4F: Grumman F4F "Wildcat," U.S. Navy carrier-based fighter aircraft, also used by land-based Marine units.
FC Radar: Fire control radar, used for targeting but not for searching.
Firing Cycle: The amount of time it takes to reload a weapon and fire again.
Floatplane: An observation plane with pontoons for landing on water; launched from warships by catapult.
Fuel Bunker: A storage tank for fuel oil.
Heading: The direction a ship is going; always expressed in compass degrees.
Henderson Field: An army and air base on the north central coast of Guadalcanal.
I.J.N.: Imperial Japanese Navy.
Iron Bottom Sound: Alternative name for Savo Sound, given due to the many ships sunk there in the Guadalcanal Campaign.
"KA": Japanese military code abbreviation for Guadalcanal.
"Kate": Nakajima B5N carrier-based torpedo bomber, Allied code-named "Kate."
Knot: Naval unit of speed equal to one nautical mile per hour, or about 1.15 m.p.h.
Line Formation: Ships sailing abreast of each other in a line perpendicular to the line of motion.

Long Lance: The excellent Japanese Type 93 torpedo.
Magazine: Ammunition storage compartment.
"Mavis": Kawanishi H6K four-engine flying boat used for long-range reconnaissance, Allied code-named "Mavis."
Mount: A weapon location, open or enclosed with a turret; used for 5" or smaller guns.
Nautical Mile: 2,000 yards.
P-38: Lockheed P-38 "Lightning," two-engined Army Air Force fighter.
P-39: Bell P-39 "Airacobra," Army Air Force fighter.
P-40: Curtiss P-40 "Warhawk," Army Air Force fighter.
PBY: Consolidated PBY "Catalina," U.S. Navy twin-engine flying boat used for reconnaissance.
Point: One point is 22.5 degrees of the compass.
Port: The left side of a ship; to its left.
Rabaul: Japanese-held base on New Britain; Japanese player's home base.
Savo Island: Conical island off the northwest coast of Guadalcanal.
Savo Sound: The open water between Guadalcanal to the south, Savo Island to the west, and Florida Island to the north; also called Iron Bottom Sound.
SBD: Douglas SBD "Dauntless," U.S. Navy carrier-based dive bomber, also used by land-based Marine units.
SC Radar: Early air search radar, American; not very effective against surface targets.
Screen: Small ships interposed between the enemy (or the enemy's presumed location) and a group's larger warships or transports.
SG Radar: American surface search radar; quite effective in the right conditions.
Shortlands: A naval and air base at the southern end of Bougainville controlled at the start of the campaign by the Japanese.
Sidebelt: Hull armor along the side of the ship.
Simultaneous Turn: Ships in a formation all turning at the same time.
Slot, The: Alternative name given to New Georgia Sound, the long passage running northwest - southeast between the Solomon Islands, with Bougainville at the north end and Guadalcanal at the south.
Solution: Targeting computation that solves the problem of where to shoot to hit the target.
Starboard: The right side of a ship; to its right.
Starshell: Illuminating flare ammunition, used to light up a target at night.
Superstructure: All of a ship's upper works above the hull: bridge structure, masts, catapults, etc.
Task Force: A naval force assigned with a specific mission or unction, usually built around a group of cruisers or capital ships.
Task Group: A subset of a task force that can operate independently.
Tassafaronga: A base on Guadalcanal's northern coast.
TBF: Grumman TBF "Avenger," U.S. Navy carrier-based torpedo bomber.
Tulagi: A naval base across Iron Bottom Sound from Guadalcanal that is conquered by the Americans at the start of the campaign.
Turret: An enclosed gun mount for guns with bores larger than five inches.
U.S.N.: United States Navy.
"Val": Aichi D3A carrier-based dive bomber, Allied code-named "Val."
VB-#: U.S. carrier-based bomber squadron (usually SBDs).
VF-#: U.S. carrier-based fighter squadron (usually F4Fs).
VMF-#: U.S. Marine fighter squadron (usually F4Fs).
VMSB-#: U.S. Marine scout/bomber squadron (usually SBDs).
VP-#: U.S. land-based observation-plane squadron (usually PBYs).
VS-#: U.S. carrier-based scout/bomber squadron (usually SBDs).
VT-#: U.S. carrier-based torpedo bomber squadron (usually TBFs).
"Zero": Mitsubishi A6M "Reisen" carrier- or land-based naval fighter, Allied code-named "Zeke," commonly called "Zero."

COMBINED INDEX TO MANUAL AND ID BOOK

Solitary page numbers refer to pages in this manual; page numbers preceded by "A" (e.g., A28) refer to page numbers in the American half of the ID Book; page numbers preceded by "J" refer to page numbers in the Japanese half of the ID Book. Bold-faced page numbers are primary reference listings.

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TASK FORCE 1942 IDENTIFICATION BOOK

JAPANESE NAVAL VESSELS

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON,D.C.

IDENTIFICATION BOOK — JAPANESE NAVAL VESSELS

NAVY DEPARTMENT — OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS — WASHINGTON, D.C.

THIS PUBLICATION HAS BEEN ISSUED FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVIDING A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO THE IDENTIFICATION AND CAPABILITIES OF THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY. THIS EDITION SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUS EDITIONS: OLDER MANUALS MAY BE RETAINED OR DISPOSED OF AS THE COMMANDING OFFICER MAY ELECT.
THIS PUBLICATION CONSISTS OF THREE MAIN PARTS:

1. **JAPANESE NAVAL ORDNANCE:** DESCRIPTIONS OF THE MOST IMPORTANT WEAPONS MOUNTED ON JAPANESE WARSHIPS, BOTH GUNS AND TORPEDOES, PAGE 3.
2. **JAPANESE WARSHIP CLASSES:** DESCRIPTIONS OF THE VARIOUS TYPES OF ENEMY WARSHIPS THAT MAY BE ENCOUNTERED, THEIR STATISTICS AND CAPABILITIES. A SIMPLIFIED SILHOUETTE OF EACH CLASS HAS BEEN PROVIDED FOR IDENTIFICATION PURPOSES, PAGE 9.
3. **AFTER-ACTION REPORTS:** DESCRIPTIONS OF IMPORTANT BATTLES WITH JAPANESE SURFACE UNITS, INCLUDING AN APPRAISAL OF THEIR SIGNIFICANCE, PAGE 31.

THIS MATERIAL IS PREPARED FROM THE BEST INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE NAVY DEPARTMENT AT THE PRESENT. IN SOME CASES, ONLY PARTIAL INFORMATION WAS AVAILABLE. IT IS EXPECTED THAT FUTURE EDITIONS WILL CORRECT THIS.

THIS SECTION PROFILES THE NINE MOST IMPORTANT GUN TYPES FOUND ON IMPERIAL JAPANESE WARSHIPS, AS WELL AS THEIR STANDARD SHIP-MOUNTED TORPEDO. FOR TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS, THE COMMANDING OFFICE SHOULD PAY PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE FIRING CYCLE AND RANGE OF THE VARIOUS WEAPONS.

JAPANESE NAVAL ORDNANCE

18 INCH, TYPE 94

BORE:	18.1"
CALIBER:	45
WEIGHT OF PROJECTILE:	3,210 LBS. (TYPE 91 AP)
MUZZLE VELOCITY:	2,570 FT./SEC.
FIRING CYCLE:	30 SECONDS.
MAXIMUM RANGE:	45,960 YDS.

The heaviest guns ever built for a warship, the Japanese 18-inchers are mounted three to a turret in the *Yamato*-class battleships. Most details of these big guns are still secret, but it's safe to assume that their armor penetration capabilities are markedly superior to those of our 16" battleship guns.

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16 INCH, 3RD YEAR TYPE

BORE:	16.1"
CALIBER:	45
WEIGHT OF PROJECTILE:	2,249 LBS. (TYPE 91 AP)
MUZZLE VELOCITY:	2,570 FT./SEC.
FIRING CYCLE:	22 SECONDS.
MAXIMUM RANGE:	42,000 YDS.

These weapons are roughly equivalent to our own 16" battleship guns. They were developed after the First World War for installation in a series of battleships that was cancelled by the Washington Naval Treaty. Now they are found only in the two *Nagato*-class BBs (*Nagato* and *Mutsu*), mounted in four twin turrets in each ship.

14 INCH, 41ST YEAR TYPE

BORE:	14"
CALIBER:	45
WEIGHT OF PROJECTILE:	1,485 LBS. (TYPE 91 AP)
MUZZLE VELOCITY:	2,540 FT./SEC.
FIRING CYCLE:	30 SECONDS.
MAXIMUM RANGE:	38,770 YDS.

Though not as heavy as our 16" weapons, these are true battleship guns, and not to be taken lightly. They are installed in twin turrets in the four *Kongo*-class battleships.

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8 INCH, 3RD YEAR TYPE

BORE:	8"
CALIBER:	50
WEIGHT OF PROJECTILE:	277 LBS. (TYPE 91 AP)
MUZZLE VELOCITY:	2,756 FT./SEC.
FIRING CYCLE:	15 SECONDS.
MAXIMUM RANGE:	31,600 YDS.

These are the standard Japanese heavy cruiser armament, equivalent to our own 8" guns. They are mounted in the *Aoba-, Myoko-, Takao-, Mogami-,* and *Tone*-class cruisers.

JAPANESE NAVAL ORDNANCE

6 INCH, 3RD YEAR TYPE

BORE:	6.1"
CALIBER:	60
WEIGHT OF PROJECTILE:	123 LBS.
MUZZLE VELOCITY:	APPROX. 3,000 FT./SEC.
FIRING CYCLE:	12 SECONDS.
MAXIMUM RANGE:	APPROX. 30,000 YDS.

These powerful 6" guns are mounted in triple turrets as secondary armament on the vast *Yamato*-class battleships. Exact details of their ballistics are not yet available.

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6 INCH, 41ST YEAR TYPE

BORE:	6"
CALIBER:	50
WEIGHT OF PROJECTILE:	100 LBS.
MUZZLE VELOCITY:	2,800 FT./SEC.
FIRING CYCLE:	12 SECONDS.
MAXIMUM RANGE:	22,970 YDS.

These older 6" guns are mounted as secondary armament on the *Kongo*-class battleships, and as main batteries on the new *Agano*-class cruiser.

5.5 INCH, 3RD YEAR TYPE

BORE:	5.51"
CALIBER:	50
WEIGHT OF PROJECTILE:	84 LBS.
MUZZLE VELOCITY:	2,800 FT./SEC.
FIRING CYCLE:	10 SECONDS.
MAXIMUM RANGE:	21,600 YDS.

This versatile gun is found both mounted on warships and as a coastal defense weapon. It is primary armament on the *Tenryu, Nagara-,* and *Naka*-class light cruisers, and secondary armament on the *Nagato*-class battleships.

5 INCH, 3RD YEAR TYPE

BORE:	5"
CALIBER:	50
WEIGHT OF PROJECTILE:	50 LBS.
MUZZLE VELOCITY:	3,000 FT./SEC.
FIRING CYCLE:	4 SECONDS.
MAXIMUM RANGE:	20,100 YDS.

This 5" gun is the standard Japanese destroyer armament, and compares very favorably with our own dual-purpose 38-caliber 5" gun. The Japanese gun has a slightly longer range, but its rate of fire and armor penetration are somewhat inferior to the American five-inch.

JAPANESE NAVAL ORDNANCE

5 INCH, TYPE 89

BORE:	5"
CALIBER:	40
WEIGHT OF PROJECTILE:	50 LBS.
MUZZLE VELOCITY:	2,370 FT./SEC.
FIRING CYCLE:	4 SECONDS.
MAXIMUM RANGE:	16,000 YDS.

This lighter 5" is a dual-purpose antiship and antiaircraft weapon found on the *Myoko-, Takao-, Mogami-,* and *Tone*-class cruisers.

TORPEDO, 24 INCH, TYPE 93 ("LONG LANCE")

LENGTH:	29 FT. 6 IN.
WEIGHT:	5,952 LBS.
EXPLOSIVE CHARGE:	1,080 LBS.
RANGE:	21,900 YDS. (FAST SETTING)
	35,000 YDS. (MEDIUM SETTING)
	43,700 YDS. (SLOW SETTING)

This is the standard Imperial Navy ship-launched torpedo. All of the above specifications are uncomfirmed and should be considered suspect; if these wild claims are true, it would mean that the "Long Lance" is a far better torpedo than our own comparable Mark XV. In fact, it would make the Type 93 the finest torpedo in the world.

THIS SECTION DESCRIBES THE PRINCIPAL COMBATANT TYPES OF SHIPS IN THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY. WHERE SEVERAL VESSELS ARE KNOWN TO BE BUILT TO A COMMON DESIGN, THEY ARE GROUPED UNDER THE "NAME SHIP" OF THE CLASS. THE FOLLOWING IS AN EXPLANATION OF THE DATA CATEGORIES PROVIDED FOR EACH SHIP CLASS:

KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: THIS LISTS ALL THE SHIP NAMES KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN BUILT IN THE CLASS. SHIPS THAT HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED SUNK ARE NOT LISTED.
MAXIMUM SPEED: MAXIMUM SPEED IS IN UNDAMAGED CONDITION. SPEED IS IN KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH FROM BOW TO STERN, BEAM FROM PORT TO STARBOARD AT WIDEST POINT, DRAFT IS DEPTH BENEATH THE KEEL.
DISPLACEMENT: THE SHIP'S "TONNAGE," ITS SIZE MEASURED IN TONS OF WATER DISPLACED.
FUEL CAPACITY: PRIMARILY FUEL OIL, MEASURED IN TONS.

ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: A SHIP'S MAIN GUN ARMAMENT.
SECONDARY BATTERY: MANY SMALLER SHIPS HAVE NO SECONDARY, SMALLER GUNS.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: ANTIAIRCRAFT GUNS OR MACHINEGUNS, WHERE SIGNIFICANT.
TORPEDOES: NUMBER AND MOUNTING OF TORPEDOES, IF CARRIED.
AIRCRAFT: NUMBER OF CATAPULTS (LAUNCHERS) AND TOTAL NUMBER OF RECONNAISSANCE FLOATPLANES.

PROTECTION

SIDEBELT: HULL ARMOR ALONG THE SIDE OF THE SHIP, THICKNESS MEASURED IN INCHES.

TURRETS: ARMOR PROTECTION ON THE PRIMARY BATTERY.

DECK: THE ARMOR PROTECTING THE INTERIOR OF THE SHIP FROM SHELLS OR BOMBS FALLING FROM ABOVE, COMBINING THE THICKNESS OF THE METAL ON ALL UPPER DECKS.

KONGO CLASS BATTLESHIPS

KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: KONGO, HIEI, KIRISHIMA, HARUNA.
MAXIMUM SPEED: 30 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 704 FT., BEAM 92 FT., DRAFT 26 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 32,000 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 6,330 TONS.



ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 8 X 14" (45), MOUNTED IN 4 TWIN TURRETS.
SECONDARY BATTERY: 14 X 6" (50), MOUNTED IN SINGLE-GUN CASEMATES PORT AND STARBOARD.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: 8 X 5" (AA), IN 4 TWIN MOUNTS; 8 X 25MM AA.
AIRCRAFT: 1 CATAPULT; 3 FLOATPLANES.

PROTECTION
SIDEBELT: 6" - 8"
TURRETS: 9"
DECK: 3"

These battleships were built during the First World War to a British design. Originally classed as battlecruisers, they were redesignated full battleships after their extensive refits in the early 1930s, when they were lengthened, strengthened, and heightened. Though no match for our latest battleships, compared to our heavy cruisers they are awesome indeed.

NAGATO CLASS BATTLESHIPS



KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: NAGATO, MUTSU.
MAXIMUM SPEED: 25 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 725 FT., BEAM 113 FT., DRAFT 31 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 39,000 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 5,650 TONS.

ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 8 X 16" (45), MOUNTED IN 4 TWIN TURRETS.
SECONDARY BATTERY: 18 X 5.5" (50), MOUNTED IN SINGLE-GUN CASEMATES PORT AND STARBOARD.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: 8 X 5" (AA), IN 4 TWIN MOUNTS; 20 X 25MM AA.
AIRCRAFT: 1 CATAPULT; 3 FLOATPLANES.

PROTECTION
SIDEBELT: 12"
TURRETS: 14"
DECK: 3.5"

These ships were begun in the last two years of the First World War, and were the first battleships in the world fitted with 16" guns. They were extensively modernized in the mid-1930s, and are extremely formidable opponents.

YAMATO CLASS BATTLESHIPS

KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: YAMATO, MUSASHI.
MAXIMUM SPEED: 27 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 862 FT., BEAM 121 FT., DRAFT 32 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 64,000 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 6,300 TONS.



ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 9 X 18.1" (45), MOUNTED IN 3 TRIPLE TURRETS.
SECONDARY BATTERY: 12 X 6.1", MOUNTED IN 4 TRIPLE TURRETS.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: 12 X 5" (AA), IN 6 TWIN MOUNTS; 24 X 25MM AA.
AIRCRAFT: 2 CATAPULTS; 7 FLOATPLANES.

PROTECTION
SIDEBELT: 16"
TURRETS: 20"
DECK: 8"

Little is known about these giants, save that they are the largest and most powerful battleships ever built. Be extremely cautious about engaging them in a surface battle.

FURUTAKA AND AOBA CLASS HEAVY CRUISERS



KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: FURUTAKA, KAKO, AOBA, KINUGASA.
MAXIMUM SPEED: 33 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 595 FT., BEAM 57 FT., DRAFT 18 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 9,300 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 2,000 TONS.

ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 6 X 8" (50), MOUNTED IN 3 TWIN TURRETS.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: 4 X 4.7" (AA), 8 X 25MM AA.
TORPEDOES: 8 TUBES, MOUNTED IN 2 QUADRUPLE ROTATING MOUNTS.
AIRCRAFT: 1 CATAPULT; 2 FLOATPLANES.

PROTECTION
SIDEBELT: 1"
TURRETS: 5"
DECK: 2"

Older heavy cruisers, built in the early 1920s and modified in the late 1930s. Though their armor is thin by modern standards, these ships still pack a substantial offensive punch.

MYOKO CLASS HEAVY CRUISERS

KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: MYOKO, NACHI, HAGURO, ASHIGARA.
MAXIMUM SPEED: 34 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 661 FT., BEAM 68 FT., DRAFT 20 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 14,000 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 2,470 TONS.



ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 10 X 8" (50), MOUNTED IN 5 TWIN TURRETS.
SECONDARY BATTERY: 8 X 5" (40) IN 4 TWIN MOUNTS.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: THE 5" GUNS, PLUS 8 X 25MM AA.
TORPEDOES: 8 TUBES, MOUNTED IN 2 QUADRUPLE ROTATING MOUNTS.
AIRCRAFT: 2 CATAPULTS, 3 FLOATPLANES.

PROTECTION
SIDEBELT: 4"
TURRETS: 3"
DECK: 3"

Originally designed to stay within the 10,000 ton limit of the Washington Naval Treaty, these ships were enlarged and modernized in the late 1930s. They were the first of the heavily-armed later cruisers.

TAKAO CLASS HEAVY CRUISERS



KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: TAKAO, ATAGO, MAYA, CHOKAI.
MAXIMUM SPEED: 34 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 661 FT., BEAM 68 FT., DRAFT 20 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 13,000 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 2,600 TONS.

ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 10 X 8" (50), MOUNTED IN 5 TWIN TURRETS.
SECONDARY BATTERY: 8 X 5" (40) IN 4 TWIN MOUNTS.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: THE 5" GUNS, PLUS 8 X 25MM AA.
TORPEDOES: 16 TUBES, MOUNTED IN 4 QUADRUPLE ROTATING MOUNTS.
AIRCRAFT: 2 CATAPULTS, 3 AIRCRAFT.

PROTECTION
SIDEBELT: 4"
TURRETS: 3"
DECK: 3"

Improved versions of the *Myoko*-class cruisers, featuring massive bridge structures and additional torpedo mounts.

MOGAMI CLASS HEAVY CRUISERS

KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: MOGAMI, MIKUMA (SUNK AT MIDWAY), SUZUYA, KUMANO.
MAXIMUM SPEED: 35 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 650 FT., BEAM 66 FT., DRAFT 19 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 12,400 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 2,163 TONS.



ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 10 X 8" (50), MOUNTED IN 5 TWIN TURRETS.
SECONDARY BATTERY: 8 X 5" (40) IN 4 TWIN MOUNTS.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: THE 5" GUNS, PLUS 8 X 25MM AA.
TORPEDOES: 12 TUBES, MOUNTED IN 4 TRIPLE ROTATING MOUNTS.
AIRCRAFT: 2 CATAPULTS, 3 AIRCRAFT.

PROTECTION
SIDEBELT: 5"
TURRETS: 3"
DECK: 2"

These were originally designed under the restrictions of the Washington Naval Treaty as light cruisers, mounting 6" guns, but they were enlarged in 1936 and again in 1939, and the six-inch cannon were replaced with eight-inch guns.

TONE CLASS HEAVY CRUISERS



KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: TONE, CHIKUMA.
MAXIMUM SPEED: 35 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 649 FT., BEAM 60 FT., DRAFT 21 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 11,215 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 2,950 TONS.

ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 8 X 8" (50), MOUNTED IN 4 TWIN TURRETS.
SECONDARY BATTERY: 8 X 5" (40) IN 4 TWIN MOUNTS.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: THE 5" GUNS, PLUS 12 X 25MM AA.
TORPEDOES: 12 TUBES, MOUNTED IN 4 TRIPLE ROTATING MOUNTS.
AIRCRAFT: 2 CATAPULTS, 5 AIRCRAFT.

PROTECTION
SIDEBELT: 3"
TURRETS: 5"
DECK: 2"

Designed as light cruisers with 6" guns, they were actually outfitted with 8" guns, and thus were classed as heavy cruisers. As an experiment, all four main battery turrets were mounted forward of the bridge (a unique arrangement found in no other class of cruiser), which left the quarterdeck free for expanded aircraft usage. The ships were intended to act as aerial scout platforms for the Imperial Fleet.

TENRYU CLASS LIGHT CRUISERS

KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: TENRYU, TATSUTA.
MAXIMUM SPEED: 33 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 460 FT., BEAM 40 FT., DRAFT 13 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 3,230 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 920 TONS.



ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 4 X 5.5" (50), IN 4 SINGLE-GUN MOUNTS.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: 1 X 3" AA.
TORPEDOES: 6 TUBES, MOUNTED IN 2 TRIPLE ROTATING MOUNTS.

PROTECTION
SIDEBELT: 2"

Built during World War I, these were the first modern light cruisers in the Japanese Navy. Like most Japanese light cruisers, they were designed to act as leaders in destroyer flotillas.

NAGARA CLASS LIGHT CRUISERS



KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: NAGARA, ISUZU, YURA, NATORI, KINU, ABUKUMA.
MAXIMUM SPEED: 36 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 530 FT., BEAM 48 FT., DRAFT 16 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 5,170 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 1,260 TONS.

ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 5 X 5.5" (50), IN 5 SINGLE GUN MOUNTS.
SECONDARY BATTERY: 2 X 5.5" (50), IN 2 SINGLE GUN MOUNTS.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: 2 X 3" AA.
TORPEDOES: 8 TUBES, MOUNTED IN 4 TWIN ROTATING MOUNTS.
AIRCRAFT: 1 CATAPULT, 1 FLOATPLANE.

PROTECTION
SIDEBELT: 2"
DECK: 2"

A very capable class of light cruiser, frequently used as destroyer squadron flagships, and well-equipped with guns, torpedoes, and even a floatplane.

NAKA CLASS LIGHT CRUISERS

KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: NAKA, SENDAI, JINTSU.
MAXIMUM SPEED: 35 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 530 FT., BEAM 48 FT., DRAFT 16 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 5,195 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 1,010 TONS.



ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 5 X 5.5" (50), IN 5 SINGLE-GUN MOUNTS.
SECONDARY BATTERY: 2 X 5.5" (50), IN 2 SINGLE-GUN MOUNTS.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: 2 X 3" AA.
TORPEDOES: 8 TUBES, MOUNTED IN 4 TWIN ROTATING MOUNTS.
AIRCRAFT: 1 CATAPULT, 1 FLOATPLANE.

PROTECTION
SIDEBELT: 2"
DECK: 2"

Similar to the *Nagara* class, the improved *Naka* class can be recognized by its distinctive series of four stacks behind the bridge.

AGANO CLASS LIGHT CRUISERS



KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: AGANO.
MAXIMUM SPEED: 35 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 570 FT., BEAM 49 FT., DRAFT 18 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 6,652 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 1,405 TONS.

ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 6 X 6" (50), IN 3 TWIN GUN MOUNTS.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: 4 X 3" AA, 32 X 25 MM AA.
TORPEDOES: 8 TUBES, MOUNTED IN 2 QUADRUPLE ROTATING MOUNTS.
AIRCRAFT: 1 CATAPULT, 2 FLOATPLANES.

PROTECTION
SIDEBELT: 1"

This brand-new class of light cruisers has yet to show itself in combat, so its effectiveness is as yet unknown.

MUTSUKI CLASS DESTROYER TRANSPORTS

KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: YAYOI, UZUKI, SATSUKI, MINAZUKI, FUMIZUKI, NAGATSUKI, MIKAZUKI, MOCHIZUKI, YUZUKI.
MAXIMUM SPEED: 34 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 330 FT., BEAM 30 FT., DRAFT 9 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 1,313 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 420 TONS.



ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 2 X 4.7" (45) DUAL-PURPOSE GUNS, IN 2 SINGLE MOUNTS.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: THE 4.7" GUNS, PLUS 10 X 25 MM AA.
TORPEDOES: 6 TUBES, MOUNTED IN 2 TRIPLE ROTATING MOUNTS.

PROTECTION
NONE

These older, obsolete destroyers have been converted into destroyer transports by removing two of the guns, as well as their minesweeping and minelaying equipment. Revisions to accommodate troops increased the tonnage, which decreased the class's maximum speed from 37 to 34 knots.

FUBUKI AND AKATSUKI CLASS DESTROYERS



KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: *FUBUKI:* FUBUKI, USUGUMO, SHIRAKUMO, ISONAMI, SHIRAYUKI, HATSUYUKI, MURAKUMO, URANAMI, SHIKINAMI, AYANAMI, ASAGIRI, YUGIRI, AMAGIRI, AKEBONO, SAZANAMI, USHIO; *AKATSUKI:* AKATSUKI, HIBIKI, IKAZUCHI, INAZUMA.
MAXIMUM SPEED: 34 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 370 FT., BEAM 34 FT., DRAFT 10 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 2,090 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 500 TONS.

ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 6 X 5" (50), IN 3 TWIN GUN MOUNTS.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: MACHINEGUNS.
TORPEDOES: 9 TUBES, IN 3 TRIPLE ROTATING MOUNTS.

PROTECTION
NONE

Among the finest destroyers in the world when first introduced in the late 1920s, they still hold up very well, though clearly undergunned in antiaircraft weaponry.

HATSUHARU AND SHIRATSUYU CLASS DESTROYERS

KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: *HATSUHARU:* HATSUHARU, YUGURE, ARIAKE; *SHIRATSUYU:* SHIRATSUYU, SHIGURE, MURASAME, YUDACHI, SAMIDARE, HARUSAME, KAWAKAZE, UMIKAZE, SUZUKAZE.
MAXIMUM SPEED: 34 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 350 FT., BEAM 32 FT., DRAFT 10 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 1,600 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 500 TONS.



ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 5 X 5" (50), IN 2 TWIN MOUNTS AND 1 SINGLE MOUNT.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: MACHINEGUNS.
TORPEDOES: 8 TUBES IN 2 QUADRUPLE ROTATING MOUNTS (*HATSUHARU:* 9 TUBES IN 3 TRIPLES).

PROTECTION
NONE

With fewer guns than the *Fubuki*-class destroyers, these later designs are less topheavy and less prone to capsizing. These and all later Japanese destroyers are rumored to carry reloads for their torpedo tubes.

ASASHIO CLASS DESTROYERS



KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: ASASHIO, OSHIO, MICHISHIO, ARASHIO, NATSUGUMO, YAMAGUMO, MINEGUMO, ASAGUMO.
MAXIMUM SPEED: 35 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 380 FT., BEAM 34 FT., DRAFT 12 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 1,961 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 500 TONS.

ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 6 X 5" (50), IN 3 TWIN GUN MOUNTS.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: 4 X 25 MM AA.
TORPEDOES: 8 TUBES, IN 4 QUADRUPLE ROTATING MOUNTS.

PROTECTION
NONE

The *Asashios* are more powerful than the *Shiratsuyu* class, carry an extra gun, and have more modern antiaircraft armament.

KAGERO AND YUGUMO CLASS DESTROYERS

KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: *KAGERO:* KAGERO, OYASHIO, HATSUKAZE, YUKIKAZE, HAYASHIO, MAIKAZE, ISOKAZE, AMATSUKAZE, TOKITSUKAZE, URAKAZE, HAMAKAZE, NOWAKI, ARASHI, HAGIKAZE; *YUGUMO:* YUGUMO, AKIGUMO, KAZEKUMO, MAKIKUMO, MAKINAMI, TAKANAMI, NAGANAMI.
MAXIMUM SPEED: 35 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 385 FT., BEAM 35 FT., DRAFT 12 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 2,050 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 500 TONS.



ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 6 X 5" (50), IN 3 TWIN GUN MOUNTS.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: 4 X 25 MM AA.
TORPEDOES: 8 TUBES, IN 2 QUADRUPLE ROTATING MOUNTS.

PROTECTION
NONE

An improvement on the *Asashios*, these are the finest standard destroyers in the Japanese navy. New vessels of this class appear to be currently under construction.

AKIZUKI CLASS DESTROYERS



KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: AKIZUKI, TERUZUKI.
MAXIMUM SPEED: 33 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 435 FT., BEAM 38 FT., DRAFT 13 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 2,700 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 1,100 TONS.

ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 8 X 3.9" (65) DUAL-PURPOSE GUNS, IN 4 TWIN MOUNTS.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: THE 3.9 INCHES, PLUS 4 X 25 MM AA.
TORPEDOES: 4 TUBES, IN A QUADRUPLE ROTATING TURRET.

PROTECTION
NONE

A hybrid class, originally planned as light cruisers designed to fill an antiaircraft role, then armed with torpedoes so they could act as destroyers. The capabilities of the rapid-firing 3.9" dual-purpose weapons are largely unknown; they may be as dangerous as 5" guns.

CHITOSE CLASS SEAPLANE CARRIERS

KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: CHITOSE, CHIYODA.
SIMILAR: NISSHIN.
MAXIMUM SPEED: 29 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 630 FT., BEAM 61 FT., DRAFT 23 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 11,000 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 3,600 TONS.



ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 4 X 5" (40), IN 2 TWIN GUN MOUNTS.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: 12 X 25 MM AA.
AIRCRAFT: 4 CATAPULTS; 12 FLOATPLANES.

PROTECTION
NONE

Designed to launch, recover, and service seaplanes, these ships may also serve other purposes, such as midget submarine tending or troop transport. They could be particularly useful in the latter category as fast, armed transports.

AFTER-ACTION REPORTS

FOR THE BENEFIT OF UNITS ASSIGNED TO THE SOLOMON ISLANDS REGION, THIS SECTION SUMMARIZES THE AFTER-ACTION REPORTS FROM EIGHT SIGNIFICANT ENGAGEMENTS, IN ORDER OF OCCURRENCE. ALL OF THESE ENGAGEMENTS WERE NIGHT ACTIONS: THIS IS TYPICAL OF SURFACE COMBAT IN THE SOLOMONS.

NOTE THAT INFORMATION ABOUT EXACT DAMAGE SUFFERED BY THE ENEMY IS NECESSARILY INCOMPLETE.

BATTLE OF SAVO ISLAND: AFTER-ACTION REPORT

DATE: 9 AUGUST 1942
LOCATION: SOUTH AND EAST OF SAVO ISLAND, SOLOMON ISLANDS

USN FORCES:

On Picket Duty West of Savo:
USS Blue, DD 387
USS Ralph Talbot, DD 390

Southern Group SE of Savo:
HMAS Canberra, CAI 33
USS Chicago, CA 29 (flag)
USS Bagley, DD 386
USS Patterson, DD 392

Northern Group NE of Savo:
USS Vincennes, CA 44 (flag)
USS Quincy, CA 39
USS Astoria, CA 34
USS Helm, DD 388
USS Wilson, DD 408

Eastern Group, Sealark Channel:
USS San Juan, CL 54 (flag)
HMAS Hobart, CLI 63
USS Monssen, DD 436
USS Buchanan, DD 484

Guarding Transports, off Lunga Point:
USS Selfridge, DD 357
USS Mugford, DD 389
USS Henley, DD 391
HMAS Australia, CAI 84 (at conference)

Situation and Intelligence:

The invasion of Guadalcanal and Tulagi had commenced at dawn on 7 August. The invasion force had been escorted by a large mixed group of cruisers and destroyers, for defense against surface and air attacks. The escort ships had withstood several air attacks on the 7th and 8th, and had been on constant alert for the approach of Japanese surface forces; consequently, all personnel were in a state of fatigue by the evening of the 8th.

Admiral Turner had received several disjointed reports of a Japanese force in the northern Solomons, said to consist of several cruisers, several destroyers, and perhaps some seaplane tenders. Course and speed information did not seem to indicate that they were headed for Guadalcanal, so Admiral Turner surmised that these ships were bound for Rekata Bay on the north end of Santa Isabel, there to set up a seaplane base. Thus, the Japanese force was not considered an immediate threat. Admiral Turner was more concerned about the planned withdrawal of the supporting American carrier forces on the 9th.

Disposition of Forces:

In defending the landing areas on Guadalcanal and Tulagi, Admirals Turner and Crutchley had a difficult tactical problem. The landing areas could be approached either from the east, via the narrow Sealark Channel, or from the west, through the relatively wide Savo Sound. Savo Island sits squarely in the center of the entrance to the sound, midway between Guadalcanal and Florida Island, dividing the entrance in two. Thus the escorting force had to defend three different approaches to the landing area, and the admirals decided to do this by dividing the escort force into three different groups, one for each approach (with a few ships remaining near the transports).

Late on the evening of the 8th Admiral Turner summoned General Vandergrift (of the invading ground forces) and Admiral Crutchley to a conference on his flagship, the transport USS *McCawley*. Admiral Crutchley proceeded to the conference in his ship, the HMAS *Australia*, effecting its (theoretically temporary) removal from the force guarding the southern entrance to Savo Sound.

Action Report:

The Japanese cruiser force apparently slipped between the picket destroyers *Blue* and *Ralph Talbot,* at a point when the pickets were drawing apart from each other, and entered Savo Sound through the southern approach at around 0130 on 9 August 1942. Initially concealed near Savo Island by fog and mist, they emerged into visibility at 0142 only 4,500 yards in front of HMAS *Canberra,* the lead ship of the Allied Southern Group. Several enemy cruisers opened up on *Canberra* simultaneously, and before she could respond or report she was on fire and out of action.

USS *Chicago,* in line behind the *Canberra,* began dodging torpedoes, but at 0147 was hit by two. Only one exploded, but this severely damaged the starboard bow and disrupted the main gun director, limiting the effectiveness of her responding fire. *Chicago* suffered a number of shell hits as she turned due west, while the Japanese proceeded to the east, leaving the severely damaged *Chicago* behind. Unfortunately, *Chicago* made no radio report of the encounter.

Commander Walker of the USS *Patterson* made the first radio warning at 0146, then became embroiled in a gun duel with two enemy light cruisers, using searchlights to illuminate them. At 0148 an enemy shell knocked out her two after gun mounts, but *Patterson* continued to fight until the enemy left the vicinity. USS *Bagley* also reacted aggressively, making a torpedo run on the enemy cruisers, but the results were inconclusive.

With the Southern Group disabled, the enemy proceeded northeast to attack the Northern Group, which, due to an intervening cloudbank, was unaware of the nature of the conflict to the south. The Japanese split their cruiser line into two parts, one sailing east of the Northern Group, while the other kept to the west, thus effectively boxing in the Northern Group .

At 0150 the enemy cruisers illuminated our cruisers *Astoria, Quincy,* and *Vincennes,* and opened fire. Captain Riefkohl, the group commander, initially thought that it was a case of mistaken identity, and that he was under attack by American ships, but he soon realized that the enemy were Japanese. The American ships were all at Condition II, and lost time going to General Quarters. Attacked from two sides by guns and torpedoes, the US cruisers were able to make only a limited response before they were knocked out of action. *Quincy* and *Vincennes* both sustained multiple torpedo hits (as well as gunfire damage), while *Astoria* sustained several dozen hits from five- and eight-inch shells, igniting flammable stores which turned the ship into a floating bonfire.

Escorting destroyers *Helm* and *Wilson* were unable to respond effectively and eventually lost contact with the enemy, who continued around Savo Island to the north, where they attacked DD *Ralph Talbot,* inflicting five hits before retiring to the west.

Results:

The US lost the cruisers *Astoria, Quincy, Vincennes,* and the HMAS *Canberra.* The USS *Chicago* was heavily damaged and was sent to San Francisco for repairs; she was unable to return to active duty until January, 1943. Also damaged were destroyers USS *Patterson* and *Ralph Talbot.* Despite the heavy damage inflicted on US Navy ships, the Japanese nonetheless turned aside and failed to attack the transports off Lunga Point and Tulagi; this must be considered the principle American success.

Several gunfire hits were reported on Japanese cruisers, some of which may have been serious, but there are no reliable reports of Japanese damage.

BATTLE OF CAPE ESPERANCE: AFTER-ACTION REPORT

DATE: 11-12 OCTOBER, 1942.
LOCATION: WEST OF SAVO ISLAND, SOLOMON ISLANDS

USN FORCES:

USS Farenholt, DD 481
USS Duncan, DD 485
USS Laffey, DD 459
USS San Francisco, CA 38 (flag)
USS Boise, CL 47
USS Salt Lake City, CA 25
USS Helena, CL 50
USS Buchanan, DD 484
USS McCalla, DD 488

Situation and Intelligence:

Rear Admiral Norman Scott was ordered to form Task Group 64.2 to support the transport of the 164th Infantry Regiment to Guadalcanal. A group of two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and five destroyers was organized. Admiral Scott put them through a few quick night combat exercises, as it was assumed an encounter with the Japanese would be a night action. They then took up station south of Guadalcanal, in position to move north into the islands to counter any reported Japanese moves.

There was no Japanese activity on the 9th and 10th of October, but on the 11th search planes reported the approach of an enemy task group consisting of two cruisers and six destroyers. Admiral Scott moved north to intercept.

Disposition of Forces:

Admiral Scott arranged his ships in a column formation, with the cruisers in the middle, three destroyers in the van, and the remaining two destroyers in the rear. As Task Group 64.2 rounded the northwest end of Guadalcanal and turned toward Savo Island, word was received that a group of Japanese ships had already arrived off the north coast of Guadalcanal and was unloading supplies. The task group was now potentially between two forces: one coming from the north, and one at Guadalcanal already.

Action Report:

Headed northeast toward Savo, at 2333 Admiral Scott ordered a column turn 180° to the southwest. Due to a misunderstanding of the order, the con of the cruiser flagship performed a simultaneous turn (turning immediately instead of following the destroyers), a move that threw the van destroyers out of line. As the task group performed the U-turn, the lead destroyers *Farenholt, Duncan,* and *Laffey* raced along the starboard side of the cruisers in an attempt to regain their position at the head of the column.

Meanwhile, radar operators on the cruisers *Boise, Helena,* and *Salt Lake City* all detected the presence of an enemy formation to the northwest. Unfortunately, lack of trust in the radar equipment, some confusing ambiguities in the contact reports, and worry about the van destroyers (now between the cruisers and the presumed enemy) combined to cause delay the Task Force commander's decision to open fire. As the Japanese formation steamed right into the starboard side of the American line, it finally became clear that the Americans were in the most favorable possible position for attack, "crossing the T" of the approaching Japanese column. Commencing with the *Helena,* the American cruisers opened fire on the leading enemy cruiser at 2346.

The Japanese were arranged in a column of three cruisers, with two destroyers off the port and starboard bow of the lead cruiser. They reacted slowly to the attack. The lead Japanese cruiser and her starboard destroyer very quickly received a number of hits from the American cruiser. The lead cruiser caught fire, made smoke, and turned out of line (though she could have escaped in the smoke); the destroyer definitely caught fire and sank.

Attempting to escape the trap, the first two Japanese cruisers turned to starboard, while the third cruiser and the final destroyer turned to port. Admiral Scott ordered a temporary cease-fire to make sure the cruisers weren't shooting at the van destroyers then, reassured, the barrage was resumed. The second Japanese cruiser suffered a number of hits, and turned northwest to escape. At 0000 Admiral Scott ordered a parallel turn to pursue the enemy and continue the battle.

The remaining Japanese cruiser and destroyer, which had turned to port, had encountered the destroyer USS *Duncan,* which had made a lone torpedo attack on the Japanese line. *Duncan* quickly suffered a number of hits, which set her afire and made her a target, unfortunately, for some American fire. She was put out of action and sunk.

At 0006 the *Boise* turned hard to starboard to avoid enemy torpedoes; four minutes later she received a devastating hit in the forward magazine. She immediately pulled out of formation while the rest of the American cruisers continued to duel with the second Japanese cruiser, which was now afire. At 0020 all enemy fire ceased, and Admiral Scott broke off the battle.

Results: Japanese losses appear to have been two cruisers and several destroyers; in addition, the Japanese mission, whatever it was, was turned back. American losses were one destroyer, with heavy damage to one light cruiser. This must be regarded as a decisive victory.

NAVAL BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL (I): AFTER-ACTION REPORT

DATE: 13 NOVEMBER, 1942.
LOCATION: EAST AND SOUTH OF SAVO ISLAND, SOLOMON ISLANDS

USN FORCES:

USS Cushing, DD 376
USS Laffey, DD 459
USS Sterett, DD 407
USS O'Bannon, DD 450
USS Atlanta, CL 51
USS San Francisco, CA 38 (flag)
USS Portland, CA 33
USS Helena, CL 50
USS Juneau, CL 52
USS Aaron Ward, DD 483
USS Barton, DD 599
USS Monssen, DD 436
USS Fletcher, DD 445

Situation and Intelligence:

Two of our reinforcement groups arrived off Guadalcanal on November 11th, carrying supplies, engineers, replacements, and the 182nd Infantry Regiment. They were escorted by Task Groups 62.4 (Rear Admiral Norman Scott) and 67.4 (Rear Admiral Daniel Callaghan), under the overall command of Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner. The Japanese staged a determined air attack on the 12th, but thanks to a skillful antiaircraft defense the transports were undamaged (though the escort flagship, the *San Francisco,* sustained some damage from a suicide plane).

Meanwhile, reconnaissance indicated the approach of a powerful Japanese surface force consisting of two battleships, several cruisers, and perhaps as many as a dozen destroyers. These were expected to arrive in the Guadalcanal area the night of the 12-13, so Turner prudently decided to withdraw the transports after dark on the 12th, leaving the escorts behind (except for a few destroyers) to confront the Japanese force. Admiral Scott's task group was merged with Admiral Callaghan's TG 67.4, and placed under the overall command of Admiral Callaghan, who was slightly senior to Scott. (Some have questioned the wisdom of this decision, given Admiral Scott's experience as a battle commander and Admiral Callaghan's relative inexperience, but in appointing Callaghan commander Admiral Turner was following standard Navy practice.)

Disposition of Forces:

Admiral Callaghan formed the cruisers in a column, with two destroyer divisions, one ahead of and one abaft of the cruisers. They escorted the transports out of the eastern channel, then returned to Savo Sound, cruising in column formation.

Action Report:

After midnight the night was exceedingly dark. The task group proceeded northeast along the Guadalcanal coast, passing Lunga Point at 0124. At about this time the SG radar on the *Helena* and *O'Bannon* detected the presence of warships approaching to the northeast; at 0137 Admiral Callaghan ordered a column turn to due north, presumably to attempt to cross the "T" of the oncoming Japanese formation. The result, however, was that the American and Japanese formations collided and interpenetrated at a combined closing speed of around 40 knots.

Lacking a clear idea of the situation, Admiral Callaghan delayed giving the order to open fire until after the lead American and Japanese destroyers were already passing each other. Once he realized that the American column had somehow gotten inside the Japanese formation, Callaghan ordered, "Odd ships fire to starboard, even ships fire to port." This unorthodox order caused further delay as our ships reoriented their targeting.

As this was underway, searchlights from Japanese destroyers to port suddenly illuminated light cruiser *Atlanta*, who immediately counter-illuminated and opened fire. The *Atlanta* traded blows with three destroyers and a light cruiser, inflicting heavy damage, but finally falling prey to a torpedo that struck her amidships and effectively put the light cruiser out of action.

By this time the entire first half of the American line was engaged with the enemy, mostly firing at the huge shape of an oncoming Japanese battleship. As ships were hit and fell out of line, other ships swerved to avoid them, and both the Japanese and American formations disintegrated into a swirling melee. At least two of our destroyers passed so close to the enemy battleship that the big guns could not be depressed enough to bring them to bear on the destroyers. Of our van destroyers, *Cushing* was destroyed by gunfire from multiple enemies, while *Laffey* succumbed to a torpedo. *Sterett,* though heavily damaged, pounded the upper works of the enemy battleship and escaped. *O'Bannon* engaged numerous targets as she circled through the battle, remaining relatively unscathed.

Flagship *San Francisco* engaged the lead enemy battleship in a close-range gun duel, scoring a number of hits, but then she was caught by enemy searchlights and became the target of both battleships and a number of lesser ships. Numerous direct hits put her guns out of action and forced her to leave the battle.

Heavy cruiser *Portland* also put a number of shells into the lead battleship and her escorts, but a torpedo hit bent her starboard plating and locked her into a starboard turn. She was forced to keep turning until the battle moved away from her. Light cruiser *Helena* sustained only minor damage, but the *Juneau* took a torpedo and had to retire.

The fate of the rear destroyers was similar to that of the van destroyers: *Monssen* destroyed by gunfire, *Barton* hit and immediately blown up by a torpedo, *Aaron Ward* disabled. Only *Fletcher* managed to fight her way through without damage.

The battle gradually wound down from 0215 to 0225, as the few capable ships on both sides left the battle area. Admirals Callaghan and Scott had been killed, so Captain Hoover of the *Helena* ordered a general retirement to the east, leaving behind a sea littered with burning and sinking ships, Japanese and American.

Results:

We lost two light cruisers, the *Atlanta* and the *Juneau* (sunk the following day by a submarine while retiring to the south), and four destroyers, *Barton, Cushing, Laffey,* and *Monssen.* Heavy cruisers *San Francisco* and *Portland* were heavily damaged and removed from the war for repairs for several months. Destroyers *Sterett* and *Aaron Ward* were also heavily damaged. In compensation, the leading enemy battleship was so badly damaged that it was unable to leave the area and was sunk by planes from Henderson Field the following day. The Japanese also lost 4 to 8 destroyers sunk or heavily damaged, and were turned back from their mission, which presumably was to bombard Henderson Field. With such grievous losses, neither side can claim a clear-cut victory.

NAVAL BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL (II): AFTER-ACTION REPORT

DATE: 14-15 NOVEMBER, 1942.
LOCATION: SOUTH AND WEST OF SAVO ISLAND, SOLOMON ISLANDS

USN FORCES:

USS Walke, DD 416
USS Benham, DD 397
USS Preston, DD 379
USS Gwin, DD 433
USS Washington (flag), BB 56
USS South Dakota, BB 57

Situation and Intelligence:

After the melee of Friday the 13th (Battle of Guadalcanal I), the Navy had almost nothing in Solomons waters with which to oppose the Japanese, so when an enemy heavy cruiser force appeared off Lunga Point on the night of November 13-14, it was able to bombard Henderson Field with impunity. Fortunately, the enemy only did some damage to one of the fighter airstrips, and in the morning the Cactus Air Force located the enemy task group retreating up the Slot and sank one of its heavy cruisers.

Reconnaissance aircraft also reported a major enemy convoy on its way down the Slot from Shortland. These transports and their escorts were repeatedly attacked by elements of the Cactus Air Force and by squadrons from the carrier *Enterprise.* By the end of the day half a dozen transports had been sunk.

Intelligence led us to believe that the Japanese had scheduled another bombardment mission in support of the convoy for the night of November 14-15. Accordingly, Admiral Halsey committed his last available surface units in opposition: the battleships *Washington* and *South Dakota* and their escorts, under the command of Rear Admiral Willis A. Lee.

Disposition of Forces:

Admiral Lee arranged his task force in a column with the four destroyers in the van, separated somewhat from the battleships so they could act effectively as a destroyer division. Alert for approaching enemy ships, the force passed between Guadalcanal and the Russells, rounded the northern side of Savo Island, and entered Savo Sound through the northern approach. It proceeded south toward Guadalcanal until well past Savo Island, then (at 2252) performed a column turn to 270° (due west). Shortly thereafter the *Washington's* SG radar first detected enemy ships to the north.

Action Report:

The *Washington's* radar had detected what turned out to be the first of several groups of enemy warships. Fire control found the targets and gradually improved their solution, until Admiral Lee gave permission to open fire at 2316. At 18,500 yards, five-inch guns illuminated the enemy destroyer squadron with starshells, and the big 16" guns took the enemy under fire. The enemy presumably took damage, as they soon made smoke and withdrew to the north.

Meanwhile, the van destroyers had detected a single enemy destroyer closing in from the west of Savo Island, and at 2322 they opened fire on this target. They soon noticed that beyond the lone ship was another destroyer squadron led by a light cruiser, and quickly redirected their fire to this more dangerous opponent. Remarkably accurate return fire fell on *Preston* and *Gwin,* sinking the *Preston* and badly damaging the *Gwin.* Shortly thereafter the other two destroyers were taken out by torpedoes: *Walke* was sunk and *Benham,* bow almost blown off, was severely damaged.

Bad luck continued to dog the task force when, at 2330, *South Dakota's* main circuit breakers failed and she lost electrical power, knocking out all radar and fire control. All she could do was follow *Washington* and hope to get the problem repaired.

Washington began exacting revenge by pummeling the first lone destroyer and knocking it out of action. Then she looked for new targets, searching for the destroyer squadron who had mauled the American destroyers (but which had Savo Island close in the background, and was almost impossible to detect). Instead the *Washington's* radar picked up a third force of larger ships and started tracking it.

South Dakota's bad luck continued even after her power came back on. She opened fire on a flaming destroyer, which apparently revealed her to the enemy heavy ships, who illuminated her with searchlights at a range of under three miles. The *South Dakota* began dueling with what appeared to be two heavy cruisers followed by a *Kongo*-class battleship. *South Dakota* struck back at the battleship, but sustained a number of superstructure hits that knocked out her radar and fire control, rendering her later fire almost hopelessly inaccurate.

Washingon, however, remained undetected by the Japanese, and was able to pour highly accurate fire into the enemy, primarily into the battleship. This turned the tide of the battle. With their cruisers damaged and their battleship sinking, the Japanese withdrew their heavies and retreated to the northwest, leaving a few destroyers behind to (ineffectively) harass our battleships.

Results:

Despite the loss of three destroyers, with damage to a fourth and to *South Dakota,* this battle must be regarded as an unqualified American victory. The Japanese bombardment mission was foiled, one of their battleships was sunk, and their transport convoy was delayed by the battle such that the Cactus Air Force was able to catch it at dawn and almost completely destroy it. This success decisively foiled the final major attempt by the Japanese to reconquer Guadalcanal.

BATTLE OF TASSAFARONGA: AFTER-ACTION REPORT

DATE: 30 NOVEMBER, 1942.
LOCATION: BETWEEN SAVO ISLAND AND GUADALCANAL, SOLOMON ISLANDS

USN FORCES:

USS Fletcher, DD 445
USS Perkins, DD 377
USS Maury, DD 401
USS Drayton, DD 366
USS Minneapolis, CA 36 (flag)
USS New Orleans, CA 32
USS Pensacola, CA 24
USS Honolulu, CL 48
USS Northampton, CA 26
USS Lamson, DD 367
USS Lardner, DD 486

Situation and Intelligence:

The ships lost in the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal were quickly replaced, and on November 24 Rear Admiral Thomas Kinkaid was ordered to use the new arrivals to form a new group, Task Force 67. He organized them in a unit designed to fight night battles, but three days later he was reassigned and the task force was turned over to Rear Admiral Carleton H. Wright. Admiral Wright decided to stick, in principle, to Admiral Kinkaid's plan.

Intelligence indicated that the Japanese were planning to send a reinforcement group escorted by destroyers to Guadalcanal on the 30th. Wright's Task Force 67 was ordered to intercept this group.

Disposition of Forces:

The main power of TF 67 was one light and four heavy cruisers, arranged in column formation behind the flagship, USS *Minneapolis.* 4,000 yards in advance of the cruisers was the destroyer division, led by USS *Fletcher.* The destroyers had been placed far in advance so that they could employ their radar to find the enemy, then launch a surprise torpedo attack before the cruisers opened up with the big guns. Two additional destroyers, added at the last minute, were placed behind the CruDiv.

Action Report:

At 2245 TF 67 entered Savo Sound from the east by Lengo Channel, then turned northwest to 320° at speed 20 knots. Shortly after 2300 radar indicated a line of enemy ships off the port bow, moving southeast parallel to the coast of Guadalcanal. American gun and torpedo directors began tracking the targets. At 2314 ordered a column turn to course 300°, and one minute later the lead destroyer, *Fletcher,* asked permission to commence firing torpedoes. Permission was not granted till 2320, by which time the optimal torpedo launch point had been passed, as our destroyers were now actually passing the line of Japanese destroyers to port.

As the torpedoes were being launched, Admiral Wright gave the order to open fire with guns. Our destroyers launched starshells, and one minute later our cruisers opened fire with their 8" guns. Most of the ships appeared to target on the closest enemy destroyer, which was apparently on screening duty to port of the main Japanese line.

Our cruisers maintained their course and speed as they pounded the enemy, an unfortunate mistake which enabled the Japanese to target their torpedoes with great accuracy. At 2327 they began impacting on the American cruisers, starting with *Minneapolis* (two hits), then *New Orleans* (one hit, but in a magazine), *Pensacola* (one hit), and finally *Northampton* (two hits). Only *Honolulu* avoided the torpedoes, as her quick-thinking captain rang up full speed and evasive maneuvers. By midnight the Japanese had broken off contact and the battle was over.

Results:

Three of our heavy cruisers were badly damaged, and one (USS *Northampton*) was sunk. In return we can confirm the loss of only one Japanese destroyer. Though the Japanese reinforcement mission was disrupted, the cost was staggeringly high. The enemy have once again demonstrated their mastery of effective torpedo tactics.

BATTLE OF KULA GULF: AFTER-ACTION REPORT

DATE: 6 JULY, 1943.
LOCATION: OFF THE NORTHEAST COAST OF KOLOMBANGARA, SOLOMON ISLANDS

USN FORCES:

USS Nicholas, DD 449
USS O'Bannon, DD 450
USS Honolulu, CL 48 (flag)
USS Helena, CL 50
USS St. Louis, CL 49
USS Jenkins, DD 447
USS Radford, DD 446

Situation and Intelligence:

On July 5th Task Group 36.1, under command of Rear Admiral Walden L. Ainsworth, was retiring down the Slot after bombarding the Japanese at Vila, when it received word of a Japanese destroyer reinforcement group near Buin. The task force immediately put about and went in search of the enemy, skimming the southern edge of the Slot at 25 knots.

Disposition of Forces:

TG 36.1 maintained antiaircraft formation until radar contact with the enemy was confirmed, at which time the group was arranged in column formation with the cruisers in the center, two destroyers leading and two destroyers trailing. All ships had SG radar.

Action Report:

Honolulu's radar detected the enemy ships at 0136 at a range of over 25,000 yards. The enemy was moving north toward the Slot along the coast of Kolombangara. Ainsworth ordered a simultaneous turn to port from course 292° to course 242° (to close the range to the enemy). Radar indicated that there were at least two groups of enemy ships, so Ainsworth initially ordered his command to split its fire between them. However, when it became clear that the second group of Japanese ships was moving away, he corrected that to all ships firing on the first group.

At 0150 all ships simultaneously turned to 302°, bringing them back into column formation; at 0156 came the order to open fire, range now being well under 10,000 yards. As usual, our fire was all concentrated on the nearest target, and the leading Japanese destroyer suffered numerous hits and was quickly knocked, blazing, out of the battle. The other destroyers remained relatively untouched, and it appears they were busily launching torpedoes.

At 0204 the commander ordered a 180° column turn to starboard to keep the enemy within range. Of the first enemy group, the lead ship was burning and sinking, and the others had retired, so our ships focused on the second group, which had turned about and was now approaching. As *Helena* was beginning the turn she was hit by one torpedo, then two more, severing her bow and breaking her back. She immediately began flooding and soon sank.

The rest of the group, now on course 112°, switched targets to the destroyers approaching from the south, and turned starboard an additional 30° to close the enemy more quickly. At 0210 the new targets were taken under fire; after five minutes the group turned 60° to port keep all guns bearing on the enemy. There was an exchange of fire until around 0230, at which point all enemy targets had apparently left the area. The battle was not quite over, however, as destroyers *Nicholas* and *Radford,* who were picking up *Helena's* survivors, twice traded blows with Japanese destroyers who were rescuing their own swimming sailors. This went on until well after dawn, at which time the opposing groups separated for good.

Results:

Though we lost CL *Helena,* the Japanese lost two destroyers (one sunk by gunfire, one run onto a reef and scuttled) and their reinforcement mission was curtailed, so the two sides came out about even. Once again an American cruiser succumbed to superior Japanese torpedo accuracy. However, our task group maintained its cohesion throughout the battle, while the Japanese engaged us in a piecemeal and disorganized fashion.

BATTLE OF VELLA LAVELLA: AFTER-ACTION REPORT

DATE: 6-7 OCTOBER, 1943.
LOCATION: THE SLOT, NORTHWEST OF VELLA LAVELLA, SOLOMON ISLANDS

USN FORCES:

TASK GROUP 31.2:

Northern Group:
USS Selfridge, DD 357 (flag)
USS Chevalier, DD 451
USS O'Bannon, DD 450

Southern Group:
USS Ralph Talbot, DD 390
USS Taylor, DD 468
USS LaVallette, DD 448

Situation and Intelligence:

On October 6 observation aircraft reported a force of nine enemy destroyers approaching Vella Lavella from the north, presumably to evacuate the Japanese troops then trapped there. Unfortunately, few of our ships were available in range to oppose them. The closest were *Selfridge, Chevalier,* and *O'Bannon,* under Captain Frank R. Walker; this trio was ordered up the Slot to intercept the enemy northwest of Vella Lavella. Three other destroyers, *Ralph Talbot, Taylor,* and *LaVallette*, were released from convoy escort duty down near New Georgia and sent racing to join Walker's destroyers at the contact point.

Disposition of Forces:

Both groups proceeded toward the rendezvous in column formation. The Northern Group was continuously dogged by observation planes, which occasionally dropped flares to illuminate them, making them visible for miles in every direction. There was no chance of surprise from the Northern Group. After curving around Vella Lavella's coast, the Northern Group was approaching the rendezvous from the northeast, the Southern Group from the south.

Action Report:

At 2231 radar reported two groups of enemy ships to the west at a range of 20,000 yards, a larger group from the south closing with a smaller group from the north. Starting at 2235 the larger group turned west, then south, so as to be in better position to receive our attack. Walker turned southwest on a closing course. At 2251 the enemy performed a simultaneous turn to the southeast in an attempt to gain a favorable attack angle; Walker responded by turning northwest, on a reciprocal course. Our Southern Group was not yet in sight, but Captain Walker decided to attack, and ordered his ships to stand by to fire torpedoes.

At 2255 the enemy were under 4,000 yards away, and *Chevalier* and *O'Bannon* launched five and six torpedoes, respectively. Seconds later Captain Walker gave the order to open fire, and our destroyers opened up with their five-inch guns, mostly aimed at the closest target, a large destroyer that appeared to be almost big enough for a light cruiser. Around 2300 this ship was hit by one of our torpedoes and became a blazing pyre. Returning fire, the remaining enemy ships turned right and withdrew from the fight.

Before our ships could follow *Chevalier* was struck by a torpedo that severed her bow. She immediately veered to the right, across the path of *O'Bannon,* who sideswiped her and came to a halt. *Chevalier* began sinking.

Selfridge continued on course and engaged the smaller enemy group, which proved to consist of two destroyers. These destroyers had apparently fired torpedoes at *Selfridge* earlier, and at 2306 she was struck by one or two of them. This ended the action for our ships, and the Japanese retired to the northwest. By the time our Southern Group arrived the battle was over.

Results:

The enemy lost a large destroyer or light cruiser; on our side, *Chevalier* was lost, *Selfridge* severely damaged and *O'Bannon* slightly hurt. In addition, the enemy's mission was turned back, though the troops on Vella Lavella were evacuated by other means.

BATTLE OF EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY: AFTER-ACTION REPORT

DATE: 2 NOVEMBER, 1943.
LOCATION: EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY, WEST COAST OF BOUGAINVILLE

USN FORCES:

TASK FORCE 39:

DesDiv 45:
USS Charles Ausburne, DD 570
USS Dyson, DD 572
USS Stanly, DD 478
USS Claxton, DD 571

CruDiv 12:
USS Montpelier, CL 57 (flag)
USS Cleveland, CL 55
USS Columbia, CL 56
USS Denver, CL 58

DesDiv 46:
USS Spence, DD 512
USS Thatcher, DD 514
USS Converse, DD 509
USS Foote, DD 511

Situation and Intelligence:

On 1 November the 3rd Marine Division was landed on the west coast of Bougainville on the shores of Empress Augusta Bay. It was assumed that the Imperial Navy would oppose this landing, so Task Force 39 was organized under the command of Rear Admiral Stanton A. Merrill to defend it.

Accurate intelligence from observation planes warned Merrill of the approach of an enemy strike force consisting of two heavy cruisers and two destroyer divisions. Task Force 39 was roughly equivalent to the enemy strength, so Admiral Merrill determined to meet the enemy and stop them in the open ocean, well offshore from the vulnerable transports.

Disposition of Forces:

The task force was arranged in three columns: cruiser division in the center, DesDiv 45 to starboard and slightly ahead, DesDiv 46 to port and slightly behind. At 0100 TF 39 was on a course north-northwest, speed 25 knots.

Action Report:

At 0227 radar detected the enemy to the north-northwest at a range between 35,000 and 40,000 yards. Merrill ordered a course change to due north. As the radar picture clarified TF 39 got a clear image of ten enemy ships in three columns. At 0231 DesDiv 45 was ordered to carry out a torpedo run against the enemy.

In order to give the destroyers a chance to close with the enemy and surprise them, at 0239 Admiral Merrill ordered the CruDiv to reverse course in a 180° simultaneous turn. This kept the cruisers in front of the advancing Japanese columns without bringing them into contact too soon. DesDiv 46 turned as well.

At 0246 DesDiv 45, now just east of the Japanese left flank column, fired torpedoes, but shortly thereafter their targets turned as the enemy veered hard to starboard, and all their torpedoes missed. DesDiv 45 then withdrew to the southeast.

Meanwhile Admiral Merrill, seeing the Japanese begin to turn, gave the order to open fire, and American guns began reaching out for targets at 0249. As usual, fire concentrated on the largest, closest target, the light cruiser at the head of the enemy column, apparently leaving it a burning wreck. The enemy illuminated our CruDiv with starshells, so the cruisers made smoke and turned starboard slightly to throw off the enemy's aim (successfully). The USS *Foote,* which had become separated from DesDiv 46, ran into an enemy torpedo at 0245 and came to a halt.

Our cruisers then began taking the other two enemy columns under fire, scoring a number of hits with their rapid-firing 6" guns. Admiral Merrill kept them marching and countermarching north and south at medium range, which kept his guns bearing on the target and made enemy torpedo hits unlikely (due to the frequent course changes). Our four light cruisers dueled with two enemy heavy cruisers, and hits were scored on both sides, but as visibility was poor the advantage seemed to be with our superior radar fire control. The Japanese formation appeared to become thoroughly confused.

For the next half hour Admiral Merrill repeatedly interposed his ships between the enemy's force and the landing zone to the east, while continuing to fire at targets as the opportunity arose. The enemy retired to the north, and our fire ceased by 0348. DesDiv 45, combing the area for targets, found a damaged enemy destroyer shortly after 0500 and sank her.

Results:

The Battle of Empress Augusta Bay was a decisive American victory. At the cost of one destroyer badly damaged and light damage to two cruisers, we sank a light cruiser and destroyer, damaged other ships, and successfully defended our vulnerable beachhead. Our destroyer and cruiser divisions maintained cohesion throughout the battle, while the Japanese formations were observed to fall apart. This battle marks the definitive ascension of the U.S. Navy over the Imperial Navy in surface night combat.

TASK FORCE 1942 IDENTIFICATION BOOK

JAPANESE NAVAL VESSELS

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
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IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY
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IT IS THE DUTY OF EVERY OFFICER IN OUR GLORIOUS NAVY TO FAMILIARIZE HIMSELF WITH THE APPEARANCE AND CAPABILITIES OF OUR ENEMY'S WARSHIPS. THIS MANUAL PROVIDES INFORMATION ON THE WEAPONS, SHIPS, AND ENGAGEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. THE INFORMATION IT CONTAINS IS DEEMED CORRECT BY THE NAVY INTELLIGENCE BUREAU, AND REPLACES ALL PREVIOUS ISSUES.

EVERY OFFICER WILL PROFIT BY CLOSE STUDY OF THIS MANUAL. LEARN ITS LESSONS WELL!

AMERICAN NAVAL ORDNANCE 

米国海軍軍規

THIS SECTION DESCRIBES THE FIVE CHIEF GUN TYPES MOUNTED IN AMERICAN WARSHIPS, AND ALSO INCLUDES DATA ON THE STANDARD AMERICAN TORPEDO. COMPARE THESE CAREFULLY WITH OUR OWN, EQUIVALENT WEAPONS.

AMERICAN NAVAL ORDNANCE

16 INCH/45 MARK 6 (MARK 7)

BORE:	16″
CALIBER:	45 (50)
WEIGHT OF PROJECTILE:	2,700 LBS.
MUZZLE VELOCITY:	2,300 FT./SEC. (2,500 FT./SEC.)
FIRING CYCLE:	30 SECONDS.
MAXIMUM RANGE:	36,900 YDS. (42,345 YDS.)

These, the heaviest naval guns in the American arsenal, are thoroughly outclassed by our 18" weapons, and their Mark 6 is inferior in range and velocity even to our own 16" guns. The Mark 7 compares favorably with our 16" 3rd Year Type, but it is mounted only in the brand-new *Iowa* class of battleships. The *North Carolina* and *South Dakota* classes are armed with the Mark 6.

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8 INCH, MARK 14

BORE:	8″
CALIBER:	55
WEIGHT OF PROJECTILE:	260 LBS.
MUZZLE VELOCITY:	2,800 FT./SEC.
FIRING CYCLE:	18 SECONDS.
MAXIMUM RANGE:	31,860 YDS.

These weapons are very similar to our own eight-inch guns, and serve as primary weaponry for the American heavy cruisers. They are mounted in the *Pensacola, Northampton, Portland,* and *New Orleans* classes.

6 INCH, MARK 16

BORE:	6″
CALIBER:	47
WEIGHT OF PROJECTILE:	130 LBS.
MUZZLE VELOCITY:	2,500 FT./SEC.
FIRING CYCLE:	7 SECONDS.
MAXIMUM RANGE:	26,120 YDS.

These are the standard weapons of the American light cruisers, found in the *Brooklyn*- and *Cleveland*- class ships. Their range is markedly inferior to our new 6.1" guns.

5 INCH, MARK 12

BORE:	5″
CALIBER:	38
WEIGHT OF PROJECTILE:	55 LBS.
MUZZLE VELOCITY:	2,600 FT./SEC.
FIRING CYCLE:	4 SECONDS.
MAXIMUM RANGE:	18,200 YDS.

The Americans are quite proud of this light dual-purpose (antiship and antiaircraft) gun, and indeed it does seem to be quite versatile. It is primary armament on their destroyers and on the *Atlanta*-class light antiaircraft cruisers, and is mounted as secondary batteries on the *North Carolina-, South Dakota-,* and *Iowa*- class battleships.

AMERICAN NAVAL ORDNANCE

5 INCH, MARKS 10 & 11

BORE:	5″
CALIBER:	25
WEIGHT OF PROJECTILE:	54 LBS.
MUZZLE VELOCITY:	2,110 FT./SEC.
FIRING CYCLE:	4 SECONDS.
MAXIMUM RANGE:	14,500 YDS.

This older five-inch gun was designed for an antiaircraft role and can now be found principally on the American heavy cruisers. In an emergency it can be employed in an antiship role, but it is largely ineffective for this purpose.

TORPEDO, 21 INCH, MARK 15

LENGTH:		24 FT.
WEIGHT:		3,841 LBS.
EXPLOSIVE CHARGE:		825 LBS.
RANGE:	6,000 YDS.	(FAST SETTING)
	10,000 YDS.	(MEDIUM SETTING)
	15,000 YDS.	(SLOW SETTING)

This, the standard USN destroyer torpedo, is vastly inferior to our own Type 93, in range, explosive power, and reliability. These weapons have a marked tendency to explode prematurely or not at all. Perhaps their exploders suffer from a poor design.

AMERICAN WARSHIP CLASSES

米国軍艦級

BELOW ARE DESCRIPTIONS OF THE MAJOR AMERICAN WARSHIP TYPES, COVERING BOTH STATISTICS AND CAPABILITIES. THE CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION ARE AS FOLLOWS:

KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: All known members of the design class built to date are listed, except for ships which are known to have been sunk.
MAXIMUM SPEED: This is maximum ideal speed of an undamaged ship, measured in knots.
DIMENSIONS: Length is from bow to stern. Beam is from port to starboard at the widest point. Draft is depth beneath the keel.
DISPLACEMENT: The mass of a ship as defined in standard tonnage.
FUEL CAPACITY: A ship's fuel (mainly fuel oil), measured in tons.

ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: A ship's main gun armament.
SECONDARY BATTERY: Smaller, additional guns (listed only if a ship is provided with them).
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: Chief antiaircraft guns or machineguns.
TORPEDOES: Number and mounting of torpedoes, if carried.
AIRCRAFT: Number of catapults (launchers) and total number of reconnaissance floatplanes.

PROTECTION
SIDEBELT: Inches of hull armor along the side of the ship.
TURRETS: Armor protection on the primary battery.
DECK: The armor protecting of the interior of the ship from shells or bombs falling from above, combining the thickness of the metal on all upper decks.

ノースカロライナ級

NORTH CAROLINA CLASS BATTLESHIPS



These are the first of America's new "fast battleships," so-called because their maximum speed enables them to keep up with aircraft carriers. Though originally designed to carry 14" guns (which would have kept them within the arms-control provisions of the Naval Treaty signed in London), President Roosevelt invoked an "escalator clause" in the treaty to allow the Navy to install 16" guns instead, on the flimsy excuse that the U.S. was "provoked" to do so by our adoption of the 18" gun in the *Yamato* class.

KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: NORTH CAROLINA, WASHINGTON.
MAXIMUM SPEED: 28 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 720 FT., BEAM 108 FT., DRAFT 27 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 35,000 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 6,590 TONS.

ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 9 X 16" (45), MOUNTED IN 3 TRIPLE TURRETS.
SECONDARY BATTERY: 20 X 5" (38), IN 10 TWIN MOUNTS.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: 16 X 1.1" AA, IN 4 QUADRUPLE MOUNTS.
AIRCRAFT: 2 CATAPULTS; 3 FLOATPLANES.

PROTECTION
SIDEBELT: 16"
TURRETS: 18"
DECK: 6"

SOUTH DAKOTA CLASS BATTLESHIPS

サウスダコタ級

KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: SOUTH DAKOTA, INDIANA, MASSACHUSETTS, ALABAMA.
MAXIMUM SPEED: 28 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 670 FT., BEAM 108 FT., DRAFT 29 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 35,000 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 6,950 TONS.

ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 9 X 16" (45), MOUNTED IN 3 TRIPLE TURRETS.
SECONDARY BATTERY: 20 X 5" (38), IN 10 TWIN MOUNTS. (16 X 5" IN *SOUTH DAKOTA*.)
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: 24 X 40 MM AA, 35 X 20 MM AA.
AIRCRAFT: 2 CATAPULTS, 3 FLOATPLANES.

PROTECTION
SIDEBELT: 18"
TURRETS: 18"
DECK: 8"



The *South Dakota* design corrected certain design deficiencies in the *North Carolina* class, notably in armor and antiaircraft armament, but as this added weight, it was shortened so as to stay within the 35,000-ton treaty limitations. This makes the *South Dakota* class appear somewhat cramped, but this has not affected its offensive power. Note the heavy emphasis on antiaircraft armament.

アイオワ級

IOWA CLASS BATTLESHIPS



These are the mightiest battleships America has yet built. Designed in clear violation of naval treaty limitations, they incorporate improved 16″ guns, a massive antiaircraft battery, and overpowered engines that, if reports are to be believed, can push these ships to an unheard-of 33 knots.

KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: IOWA, NEW JERSEY.
MAXIMUM SPEED: 33 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 870 FT., BEAM 108 FT., DRAFT 29 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 45,000 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 7,250 TONS.

ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 9 X 16″ (50), IN 3 TRIPLE TURRETS.
SECONDARY BATTERY: 20 X 5″ (38), IN 10 TWIN MOUNTS.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: 80 X 40 MM AA, 52 X 20 MM AA.
AIRCRAFT: 2 CATAPULTS; 3 FLOATPLANES.

PROTECTION
SIDEBELT: 19″
TURRETS: 18″
DECK: 10″

PENSACOLA CLASS HEAVY CRUISERS

ペンサコラ級

KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: PENSACOLA, SALT LAKE CITY.
MAXIMUM SPEED: 32 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 575 FT., BEAM 65 FT.,
DRAFT 16 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 9,100 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 3,000 TONS.

ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 10 X 8″ (55), MOUNTED IN
2 TWIN AND 2 TRIPLE TURRETS.
SECONDARY BATTERY: 8 X 5″ (25), IN
8 SINGLE MOUNTS.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: THE FIVE-INCHES.
AIRCRAFT: TWO CATAPULTS; TWO FLOATPLANES.

PROTECTION
SIDEBELT: 3″
TURRETS: 2″
DECK: 3″



These were the first American cruisers built under the limitations of the Washington Naval Treaty. They compare favorably with their contemporaries from the mid to late 1920s, the British *Kent* class and our own *Myoko*-class cruisers, but they must be considered undergunned by modern standards, particularly in the area of antiaircraft defenses.

ノーザンプトン級

NORTHAMPTON CLASS HEAVY CRUISERS



By regrouping the main guns into three triple turrets, this class improved on the weight distribution of the *Pensacola* class. Otherwise, it is quite similar to its predecessors.

KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: NORTHAMPTON, CHESTER, LOUISVILLE, CHICAGO, HOUSTON, AUGUSTA.
MAXIMUM SPEED: 32 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 590 FT., BEAM 66 FT., DRAFT 16 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 9,100 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 3,060 TONS.

ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 9 X 8″ (55), IN 3 TRIPLE TURRETS.
SECONDARY BATTERY: 8 X 5″ (25), IN 8 SINGLE MOUNTS.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: THE FIVE-INCHES.
AIRCRAFT: 2 CATAPULTS; 3 FLOATPLANES.

PROTECTION
SIDEBELT: 3″
TURRETS: 2″
DECK: 3″

PORTLAND CLASS HEAVY CRUISERS

ポートランド級

KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: PORTLAND, INDIANAPOLIS.
MAXIMUM SPEED: 32 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 600 FT., BEAM 66 FT.,
DRAFT 17 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 9,900 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 2,550 TONS.

ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 9 X 8″ (55), IN 3 TRIPLE TURRETS.
SECONDARY BATTERY: 8 X 5″ (25), IN
8 SINGLE MOUNTS.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: THE FIVE-INCHES.
AIRCRAFT: 2 CATAPULTS; 3 FLOATPLANES.

PROTECTION
SIDEBELT: 4″
TURRETS: 3″
DECK: 4″



These ships are basically *Northampton*-class cruisers with heavier armor protection.

ニューオリンズ級

NEW ORLEANS CLASS HEAVY CRUISERS



These are the best of the American heavy cruisers built under the prewar Naval Treaty limitations. Their armor and antiaircraft defenses are superior to previous classes.

KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: NEW ORLEANS, ASTORIA, MINNEAPOLIS, TUSCALOOSA, SAN FRANCISCO, QUINCY, VINCENNES.
MAXIMUM SPEED: 32 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 580 FT., BEAM 62 FT., DRAFT 19 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 9,950 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 2,200 TONS.

ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 9 X 8″ (55), IN 3 TRIPLE TURRETS.
SECONDARY BATTERY: 8 X 5″ (25), IN 8 SINGLE MOUNTS.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: THE FIVE-INCHES, PLUS 16 X 1.1″ AA IN 4 QUADRUPLE MOUNTS.
AIRCRAFT: 2 CATAPULTS; 4 FLOATPLANES.

PROTECTION
SIDEBELT: 5″
TURRETS: 6″
DECK: 5″

KENT CLASS HEAVY CRUISERS

(ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY)

ケント級

KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: AUSTRALIA, CANBERRA.
MAXIMUM SPEED: 31 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 600 FT., BEAM 68 FT., DRAFT 16 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 9,850 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 2,400 TONS.

ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 8 X 8" (MK. I), MOUNTED IN 4 TWIN TURRETS.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: 8 X 4" AA, IN 4 TWIN MOUNTS.
AIRCRAFT: 1 FLOATPLANE.

PROTECTION
SIDEBELT: 4"
TURRETS: 3"
DECK: 1"



These Australian heavy cruisers are reported to be attached to American naval units in the South Pacific area. They are an older British design, rather thinly armored, but still capable.

ブルックリン級

BROOKLYN CLASS LIGHT CRUISERS



These were clearly designed in imitation of our own *Mogami*-class cruisers, which were originally built with 6″ guns in five turrets before being upgraded to 8″ weapons. With 15 rapid-firing guns, the *Brooklyn*-class cruisers can certainly put a lot of shells into the air at once.

KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: BROOKLYN, PHILADELPHIA, SAVANNAH, NASHVILLE, PHOENIX, BOISE, HONOLULU, ST. LOUIS, HELENA.
MAXIMUM SPEED: 34 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 600 FT., BEAM 62 FT., DRAFT 19 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 10,000 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 2,200 TONS.

ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 15 X 6″ (47), MOUNTED IN 5 TRIPLE TURRETS.
SECONDARY BATTERY: 8 X 5″ (25), IN 8 SINGLE MOUNTS.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: THE FIVE-INCHES.
AIRCRAFT: 2 CATAPULTS, 4 FLOATPLANES.

PROTECTION
SIDEBELT: 5″
TURRETS: 4″
DECK: 5″

ATLANTA CLASS LIGHT CRUISERS

アトランタ級

KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: ATLANTA, JUNEAU, SAN DIEGO, SAN JUAN.
MAXIMUM SPEED: 36 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 535 FT., BEAM 53 FT., DRAFT 16 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 6,000 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 600 TONS.

ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 12 X 5" (38), IN 6 TWIN MOUNTS.
SECONDARY BATTERY: 4 X 5" (38), IN 2 TWIN MOUNTS.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: ALL THE FIVE-INCHES, PLUS 12 1.1" AA IN 3 QUADRUPLE MOUNTS, AND 8 X 20 MM AA.
TORPEDOES: 8 TUBES IN 2 QUADRUPLE ROTATING MOUNTS.

PROTECTION
SIDEBELT: 3"
TURRETS: 1"
DECK: 2"



These cruisers, configured for antiaircraft defense, are unique in the American navy for their large number of small-caliber guns. They may be excellent in the air defense role, but there is reason to doubt their usefulness against ships other than destroyers and light cruisers.

クリーブランド級

CLEVELAND CLASS LIGHT CRUISERS



This appears to be a very capable class of light cruisers, and a number of these ships are currently under construction in the American shipyards. They are an improvement on the *Brooklyn* class, with fewer 6″ guns but a much heavier antiaircraft capability.

KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: CLEVELAND, COLUMBIA, MONTPELIER, DENVER.
MAXIMUM SPEED: 33 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 600 FT., BEAM 66 FT., DRAFT 20 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 10,000 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 2,420 TONS.

ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 12 X 6″ (47), MOUNTED IN 4 TRIPLE TURRETS.
SECONDARY BATTERY: 12 X 5″ (38), IN 6 TWIN MOUNTS.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: THE FIVE-INCHES, PLUS 24 X 40 MM AA.
AIRCRAFT: 2 CATAPULTS; 4 FLOATPLANES.

PROTECTION
SIDEBELT: 5″
TURRETS: 4″
DECK: 5″

LEANDER CLASS LIGHT CRUISERS
(ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY)

レンダー級

KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: HOBART (R.A.N.), ACHILLES (R.N.Z.N.)
MAXIMUM SPEED: 32 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 550 FT., BEAM 56 FT., DRAFT 15 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 7,100 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 1,050 TONS.

ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 8 X 6" (MK. XXI), MOUNTED IN 4 TWIN TURRETS.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: 8 X 4" AA, IN 4 TWIN MOUNTS.
TORPEDOES: 8 TUBES, IN 2 QUADRUPLE ROTATING TURRETS.
AIRCRAFT: 1 FLOATPLANE.

PROTECTION
SIDEBELT: 3"
TURRETS: 1"
DECK: 2"



These light cruisers from the Australian and New Zealand navies are known to be operating with American naval units in the South Pacific area.

マンレー級

MANLEY CLASS DESTROYER TRANSPORTS



These are obsolete WWI-era "flush-deck" destroyers converted to high-speed transports. To make room for troops and supplies, most of the weapons and half the boilers were removed, reducing the familiar four-stack profile to only two.

KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: MANLEY, COLHOUN, GREGORY, LITTLE, MCKEAN.
MAXIMUM SPEED: 25 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 310 FT., BEAM 32 FT., DRAFT 9 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 1,100 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 400 TONS.

ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 3 X 3" (50), IN SINGLE MOUNTS.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: 2 X 40 MM AA.

FARRAGUT CLASS DESTROYERS

ファラグート級

KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: FARRAGUT, DEWEY, PHELPS, HULL, MACDONOUGH, WORDEN, DALE, MONAGHAN, AYLWIN.
MAXIMUM SPEED: 36 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 335 FT., BEAM 34 FT., DRAFT 9 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 1,395 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 600 TONS.

ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 5 X 5" (38), IN 5 SINGLE MOUNTS.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: THE FIVE-INCHES.
TORPEDOES: 8 TUBES, IN 2 QUADRUPLE ROTATING MOUNTS.



Built in the early 1930s, these were the first American destroyers built since the WWI "flush-deckers." Though well-armed with guns and torpedoes, they completely lack dedicated antiaircraft defenses.

ポーター級

PORTER CLASS DESTROYERS



These large destroyers were designed as "destroyer leaders," flagships of destroyer flotillas (the functional, though inferior, equivalent of our *Nagara* and *Naka* light cruiser classes). Note that they also lack antiaircraft defenses.

KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: PORTER, SELFRIDGE, MCDOUGAL, WINSLOW, PHELPS, CLARK, MOFFET, BALCH.
MAXIMUM SPEED: 37 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 375 FT., BEAM 37 FT., DRAFT 10 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 1,850 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 650 TONS.

ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 8 X 5" (38), IN 4 TWIN MOUNTS.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: THE FIVE-INCHES.
TORPEDOES: 8 TUBES, IN 2 QUADRUPLE ROTATING MOUNTS.

MAHAN CLASS DESTROYERS

マハン級

KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: MAHAN, CUMMINGS, DRAYTON, LAMSON, FLUSSER, REID, CASE, CONYNGHAM, SHAW, CUSHING, PERKINS, SMITH, PRESTON.
MAXIMUM SPEED: 36 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 335 FT., BEAM 35 FT., DRAFT 10 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 1,500 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 550 TONS.

ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 4 X 5" (38), IN 4 SINGLE MOUNTS.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: THE FIVE-INCHES.
TORPEDOES: 12 TUBES, IN 3 QUADRUPLE ROTATING MOUNTS.



Similar in capability to the *Farraguts,* though with one less gun and four more torpedoes.

グリッドリー／ベナム級

GRIDLEY AND BENHAM CLASS DESTROYERS



Otherwise similar to the *Mahans,* the *Gridleys* are notable for their large number of torpedoes. Note that these are the first U.S. destroyers with dedicated antiaircraft weaponry.

KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: GRIDLEY, CRAVEN, BAGLEY, BLUE, HELM, MUGFORD, RALPH TALBOT, HENLEY, PATTERSON, JARVIS, BENHAM, ELLET, LANG, MCCALL, MAURY, MAYRANT, TRIPPE, RHIND, ROWAN, STACK, STERETT, WILSON.
MAXIMUM SPEED: 36 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 335 FT., BEAM 36 FT., DRAFT 10 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 1,500 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 550 TONS.

ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 4 X 5″ (38), IN 4 SINGLE MOUNTS.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: THE FIVE-INCHES, PLUS 4 X 1.1″ AA.
TORPEDOES: 16 TUBES, IN 4 QUADRUPLE ROTATING MOUNTS.

SIMS CLASS DESTROYERS

シムズ級

KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS: HUGHES, ANDERSON, MUSTIN, RUSSELL, O'BRIEN, WALKE, MORRIS, ROE, WAINWRIGHT, BUCK.
MAXIMUM SPEED: 38 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 345 FT., BEAM 36 FT., DRAFT 10 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 1,570 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 500 TONS.

ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 5 X 5" (38), IN 5 SINGLE MOUNTS.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: THE FIVE-INCHES, PLUS 4 X 1.1" AA.
TORPEDOES: 12 TUBES, IN 3 QUADRUPLE ROTATING MOUNTS.



This improvement on the *Benham* class sacrifices one torpedo mount for an additional gun mount, and has more powerful engines enabling it to make as much as 38 knots.

ベンソン級

BENSON CLASS DESTROYERS



The *Benson* class was designed for sea control rather than fleet support, with an emphasis on antisubmarine weapons at the expense of torpedoes. This class is currently being built in great numbers in American shipyards.

KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS (PARTIAL): BENSON, MAYO, MADISON, LANSDALE, LAFFEY, WOODWORTH, FARENHOLT, BAILEY, MEADE, MURPHY, PARKER, COGHLAN, FRAZIER, KEARNY, GWIN, MEREDITH, GRAYSON, AARON WARD, BUCHANAN, DUNCAN, LANSDOWNE, LARDNER, MCCALLA.
MAXIMUM SPEED: 37 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 345 FT., BEAM 36 FT., DRAFT 10 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 1,620 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 500 TONS.

ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 4 X 5" (38), IN 4 SINGLE MOUNTS.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: THE FIVE-INCHES, PLUS MACHINE GUNS.
TORPEDOES: 5 TUBES, IN A QUINTUPLE ROTATING MOUNT.

FLETCHER CLASS DESTROYERS

フレッチャー級

KNOWN CLASS MEMBERS (PARTIAL): FLETCHER, RADFORD, JENKINS, LA VALLETTE, NICHOLAS, O'BANNON, CHEVALIER, SAUFLEY, WALLER, STRONG, TAYLOR, DE HAVEN, STANLY, PHILIP, RENSHAW, CONWAY, CONY, CONVERSE, EATON, FOOTE, SPENCE, TERRY, CHARLES AUSBURNE, CLAXTON, DYSON.
MAXIMUM SPEED: 37 KNOTS.
DIMENSIONS: LENGTH 370 FT., BEAM 39 FT., DRAFT 18 FT.
DISPLACEMENT: 2,050 TONS.
FUEL CAPACITY: 550 TONS.

ARMAMENT
PRIMARY BATTERY: 5 X 5" (38), IN 5 SINGLE MOUNTS.
ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERY: THE FIVE-INCHES, PLUS 8 X 20 MM AA.
TORPEDOES: 10 TUBES, IN 2 QUINTUPLE ROTATING MOUNTS.



At over 2,000 tons, these are the largest American destroyers ever built, and perhaps the most capable. They are very well-armed, and flexible enough to handle a variety of roles.

AFTER-ACTION REPORTS

事後報告

THIS SECTION CONSISTS OF SUMMARIES OF AFTER-ACTION REPORTS FROM EIGHT BATTLES BETWEEN SHIPS OF THE IMPERIAL NAVY AND THE AMERICAN NAVY. ALL WERE NIGHT ACTIONS THAT TOOK PLACE IN THE SOLOMONS ISLANDS. AS FURTHER SUCH ENGAGEMENTS CAN BE EXPECTED, ALL OFFICERS ARE ADVISED TO ACQUAINT THEMSELVES WITH THE RESULTS OF THESE BATTLES SO THAT THEY MAY LEARN FROM WHAT HAS GONE BEFORE.

THOUGH EVERY EFFORT HAS BEEN MADE TO ENSURE ACCURACY, INFORMATION ABOUT RESULTS ON OUR SIDE IS NECESSARILY MORE ACCURATE THAT WHAT WE KNOW OF AMERICAN LOSSES.

ソボ島 FIRST BATTLE OF THE SOLOMON SEA: AFTER-ACTION REPORT (BATTLE OF SAVO ISLAND)

DATE: 9 AUGUST 1942
LOCATION: SOUTH AND EAST OF SAVO ISLAND, SOLOMON ISLANDS

IJN FORCES:

CA Chokai (flag)	CA Kinugasa
CA Aoba	CL Tenryu
CA Furutaka	CL Yubari
CA Kako	DD Yunagi

Situation and Intelligence:

Shortly after receiving news of the dawn invasion of Guadalcanal and Tulagi on 7 August, Admiral Mikawa in Rabaul ordered cruisers *Aoba, Furutaka, Kako,* and *Kinugasa* to join his flagship *Chokai* for a planned night attack on the invaders. At the insistence of their commander, light cruisers *Tenryu* and *Yubari* were added to the Striking Force, as well as the aging *Yubari,* the only available destroyer. *Chokai* sortied Rabaul at 1430 on the 7th.

As the Striking Force steamed south on the 8th, the *Aoba's* floatplane was sent ahead on a scouting mission. It described the American landing force, and reported an escort of one battleship, six cruisers, and nineteen destroyers. Mikawa continued on course down the Slot, deviating only long enough to deceive two American observation planes.

At 2100, as the Striking Force neared Guadalcanal, Mikawa received word from the Air Force of a successful raid that had sunk three cruisers, two destroyers, and several transports. Heartened by this news, he prepared his task group for the attack.

Disposition of Forces:

The Striking Force assumed a column formation, led by the admiral's flagship, *Chokai*. Admiral Mikawa elected to place the light cruisers and the destroyer at the end of the column because they were not used to working with the ships of Cruiser Division 6, and he did not want them to go astray and cause confusion among the bigger ships. In this line formation the Striking Force evaded the American picket cruisers west of Savo Island and entered Savo Sound in the mist south of the island.

Shortly after 2300, four of the cruisers had launched their floatplanes, and these provided intelligence of the American ships southeast of Savo Island. The Striking Force evaded the American picket cruisers west of Savo Island and entered Savo Sound in the mist south of the island, heading for the American cruisers which they knew were beyond. As the Striking Force rounded the southern curve of Savo, a brief gap in the low clouds enabled our sharp-eyed lookouts to spot another group of American ships to the northeast.

Action Report:

At 0142 the *Chokai* emerged from the mist less than 5,000 yards from a line of American cruisers fine off the starboard bow. She opened fire immediately, and the cruisers behind her followed suit, adding torpedoes to the gunfire. The lead enemy cruiser was quickly set afire and left in a sinking condition. The second cruiser replied ineffectively, received an obvious torpedo hit, and then left the battle. Their destroyers dueled briefly with our light cruisers before prudently withdrawing. The southern group of American warships was thus eliminated in less than eight minutes.

The Striking Force now turned toward the north, but it accidentally divided in two when *Furutaka* veered to port to avoid a disabled American cruiser and ended up leading *Tenryu* and *Yubari* on a course due north. The leading cruisers continued on a course to the northeast, with the result that our two cruiser groups bracketed the American northern force, who seeemed unaware of our ships' presence until our searchlights were turned on them at 0150. The American cruisers reacted slowly at first under the onslaught of our gunfire and torpedoes, but with great courage, particularly the lead cruiser which, though burning and battered from multiple hits, charged the *Chokai* with forward guns blazing. The *Chokai* suffered some painful damage during this encounter. However, after 20 minutes all the American cruisers were out of action and sinking.

The Striking Force continued northwest around Savo Island, where they disabled one of the American picket destroyers. The force was now in disarray, with half of its torpedoes expended; by the time the group could be reformed dawn would be on its way, with the inevitable American air attack. Consequently, Admiral Mikawa decided to accept the victory he had received and retire north to safety.

Results:

The Imperial Japanese Navy won a glorious victory over its foes, sinking five cruisers (two British, three American). In return, the *Chokai* suffered moderate damage, while our other ships were damaged only slightly, if at all.

It is regrettable that Admiral Mikawa was not able to attack the transports, which were the original target of the attack. A great opportunity may have been missed here. It is likewise regrettable that cruiser *Kako* was torpedoed and sunk by an American submarine during its return to base, but this was only a very indirect result of the battle, which otherwise must be considered a great triumph.

BATTLE OF CAPE ESPERANCE: AFTER-ACTION REPORT

エスペランス岬

DATE: 11-12 OCTOBER, 1942.
LOCATION: WEST OF SAVO ISLAND, SOLOMON ISLANDS

IJN FORCES:

Bombardment Group:
CA Aoba (flag)
CA Furutaka
CA Kinugasa
DD Fubuki
DD Hatsuyuki

Reinforcement Group:
CVS Nisshin
CVS Chitose
DD Asagumo
DD Natsugumo
DD Yamagumo
DD Murakumo
DD Shirayuki
DD Akizuki

Situation and Intelligence:

Two missions were planned for the night of 11-12 October: a major reinforcement group was to land troops and artillery on Guadalcanal starting early in the night, while a bombardment group was to arrive at midnight and devastate the American planes at Henderson Field. No American warships were reported in the area, and it was assumed that the United States Navy would not dare to challenge us.

Disposition of Forces:

Protected by the 11th Air Fleet, the Reinforcement Group arrived on time without mishap and began unloading troops and supplies. Meanwhile the Bombardment Group proceeded confidently down "The Slot," maintaining a prudent "T" formation: three heavy cruisers in a central column, with the lead cruiser flanked by the destroyers.

Action Report:

At 2343, as the group proceeded southeast several miles west of Savo Island, lookouts reported ships visible ahead. Assuming these were elements of the Reinforcement Group, Admiral Goto ordered his ships to flash their recognition lights. The ships, American cruisers, responded by opening fire on Goto's flagship, the *Aoba,* at 2346.

Not expecting to meet American warships in these waters, our ships were rather slow in returning fire. As they had obviously fallen into a trap, all ships began an immediate retirement. *Aoba, Furutaka,* and *Fubuki* turned to starboard, while *Kinugasa* and *Hatsuyuki* turned to port. Unfortunately, the American cruiser line was "crossing the T" from port to starboard, so the *Aoba, Furutaka,* and *Fubuki* suffered heavily. All three caught fire; the *Fubuki* sank.

The *Kinugasa* and *Hatsuyuki* encountered a lone American destroyer, sank her, and continued their turn to the northwest, supporting the rest of the group with torpedoes and long-range fire. Meanwhile the *Aoba,* heavily damaged, retired to the north, while the *Furutaka* covered her retreat, damaging and possibly sinking one or two American cruisers. At 0020 the Americans, having received enough punishment, gave up the pursuit.

Results:

The Americans failed to damage the *Kinugasa* and *Hatsuyuki* at all. The *Fubuki* was sunk by massed cruiser fire, but the *Aoba,* though heavily damaged, was heroically conned back to safety at our base in the Shortlands. The *Furutaka,* unfortunately, succumbed to the wounds she received defending the flagship; she lost power, flooded and sank less than 25 miles from Savo Island. In addition, two destroyers detached from the Reinforcement Group to aid the survivors of the Bombardment Group, the *Natsugumo* and *Murakumo,* were attacked and sunk the following morning by planes from Henderson Field.

The Americans definitely lost one destroyer, and perhaps as many as two cruisers. However, this cannot be regarded as adequate compensation for the loss of the *Furutaka* and three destroyers, plus damage to the *Aoba* sufficient to keep her out of the war for an extended period. In addition, the bombardment mission was turned back and Henderson Field was not suppressed. In this case, it appears fortune smiled upon our enemy.

ガダルカナル1

THIRD BATTLE OF THE SOLOMON SEA (I): AFTER-ACTION REPORT
[NAVAL BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL (I)]

DATE: 13 NOVEMBER, 1942.
LOCATION: EAST AND SOUTH OF SAVO ISLAND, SOLOMON ISLANDS

IJN FORCES:

DD Yudachi
DD Harusame
CL Nagara
BB Hiei (flag)
BB Kirishima
DD Inazuma
DD Akatsuki
DD Ikazuchi
DD Yukikaze
DD Amatsukaze
DD Teruzuki
DD Asagumo
DD Murasame
DD Samidare

Situation and Intelligence:

A large force of transports and escort destroyers was gathered in Shortland harbor preparatory to sending a large convoy of troops and supplies to Guadalcanal. To support this movement, and to suppress American aircraft that might harass the convoy, Rear Admiral Hiroaki Abe was given the mission of bombarding Henderson Field with Battleship Division 11, escorted by Destroyer Squadrons 4 and 10.

Meanwhile, an American convoy arrived at Guadalcanal to deliver reinforcements and supplies to the enemy. These were attacked by the 11th Air Fleet, and damaged to the extent that our command assumed the American ships would retire in the face of our approaching Bombardment Group. The Bombardment Group shaped a course that would bring them to Guadalcanal opposite Henderson Field after midnight.

Disposition of Forces:

Destroyer Squadron 10 (*Nagara, Akatsuki, Ikazuchi, Inazuma, Amatsukaze, Yukikaze, Teruzuki*) was arranged in echelon around the battleships, while Destroyer Squadron 4 (*Asagumo, Harusame, Murasame, Yudachi, Samidare*) was sent ahead of the main body to reconnoiter. In addition, three destroyers (*Shigure, Yugure, Shiratsuyu*) were detailed to picket duty, guarding the southern flank by covering the approach between Guadalcanal and the Russell Islands.

In the final approach down the Slot, the Bombardment Group passed through a line of very dense rainstorms. Visibility was virtually nil, and while maneuvering in the rain the formations became quite jumbled. When they came out of the rain near Savo Island, two of the forward reconnaissance destroyers were barely ahead of the main body, and the other three were actually *behind* it. Thus Admiral Abe lacked advance warning of the American task group waiting in Savo Sound.

Action Report:

At 0130 the Bombardment Group was proceeding southwest into Savo Sound, heading for Lunga Point. With no expectation of encountering American warships, Admiral Abe ordered, "Gun battle. Target airfield," and the battleships began loading their big guns with special non-armor-piercing bombardment ammunition.

A few minutes later *Yudachi* and *Harusame* reported enemy ships off the starboard bow, toward Lunga Point, and shortly thereafter lookouts on *Hiei,* the flagship, also reported enemy ships 9,000 yards to the southeast. Admiral Abe directed that the battleships change to armor-piercing ammunition, ordered a change of course to 80° (east). By this time *Yudachi* and *Harusame* were already passing the lead American destroyers.

Admiral Abe ordered the American ships illuminated by searchlights; at 0148 the *Hiei* and *Akatsuki* lit up the first cruiser in the American line. It was suddenly clear that, through some miscalculation, our formation and the American formation were about to pass through each other at pointblank range. Our ships immediately opened fire on the illuminated targets.

The American cruiser took both H*iei* and *Akatsuki* under fire, but our ships replied, targeting with great accuracy, and *Akatsuki* launched torpedoes, one of which struck the cruiser and almost destroyed it. It was forced to leave the battle, and our ships turned their attention to other targets.

As the American line drove into our own, it became very difficult to maintain formation. The battle lost all structure, and *Nagara* and her destroyers were forced into independent action against an equally disorganized enemy. Fortunately, our sailors' fighting spirit, superior training, and excellent torpedoes combined to inflict great punishment on the American ships. Unfortunately some of the American cruisers, shying away from confronting our mighty battleships, chose instead to vent their ire upon smaller opponents. Destroyers *Akatsuki* and *Yudachi* were sunk, and *Ikazuchi* and *Amatsukaze* heavily damaged.

Meanwhile our battleships *Hiei* and *Kirishima* wreaked havoc on every ship they turned their guns on. One after another the American cruisers were sunk or disabled, but not without taking some revenge. Almost every American ship focused its fire on our lead battleship, the *Hiei.* While their small-caliber shells could not penetrate the battleship's armor to damage its vitals, its upper works were raked with fire until they caught fire and collapsed, while one unlucky cruiser shell struck and disabled her rudder.

By 0120 the American formation was largely destroyed, but with our own ships in disarray, Admiral Abe dead, and the *Hiei* heavily damaged, Rear Admiral Kimura soon ordered a general withdrawal. Unfortunately, *Hiei's* rudder would not function properly, and the great ship was able to get only as far as the north shore of Savo Island. Admiral Kimura detailed several destroyers to stay and protect her while repairs were attempted. Sadly, repairs could not be completed before dawn, and with the day came repeated attacks by enemy planes from Henderson Field. After it became clear that she could not escape, the destroyers removed her crew and the *Hiei* was scuttled to prevent her falling into enemy hands.

Results:

The loss of the *Hiei* is a great tragedy, and she will be sorely missed in the months to come (as will brave *Akatsuki* and *Yudachi*). The *Hiei's* ultimate loss to aircraft from Henderson Field underscores the importance of the bombardment mission, converting the failure of the mission into an object lesson from which we can all learn. However, in our grief we must not forget that our ships destroyed almost the entire American formation, sinking or badly damaging five cruisers and half a dozen destroyers. This must be regarded as a great achievement.

ガダルカナル2

THIRD BATTLE OF THE SOLOMON SEA (II): AFTER-ACTION REPORT

[NAVAL BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL (II)]

DATE: 14-15 NOVEMBER, 1942.
LOCATION: SOUTH AND WEST OF SAVO ISLAND, SOLOMON ISLANDS

IJN FORCES:

BB Kirishima
CA Atago (flag)
CA Takao
CL Nagara
DD Shirayuki
DD Hatsuyuki
DD Teruzuki
DD Samidare
DD Inazuma
DD Asagumo
CL Sendai
DD Uranami
DD Shikinami
DD Ayanami

Situation and Intelligence:

The battle of 13 November, though it resulted in great loss to the American Navy, did not include a successful bombardment of Henderson Field, whose aircraft had to be suppressed to ensure the success of our Reinforcement Group convoy. Therefore, commitment of the convoy was delayed one day so that a new Bombardment Group could be organized under Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondo.

A cruiser bombardment group assaulted Henderson Field on the night of 13-14 November, and caused a great deal of damage, but did not decisively suppress the enemy air group stationed there. A much more powerful Bombardment Group, including battleship *Kirishima,* was created to precede the Reinforcement Group to Guadalcanal on the subesquent night, 14-15 November.

Unfortunately, the slow-moving Reinforcement Group was discovered by American reconnaissance planes as it made its way down the Slot, and it was repeatedly attacked by both carrier-based and Guadalcanal-based planes on the 14th. Almost half the transports were sunk or disabled but, realizing the gravity of the situation on Guadalcanal, it was determined to continue with the remaining ships.

Our own spotter planes discovered an American task group headed for Guadalcanal, reported to be two cruisers and four destroyers. These would be a problem for the Bombardment Group to deal with.

Disposition of Forces:

Knowing that American surface warships would be in the area, Admiral Kondo cannily divided his forces so that some could neutralize the Americans while the others performed the bombardment mission. The Bombardment Unit consisted of battleship *Kirishima,* heavy cruisers *Atago* and *Takao,* and destroyers *Teruzuki* and *Asagumo.* A Sweeping Unit was formed of light cruiser *Sendai* and destroyers *Uranami, Shikinami,* and *Ayanami,* while the Screening Unit consisted of light cruiser *Nagara* and destroyers *Shirayuki, Hatsuyuki, Samidare,* and *Inazuma.*

The Sweeping Unit was to travel ahead and sweep Savo Sound, determining the number and type of any enemy vessels found there. The Screening Unit's job was to foil all attempts to interfere with the Bombardment Unit, which would proceed to Lunga Point and destroy Henderson Field.

Action Report:

The Sweeping Unit entered Savo Sound north of Savo and proceeded down the east side of that island, all but destroyer *Ayanami,* which was sent in a loop around the west side of the island. Shortly after 2200, at very long range, they detected large enemy ships to the south of Savo Island heading west. The larger group, led by *Sendai,* stole toward the enemy for over an hour, until they were detected and the American ships opened fire (at 2317). Though they suffered no damage from the barrage, the volume of fire was impressive, so the Sweeping Unit made smoke and turned north to confuse the American gunners. The Americans stopped firing after our ships disappeared into the smoke.

Meanwhile the Sweeping Unit had been moving south to the west of Savo Island, followed by the Bombardment Unit. When the Americans, now south of the island, began firing at the Sweeping Unit, the Screening Unit moved to close with the enemy (led by detached destroyer *Ayanami,* which had swept around Savo to the west). The Americans continued west-northwest on a reciprocal course, and soon spotted *Ayanami.* They opened fire; *Ayanami* and the Screening Unit (led by *Nagara*) replied. Our ships were close in to Savo, with the island as a dark background, while the American ships were easily seen in the open waters of the passage; this, plus our traditionally accurate gunnery, ensured that our attack was far more effective. The American column was led by four destroyers that failed to deviate in either course or speed, so they were simply destroyed one after another by gunfire and accurate torpedo targeting. Heroic *Ayanami* attracted most of the American fire, and sacrificed herself so that the Screening Unit would remain intact and effective.

By 2345 the initial encounter with the Screening Unit was over, the columns having passed out of effective range. The Bombardment Unit now moved to attack the American column, turning west to parallel the American course. Having gotten ahead of the Americans, they then turned east again to bring their full broadsides to bear on the enemy. After closing to close range, at 2400 *Atago* and *Takao* illuminated the nearest American ship with searchlights.

To Admiral Kondo's surprise, it was not the heavy cruiser everyone expected, but a battleship. A fierce firefight immediately erupted between the enemy battleship, *Atago, Takao,* and *Kirishima,* which was the main target of the American big guns. The American battleship appeared to suffer a great deal of superstructure damage, caught fire, and eventually stopped shooting, but *Kirishima*, whose 14" guns were outmatched by the American's 16" weapons, also suffered greatly. After receiving several major hull hits, she lost speed and began flooding.

The Bombardment Unit reversed course again to follow the crippled American battleship, and shortly afterward they detected yet another battleship several miles ahead of the damaged vessel. (This second dreadnought may have played a part in the savaging of *Kirishima.*) Torpedoes were fired at the second battleship, but without success.

At this point Admiral Kondo was aware that our Reinforcement Group convoy was approaching the battle area from the northwest, so he canceled the bombardment mission and pursued the remaining American battleship, hoping to prevent it from engaging the convoy. In this he was successful, though Bombardment Unit was not able to bring the enemy battleship to a decisive engagement. By 0130 the pursuit phase of the battle was over.

Results:

Once again, a powerful American force was routed, with most of its ships sunk or heavily damaged. It grieves us, however, to report that mighty *Kirishima* succumbed to her wounds and sank west of Savo Island before dawn. *Ayanami* was also lost. Worst of all, as the bombardment mission was canceled, Henderson Field was unsuppressed, and in the morning numerous American planes arose to attack our unloading convoy. Apparently only a few of the troops and a small part of the supplies were landed successfully on Guadalcanal, a most regrettable ending to this noble effort.

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BATTLE OF LUNGA POINT: AFTER-ACTION REPORT
(BATTLE OF TASSAFARONGA)

DATE: 30 NOVEMBER, 1942.
LOCATION: BETWEEN SAVO ISLAND AND GUADALCANAL, SOLOMON ISLANDS

IJN FORCES:

DD Takanami	DD Makinami
DD Oyashio	DD Naganami (flag)
DD Kuroshio	DD Kawakaze
DD Kagero	DD Suzukaze

Situation and Intelligence:

After the failure of the transport convoy it was decided to resupply Guadalcanal by fast-moving destroyers which could drop drums of supplies over the side as they passed the shore. The first of these drum transportation missions was scheduled for 30 November. Admiral Tanaka's unit attempted to avoid discovery by taking a roundabout course that avoided the Slot, but they were nonetheless sighted by enemy observation aircraft on the morning of the 30th.

Disposition of Forces:

The Reinforcement Unit consisted of eight destroyers, six of which were loaded with supply drums to be dropped off. *Naganami* (the flagship) and *Takanami* were designated to screen the transportation destroyers.

The ships were arranged in column formation, and as they approached the drop-off point *Takanami* was placed as a picket about 3,000 yards off the port bow of the head of the column. After entering Savo Sound, the line sailed southeast along the Guadalcanal coast as the destroyers prepared to drop off their supply drums.

Action Report:

At 2312 *Takanami* reported enemy ships to the east, and shortly thereafter Admiral Tanaka ordered our ships to forego dropping the supply drums and attack the Americans. A standard torpedo attack was prepared as the American line drew closer. The Americans apparently fired no torpedoes, and commenced the attack with gunfire at 2320, concentrating on *Takanami.* This brave screening ship replied with her own guns, drawing the enemy fire while our other destroyers chose torpedo targets from the line of American cruisers and launched their Long Lances. Meanwhile *Naganami* came about and began laying a smoke screen.

As the American cruisers began to explode our destroyers turned and retired to the northwest into the smoke screen laid earlier by *Naganami.* The Americans did not choose to pursue.

Results:

Takanami, sadly, was a total loss, but as her death enabled our other ships to destroy four enemy cruisers, we can only commend her noble sacrifice. The reinforcement mission was canceled for that night, but we are sure the troops ashore would approve of the price the Americans paid for a temporary interruption of their supplies.

BATTLE OF KULA GULF: AFTER-ACTION REPORT

DATE: 5-6 JULY, 1943.
LOCATION: OFF THE NORTHEAST COAST OF KOLOMBANGARA, SOLOMON ISLANDS

IJN FORCES:

Support Unit:
DD Niizuki (flag)
DD Suzukaze
DD Tanikaze

First Transport Unit:
APD Mochizuki
APD Mikazuki
DD Hamakaze

Second Transport Unit:
DD Amagiri
DD Hatsuyuki
APD Nagatsuki
APD Satsuki

Situation and Intelligence:

Troops and supplies were needed by our forces defending Kolombangara, so a Reinforcement Group was formed under the command of Rear Admiral Akiyama. It consisted of seven destroyers and destroyer-transports, divided into two transportation groups and loaded with troops and supplies, and three destroyers in a Support Unit as escorts. Enemy warships had bombarded Vila the night before (5 July), and were known to be in the area, so our ships were alert and ready for trouble.

Disposition of Forces:

The Reinforcement Group had arrived in Kula Gulf without mishap. As First Transport Unit unloaded on the east coast of Kolombangara, Support Unit and Second Transport Unit came about and moved back up the Gulf toward the Slot. (It was planned to unload the second unit after the first unit was finished.) Both Support Unit and Second Transport Unit were traveling north in column formation, with about 5,000 yards between the groups.

Action Report:

At 0106 the fine new radar in *Niizuki* detected the approach of enemy ships. First Transport Unit was detached at this time, while Support Unit and Second Transport Unit continued to move confidently north toward the Slot. At about 0140, as Support Unit neared the opening of the Gulf, Second Transport Unit was ordered to turn about and head for Vila. The line of American ships continued to close until they were well within torpedo range. Support Unit had just completed torpedo target solutions when the Americans opened fire with numerous 6" guns at 0157.

Almost every shell went toward *Niizuki,* the leader, which was rapidly transformed into a blazing wreck. *Suzukaze* and *Tanikaze,* almost unscathed, calmly launched their torpedoes at the American cruisers (lit up by the continuous flashes of their guns), then retired to the west to reload. As the Americans came about one cruiser was hit by multiple torpedoes and almost immediately destroyed.

Second Transport Unit had turned about to join the battle and sparred inconclusively with the Americans from 0210 to 0230. *Amagiri* had a brief fight with American destroyers as she picked up *Niizuki's* survivors, as did *Mochizuki* a little later, but no serious damage was done on either side.

Results:

Once again our superior torpedo tactics are vindicated by the almost instant destruction of an American light cruiser. However, the rapid demolition of *Niizuki* is testament to the devastating rapid-fire capabilities of the American 6" gun, which is both fast and accurate. *Hatsuyuki* was also lost when she ran aground while maneuvering near Kolombangara, so this battle must be regarded as a draw.

BATTLE OF VELLA LAVELLA: AFTER-ACTION REPORT

DATE: 6-7 OCTOBER, 1943.
LOCATION: THE SLOT, NORTHWEST OF VELLA LAVELLA, SOLOMON ISLANDS

IJN FORCES:

Support Group:
DD Akigumo (flag)
DD Isokaze
DD Kazegumo
DD Yugumo
DD Shigure
DD Samidare

Transport Group:
APD Fumizuki
APD Matsukaze
APD Yunagi

Situation and Intelligence:

When it became necessary to withdraw our troops from the island of Vella Lavella, Rear Admiral Ijuin was assigned the task of bringing them out. The Americans were behaving very aggressively in nearby waters, so he formed a Transport Group of three APDs and a Support Group of six destroyers. An additional group of subchasers, small transports and boats was also organized.

Our ships were spotted by enemy observation planes as they passed the coast of Bougainville, so it was assumed that the enemy would be alerted as to their approach. It came as no surprise a few hours later when our own reconnaissance planes reported a group of four American cruisers and three destroyers steaming up the Slot on an intercept course.

Disposition of Forces:

The Support Group ranged out in front, in column formation, followed by the Transport Group, who were escorted by *Shigure* and *Samidare* (detached from the Support Group). The subchaser/boat group lagged behind, keeping a low profile. When the Americans (illuminated by flares from our observation planes) were observed approaching from the east, our APDs were ordered to retire from the scene and *Shigure* and *Samidare* moved to rejoin the Support Group.

Action Report:

The Americans were seen to be three ships, probably destroyers, closing from the east. The Support Group, on a northeast course to join up with *Shigure* and *Samidare,* turned to port until they were on a southerly course that would cross the "T" of the approaching American column. Unfortunately, Admiral Ijuin chose to have Support Group make a simultaneous turn to starboard, and then another to port. This was intended to put our ships in attack position, but the Americans having continued to close at high speed, it instead resulted in our ships' masking each others' fire so that only *Yugumo,* closest to the enemy, had a clear shot. At 2256 she launched torpedoes and opened fire, then bravely charged the American column. One of the American ships exploded from a torpedo hit, but then *Yugumo* suffered the full force of the Americans' wrath, taking both torpedo and shell hits. She and her American victim both began to sink.

The other three ships in the support group retired to the south under the cover of smoke. One of the American destroyers, on a northwest course, attacked *Shigure* and *Samidare,* who replied with a spread of torpedoes that hit their target at 2306. They then retired with the rest of Support Group.

Results:

It was a decided tactical victory for the Imperial Navy, trading one destroyer for at least two enemies. True, the transport APDs were forced to withdraw, but the subchaser/boat group, unnoticed by the Americans, stealthily loaded the Vella Lavella garrison and brought them safely out of the trap.

BATTLE OF EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY: AFTER-ACTION REPORT

エンプレス オーガスタ 湾

DATE: 2 NOVEMBER, 1943.
LOCATION: EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY, WEST COAST OF BOUGAINVILLE

IJN FORCES:

TOROKINA INTERCEPTION FORCE:

Cruiser Division 5:
CA Myoko (flag)
CA Haguro

Screen, Left Flank:
CL Sendai
DD Shigure
DD Samidare
DD Shiratsuyu

Screen, Right Flank:
CL Agano
DD Naganami
DD Hatsukaze
DD Wakatsuki

Situation and Intelligence:

On November 1 word was received of the American landings on Bougainville next to our positions on Cape Torokina. Rear Admiral Omori was ordered to escort several transports which would attempt a counter-landing, then attack the American transports off Cape Torokina. After a delay it was determined that our transports could not be readied in time to accompany him, so Omori was ordered to continue on his own to attack the American shipping.

An American cruiser force, which had bombarded Buka the night before, was known to be in the area, and the Torokina Interception Force was alerted to watch for them.

Disposition of Forces:

Admiral Omori arranged his forces in three parallel columns, heavy cruisers in the middle, with a destroyer division on each flank as a screen.

Action Report:

Admiral Omori's powerful force rushed south from Rabaul and headed straight for the landing area. The first brush with the enemy occurred at 0130 November 2 when an enemy plane appeared unexpectedly and dropped a single bomb on CA Hagu*ro,* inflicting hull damage and slowing her somewhat. Shortly thereafter an observation plane radioed news of an American force of one cruiser and three destroyers approaching from the south. Admiral Omori changed course slightly to intercept the enemy. However, an additional report of transports actively unloading on the shore of Empress Augusta Bay caused him to revert to his original destination at 0200 — such targets could not be overlooked.

At 0245 an observation plane dropped a flare ahead, illuminating enemy ships that were sighted by *Sendai.* The path to the landing area was blocked by an American task force. Admiral Omori ordered a simultaneous turn right. As they were completing this maneuver *Sendai* and her destroyers were already launching torpedoes at the enemy. But before our ships could reform the Americans opened fire.

As usual, American fire concentrated on the nearest target, the unfortunate *Sendai.* Destroyers *Samidare* and *Shiratsuyu,* trying to avoid the intense barrage falling on *Sendai,* collided while turning and were forced to withdraw from the battle. As much as they could, the left flank screen returned fire, but the American cruisers cravenly hid behind a smoke screen, which rendered our fire ineffective. The left flank screen was also harassed by a group of destroyers to the northeast.

A few minutes later the American cruisers reappeared and engaged our cruiser division and right flank screen, which had interpenetrated somewhat during the turn maneuvers. Their rapid-firing 6" guns soon found the range to our cruisers, and the water around *Myoko* and *Haguro* began to erupt. Once again there was a collision as one of our destroyers tried to dodge the shellfire: *Hatsukaze* was hit by *Myoko,* which ripped off part of her bow.

Our ships returned fire, using starshells to try to illuminate the enemy, but visibility was poor and the enemy continued to stand off and fire from ranges of 15,000 to 20,000 yards. This gave the Americans, with their radar, a decided advantage in targeting. Nonetheless, our superb gunnery was still able to inflict several damaging hits on our near-invisible opponents, and at least one destroyer was seen to succumb to a torpedo. After 20 minutes of ineffective long-range dueling, Admiral Omori bravely decided to attempt to improve the targeting odds by closing with the enemy. Accuracy appeared to improve, and several hits were clearly seen around 0325. The enemy ships then seemed to vanish into a pall of smoke. Though this was but a ruse on the part of our opponents, Admiral Omori took this to mean that the American cruisers were either sinking or retreating due to heavy damage. With half his destroyers and light cruisers sinking or crippled, he decided it was time to withdraw. All ships then retired to the northwest.

Results:

Admiral Omori's tactics were ineffective against an enemy who chose to stand off and fire by radar from outside comfortable torpedo range. *Hatsukaze* and *Sendai* were sunk, and *Samidare* and *Shiratsuyu* were damaged. Subsequent aerial reconnaissance indicated no severe damage to the American cruisers; the enemy may have lost one destroyer, but this cannot be confirmed. The transports in the landing zone were never threatened, and the American invasion was successful. This battle can only be regarded as a humiliating defeat.

IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY
INTELLIGENCE BUREAU

日本情報局

OFFICIAL NAVY PUBLICATION
COMBINED IDENTIFICATION MANUAL, U.S. NAVY

TASK FORCE 1942

SURFACE NAVAL ACTION IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC™

Technical Supplement for IBM & Compatible Computers

CONTENTS

Your *Task Force 1942* simulation game should contain a manual, an identification book, this technical supplement, five 3 1/2´´ disks or six 5 1/4´´ disks, a control summary card, a map of the Solomon Islands, and a backup disks order card.

REQUIRED EQUIPMENT

Computer: This program requires an IBM 386 or better, or a computer 100% compatible with one of these models. The computer must use an 80386 microprocessor or better. The machine must have at least 2 MB of RAM, and must be able to load DOS high in memory.

Display: This program requires a color monitor with an IBM MCGA or VGA graphics system. If you are using a compatible graphics card/monitor, it must be 100% compatible with one of the above (MCGA or VGA).

Controls: The game can be run entirely from keyboard, with mouse and keyboard, with joystick and keyboard, or with mouse, joystick, and keyboard.

Disk Drives: *Task Force 1942* must be loaded onto a hard disk.

DOS: You must have IBM PC-DOS or Microsoft MS-DOS, version 5.0 or higher.

Memory Requirements:

You must have at least 610 thousand bytes of conventional memory if using a sound driver and 600 thousand bytes of expanded memory to run *Task Force 1942*. If you do not have an EMS (expanded memory) driver installed, you have to make and use a boot disk, or consult your DOS 5 manual as to how to set up EMS in your system.

The following features appear in *Task Force 1942* only on systems with expanded memory:

Maximum-detail ship objects.
Maximum-detail land forms.
Maximum-detail topography on the charts.
The "Zoom Window" when magnifying the charts.
A larger variety and complexity of splash, explosion, and smoke graphics.

COPY PROTECTION

Task Force 1942 has no on-disk copy protection. This means you can install the game files from the original disks to a hard disk without the need to access the original disks. These files are normal in all respects, and should not cause problems when backing up, restoring, or optimizing a hard disk.

However, the program asks you a question to ensure ownership of the manuals (you are asked to identify a World War II warship, and must compare the onscreen illustration with the illustrations in the Identification Book). MicroProse regrets that continuing casual and organized software piracy requires that we maintain this minimal form of copy protection. We have done our best to design the copy protection to minimize intrusion upon the legitimate owners.

MICROPROSE
ENTERTAINMENT • SOFTWARE

INSTALLATION

Task Force 1942 includes an installation program that transfers the information from the original (distribution) disks onto a hard drive.

The program creates a directory titled "MPS" (if one already exists, the old one is used instead) and a subdirectory titled "TF1942." Finally, it creates a TF1942.BAT runtime batch file in the MPS directory. None of the other files are copy protected. They can be erased, moved, backed up and/or reinstalled. The files can't, however, be copied directly from the original disks; some have been compressed as a means to reduce the number of distribution disks.

To run the Install Program: place disk "1" in a floppy drive, type the letter of the drive and a colon (e.g., "A:"), followed by pressing the Return/Enter key. Follow the prompts.

One of the prompts asks if you would like to generate a boot disk; if you are having problems running the program due to limited memory, answer "Yes."

LOADING

1. Boot your machine: turn on your machine and wait until the ">" prompt appears. Make sure that you have DOS loaded high in memory. (You may wish to refer to your DOS 5 manual for an explanation of this process.) If necessary, boot with the boot disk made during the installation process.

2. Load Program: Go to the MPS directory with the "CD" DOS command. Normally, "CD\MPS" does this. Then type "TF1942" followed by "Return/Enter." The program will begin to load.

LOADING OPTIONS

The first time you load the program, it asks you certain questions, such as what type of sound you prefer. After you save this configuration, you are not required to answer the questions again; your configuration is automatically loaded when you load the program.

However, if you later want to modify the configuration, you must go to the MPS\TF1942 subdirectory and type "INSTALL" followed by "Return/Enter." This allows you to modify the configuration as desired.

SOUND OPTIONS

IBM Sound: This option supports the internal speaker standard on most IBM and compatible computers.

AdLib Sound: Use this option only if you have an AdLib sound board installed in your computer.

Sound Blaster: Use this option only if you have an Sound Blaster sound board installed in your computer.

Roland MT-32 Sound: Use this option only if you have a Roland MT-32 installed. This option uses more memory than other sound-card options.

No Sound: Use this option if you desire a quiet playing environment. This option uses the least memory space of all.

CONTROL OPTIONS

Keyboard: The keyboard can be utilized to control all game functions; the game does not require a mouse and/or joystick.

Mouse: This is optional in *Task Force 1942*. The system automatically detects the presence of a mouse driver; you do not select this as an option during "setup." Any Microsoft® compatible mouse is acceptable. All keyboard controls remain active.

Joystick: This is optional in *Task Force 1942*. All keyboard and mouse controls remain active.

MEMORY CONSIDERATIONS

Like many simulations, *Task Force 1942* requires large amounts of memory. You should never use certain types of TSR (terminate and stay resident) programs with *Task Force 1942*, programs such as notepads, network drivers, etc. The only acceptable TSRs for use with *Task Force 1942* are mouse drivers, EMS handlers, disk caches, and RAM disks.

If you have insufficient memory to run the simulation, you will get an "Out of Memory" message. Depending on your configuration, you may need to create alternate CONFIG.SYS and AUTOEXEC.BAT files that do not use the shell or disk cache and have the minimum number of files and/or buffers.

PROBLEMS?

The latest notes regarding this program and problems with "compatibles" can be found on disk, in an ASCII file named "READ.ME." You can read this file by using a text editor or standard DOS commands such as "TYPE READ.ME."

If the program does not load or run correctly, turn off your entire machine and restart it. Make sure DOS and *Task Force 1942* are the only programs loading into memory (except for mouse drivers, EMS handlers, disk caches, or RAM disks).

If you continue to have trouble, your copy may be bad; try reinstalling the original *Task Force 1942* disks; make a boot disk while you're at it, and use this disk to boot your computer "clean."

If the originals don't work, try installing the original *Task Force 1942* disks in another computer. If the disks work in another computer, then your computer has compatibility problems (i.e., some aspect is not entirely IBM compatible). You may also try a different machine speed, or a keyboard, or a sound option. Sometimes an alternate configuration works.

TECHNICAL SUPPORT

If the game continues to malfunction after booting clean, you may have a defective disk or compatibility problems. If you can, run the game on another computer; if it malfunctions there as well, try replacing the disks at the store where you bought the game. If problems persist, you should contact our Technical Support department.

Telephone: (410) 771-1151, 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. EST. Please have a pencil and paper handy when you call.

Fax: (410) 771-1174.

MicroProse BBS: See Onlinr Support Services.

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ONLINE SUPPORT SERVICES

MicroProse provides Upcoming News, Latest Versions, Updates, Product Demos, Reviews, Technical Support and more on the following Online Services for Modem Users. All are staffed by our Online Service Representative, Quentin Chaney.

MicroProse Bulletin Board Service (MPS*BBS)
(410) 785-1841, with settings of 8,N,1, and supports up to 14400 baud, 8 Lines, 24 a day 7 days a week.

America Online: Industry Connection,
Keyword: "MicroProse", Address: MicroProse

CompuServe: Game Publishers Forum,
Keyword: "Go GAMPUB", Address: 76004,2223

Delphi: GameSig, Address: MicroProse

Fidonet: MicroProse Conference, Node 1: 261/1153

GEnie: Scorpia RT, Keyword; "Scorpia", Address: MicroProse

Internet: Address: 76004.2223@CompuServe.Com

MCI Mail: Address: MicroProse

PC-Link: Computer Forum, Keyword: "MicroProse",
Address: MicroProse

Prodigy: "Game Club", Keyword: "MicroProse",
Address: XHFK15D

Promenade: Industry Connection, Keyword: "MicroProse",
Address: MicroProse

Q-Link: Computer Forum, MicroProse Section, Address: MPSLabs.

SUPPLEMENTARY GAME INFORMATION

FEATURE VARIATIONS

Due to the exigencies of software publishing, the manual goes to press before the software is finished, and as a result, certain feature descriptions in the manual are at variance with the finished software. That includes the following areas:

Gun Director Wide/Close-up Views. The manual states that when the player goes to the gun director, it appears first in the wide view. This plays easier if the close-up view appears first, so we changed it.

Gun Director ID Book: This now automatically appears when the player goes to the wide view. The book will identify only locked-on targets that are close enough for the lookouts to see them clearly; otherwise it will be turned to a blank page.

Gun Director: Red Targeting Arrows: These flashing red arrows on the viewfinder indicate which way you should adjust your aim in order to improve your chances of hitting your target.

Gun Director: Red Battery Lights: On the damage control screen, a red light next to a system means that it is destroyed and cannot be repaired, while a yellow light means the system is damaged. However, in the gun director a red light means a battery is destroyed *or damaged,* while a yellow light means the battery is reloading or cannot bear on the target. Thus, a red-lit battery may return to green if it was merely damaged and is later repaired.

Increased Time Rate: This returns to normal (1x) whenever you enter a new station. Otherwise you could forget that the time rate was increased and the game could run away from you.

Aola Base: The base of Aola on Guadalcanal is inactive unless the Americans lose Henderson Field, in which case they retreat to a new secondary base at Aola. From Aola the Americans can attempt to retake Henderson, then Tassafaronga, and thereby win the campaign. However, if the Japanese conquer Henderson, then Aola, they are the winners.

Tulagi and Shortlands: These bases have been deactivated in the final version. Though historically significant, in the context of this game they turned out to be an unnecessary complication.

Creating Task Forces: A task force may have only one task group with transports in it.

Air Search: A base can have no more than two air search missions active at a given time.

Variable Start Conditions for Historical Engagements. Time considerations forced the omission of this feature.

Simulated Encounter Setup: The ship-selection process has been streamlined. Point values of the two sides are displayed, but the player may now choose to create opposing units of greatly disparate power if desired. For greater control over the encounter situation, the player can now select both start location and task group destination (which determines the unit's heading at the start of the encounter). Time selection has also been streamlined.

FEATURE CLARIFICATIONS

Targeting Range: Though some large-caliber guns have very long ranges, effective targeting is limited to about 20,000 yards.

Ending Engagements: If you wish to end an engagement early (before one side's ships have all fled or been lost), you may do so by going to your ship's center bridge and pressing the ESC key. The computer will take a few moments to fight out the rest of the battle itself, then determine the victor.

If you end an engagement before there has been any significant combat between the two sides, the battle is completely aborted and no points are awarded.

Commanding a Task Group: Player Control/Admiral Control: Friendly task groups operate under (computer) admiral control until the player takes command. When the player first clicks on a friendly task group, a short Command Menu appears with only two options: *Take Command* and *Enter Flagship.* If the player chooses *Take Command,* the full Command Menu appears. From this point on, the task group admiral stops giving orders and the ships respond only to the player's commands (except in emergencies

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such as collision avoidance). To restore the task group to (computer) admiral control, select *(Admiral Name) Commands* from the Command Menu.

If you want to enter a ship in a task group without taking over task group command, click on the ship until the *Take Command* and *Enter Ship* menu appears. Select *Enter Ship,* and you will go to that ship's bridge. You can then command that individual ship's stations while the full task group is still taking commands from the task group admiral.

Sometimes when you are commanding a task group from the charts you will find that a ship or division does not behave as you expect, following your orders only temporarily or perhaps even ignoring them entirely. Please remember that your commanders are not mindless robots; they have their own ship's safety to consider, and if confronted with an emergency situation they may respond in a way contrary to your commands. Furthermore, sometimes they just make mistakes, particularly when a unit's fatigue level is high. Reluctant subordinates is just one of the many command and control problems of a combat admiral.

Guadalcanal Campaign: American Side. The Guadalcanal Campaign begins on August 7, 1942, with the American invasion force already unloading in Iron Bottom Sound. The American player will find that all of his or her ships are on a mission to Guadalcanal, and are already following preprogrammed mission orders. The transport group is on a supply mission, and is unloading troops and equipment off Lunga Point; the three escort task groups are on patrol missions, and are already patrolling the three entrances to Iron Bottom Sound. Except for plotting air searches, the American player will have little to do for the first few minutes of the game, and will probably want to increase the time rate to get past the unloading period. In short order the player's ships will return to Espíritu Santo, their mission done, or else the Japanese will attack. In either case, the player will have more than enough to do from that point on.

ADDITIONAL CREDITS

Quality Assurance for Original IBM version: Mike Rea, Dave Ellis, Chris Hewish, Bill Burton, Andy Mazurek, Mick Uhl, Brian Hellesen, Dave Ginsburg, Frank Brown, Mark Reis, Paul Murphy, Rawn Martin.

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Your Official Proof-of-Purchase is located on the reverse side.

The official proof-of-purchase is required when ordering a backup copy of your game, and when participating in most MicroProse promotions!

DETAILED CONTROLS

GENERAL CONTROLS

Move Cursor	ARROW keys, mouse or joystick
Move Cursor to Nearest Hot Spot	CTRL/ARROW key in desired direction
Make Selection	RETURN/ENTER key, left mouse button, or joystick button #1
Close Menu	ESC key, right mouse button, or joystick button #2
Scroll/Slide Screen	SHIFT/ARROW key in desired direction
Increase Time Rate (by one factor)	+ key (=)
Increase Time Rate to Max (8x)	SHIFT/+ key
Decrease Time Rate (by one factor)	- key (_)
Decrease Time Rate to Normal (1x)	SHIFT/- key
Pause	ALT/P key
Remove Pause	Any key
Quit to DOS	ALT/Q key
Save Game	F8
Restore Game	F9
Options Menu	F10
Sound On/Off	ALT/S key
Joystick Adjustment	ALT/J key

CHANGING STATIONS

To go to:	
Bridge	F1; if no menus open, ESC key, right mouse button, or joystick button #2
Charts	F2
Gun Director	F3
Observer View	F4
Torpedo Director	F5
Damage Control	F6
Binoculars	F7
Shift to Other Torpedo Mount	0 key , or SHIFT/ARROW key
Shift to Other Bridge Station	SHIFT/ARROW key in desired direction
Shift Gun Director: Wide/Close-up View	3 key

SHIP CONTROLS

Turn to Port, Gradually	< key (,)
Turn to Port, one point (22°)	SHIFT/< key (,)
Turn to Starboard, Gradually	> key (,)
Turn to Starboard, one point (22°)	SHIFT/> key (,)
Increase Speed Gradually	1 key
Increase Speed to 1/2 Max (Press again to increase speed to max)	SHIFT/1 key
Decrease Speed Gradually	2 key
Decrease Speed to 1/2 Max (Press again to decrease to full stop)	SHIFT/2 key

TARGETING AND VIEWING CONTROLS

Magnify (Zoom)	Z key
Decrease Magnification (Unzoom)	X key
Traverse View Left	LEFT ARROW key
Traverse View Right	RIGHT ARROW key
Traverse View, Fine Control	CTRL/LEFT or RIGHT ARROW
Traverse View to Next Cardinal Direction	SHIFT/ARROW in desired direction
Adjust Range Longer	UP ARROW key
Adjust Range Shorter	DOWN ARROW key
Adjust Range, Fine Control	CTRL/UP or DOWN ARROW
Director Targeting On/Off	SPACE BAR
Fire Weapon	RETURN/ENTER key, left mouse button, joystick button #1
Starshells, Load/Unload	8 key (*, or "star")
Searchlight at Current Target, On/Off	9 key
Shift to Other Torpedo Mount	0 key , or SHIFT/ARROW key
Shift Gun Director: Wide/Close-up View	3 key
Charts Scale Panel On/Off	Alt/K key

TASK FORCE 1942

SURFACE NAVAL ACTION IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC™

SOLOMON ISLANDS 1:250,000

For use by War and Navy Department Agencies only
Not for sale or distribution

WAR DEPARTMENT
CORPS OF ENGINEERS, U. S. ARMY

Advance edition
Subject to correction

NO. 1 GUADALCANAL & FLORIDA ISLANDS

Prepared under the Direction of the Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.
Map compiled and logical contours drawn from available data by 64th Engineer Top Co.; for Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Area Ph November, 1942.

LEGEND

Heavy Vegetation
Light Vegetation
Road
Trail
Shoal Waters
3-Fathoms
5-Fathoms
10-Fathoms
50-Fathoms
Danger Zone
Vegetation shown only in areas where photographic verification was available

T.M.S. XII

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SCALE 1:250,000

5 0 5 10 15 MILES
5 0 5 10 15 20 25 KILOMETERS
5000 0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 YARDS

CONTOUR INTERVAL 500 FEET

SOUTHERN NEW GUINEA ZONE GRID (Purple)

Projection: Lambert Conical Orthomorphic
Spheroid: Bessel
Origin: 8 S and 150 E
False Co-ordinates of Origin: 1,000,000 meters East, 1,000,000 meters North

NOTE: OFFICERS USING THIS MAP WILL MARK HEREON CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS WHICH COME TO THEIR ATTENTION AND MAIL DIRECT TO "THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, WASHINGTON, D. C."

437651

APPROXIMATE MEAN DECLINATION 1942, ANNUAL MAGNETIC CHANGE 7' DECREASE FOR CENTER OF SHEET

ARMY MAP SERVICE, U. S. ARMY, WASHINGTON, D. C., 1/1/1943

TO GIVE A GRID REFERENCE ON THIS SHEET
LETTER. Must be used for this sheet. Obtain from face of map or from diagram.
FIGURES. IGNORE the SMALLER figures printed near the sheet corners. These are for finding the full co-ordinates, viz. 802000
USE ONLY THE LARGER FIGURES PRINTED IN THE MARGIN OR ON THE FACE OF THE MAP, viz 900000

POINT PARINA — LETTERS YG

	East	North
Take West edge of square in which point lies, and read the figure printed opposite this line on North or South margin or on the line itself on the face of the map.	1	Take South edge of square in which point lies, and read the figure printed opposite this line on East or West margin or on the line itself on the face of the map. 1
Estimate tenths between lines	8	3
	East 18	North 13

REFERENCE YG1813 to nearest 1,000 metres

Unit	Map	Ground
Yards		12,960 Yards

NO. 1 GUADALCANAL & FLORIDA ISLANDS
S848-E159277113x132

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NAME	NAME
ADDRESS	ADDRESS
CITY STATE ZIP	CITY STATE ZIP
DAYTIME PHONE NUMBER ( )	

Method Of Payment

❑ Check or money order (Sorry no C.O.D.)

❑ American Express ❑ VISA ❑ MasterCard

Account Number

Expiration Date

Cardholder's Signature

Qty.	Item & Description	Logo Mdse. Size	Price	Total

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Top off any outfit with our midweight sweatshirt, perfectly balanced to be a force for fashion. Made of poly/cotton with a solid white body and sleeves, with heather yoke and panels. White/ash pencil stripe highlights sleeves. Two-color navy knit trim at neck, cuffs, and waistband. Imported.
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

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
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
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
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
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
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